

THE
PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

No. XVI.

ART. I.—GFRÖRER'S ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY.

Critical History of the Origin of Christianity; consisting of, Philo and the Alexandrian Theosophy; The Century of Salvation (Jahrhundert des Heils); The Sacred Legends (Heilige Sage); The Sanctuary and the Truth (Heiligthum und Wahrheit). In seven volumes. By A. Fr. Gfrörer, Professor and Librarian at Stuttgart.

DISSATISFACTION with the different critical systems which have one after the other professed to give a full account of the New Testament narratives, and dislike of the so-called orthodoxy which has arisen from investing the speculations of Schelling and Hegel with the terms of theology, induced the author of the work before us to attempt a thorough investigation of all existing documents which throw light upon the customs, habits of mind, and opinions of the men amongst whom the sacred records originated, and to endeavour by means of the materials so obtained, and in a spirit of pure historical criticism, to illustrate their true character. The result is contained in the seven volumes before us. The collection of materials, which is, as we think, far the most important part of the book, occupies the first four volumes; the three latter consist chiefly of criticism on the Gospels. As it is our wish to call attention to what appears to us a most valuable work, rather than to criticise its merits, we shall endeavour to give a short analysis of the whole, dwelling parti-

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cularly on those parts which relate to the Alexandrian Theosophy.

The first volume is occupied with a digest of the opinions of Philo, the Alexandrian Jew. These are derived from his own works, proved to have been written before the year A. D. 40, and consequently before Christianity could have made any great impression at Alexandria: which is important, as showing, what is indeed sufficiently obvious from the manner in which he writes, that nothing which he held in common with the Christians was borrowed from them. He appears to have been a man of birth and rank, and of considerable importance amongst his people in Egypt: he was on one special occasion chosen by them as their envoy and representative at the Court of Rome. But the bent of his mind was towards speculation, and he was deeply versed in all those various forms of philosophy and religious opinion which met and mingled in Alexandria, the great emporium for the thought as well as the trade of Europe and Asia. His intellect was not ill suited for his position. Collective and comparative, rather than original and penetrating, he seems to have taken kindly to all the systems presented to him, and to have endeavoured more or less successfully to unite and assimilate them. Hence a most miscellaneous assortment. From the distant East came the idea that God must exist in a state of purity and tranquillity, far from this changing and perishable world; from the same source was derived the cognate opinion of the impurity of matter, and the degradation which the soul suffers during its sojourn in the body; in other words, the doctrine that the flesh or matter is the origin of evil, with all its important consequences: from the Greek came the apprehension of the beauty of the Universe, the belief in its existence as a Divine whole, and the feeling that God must be perpetually living and working in it; from the Greek too, was, immediately at any rate, derived the Platonic doctrine of abstract Ideas, sometimes strangely modified by Jewish influences into personal beings; whilst, inconsistent as it may seem with some of these views, Philo retained the old Hebrew faith in the Divine personality of one God, and the intense national belief in His peculiar relation to the Jewish people, in His choice of them and special revelation of Himself to

them, and in His intention to exalt and glorify them at the expense of the other nations of the world. This mixture of opinions is matter of special interest to us, who live in a time when the elements of thought are no less various and discordant, when old theologies and philosophies of all ages and kinds are weltering in a seemingly hopeless chaos. Gfrörer tells us that he knows of no better historical parallel for the state of thought in modern Germany than the philosophy of Alexandria at the beginning of the Christian era.

Of all Philo's doctrines, the most characteristic as well as the most original, if any opinions of such a school can be called original, is that of the Logos. Upon this Gfrörer has spent more than usual trouble, supporting every statement by long quotations. This doctrine was no unnatural product of the endeavour to unite discordant theosophies. It was an attempt, and, as history proves, turned out the most important attempt ever made by speculation, to reconcile the different thoughts which men have had concerning God and the world; to wed the human with the Divine, the world with God, the finite with the Infinite, the transitory with the Imperishable. Though the solution of these questions enters more or less into all religious creeds, their difficulty was not strongly felt by men with whom one view of the character of the Divine Being prevailed to the comparative exclusion of others. The Oriental, whose Ideal was Purity and Tranquillity, could think of God as of a Being far removed from the world, with whom the purest of mankind alone hold a mystical and spiritual communion, without being anxious to attribute to him constant activity or the immediate management of earthly and material things. The Greek, with open sense for external nature, and ready wit and constant practice in all the business of social and political life, could remain content with the child-like worship of the numerous Deities in whom he personified the powers of nature and the qualities of men, or with the more abstract Pantheism of the latter schools, without feeling conscious of any chasm between the physical and the spiritual, and of the distance which disobedience to a moral Ruler places between man and God. With the Jews as a nation and as individuals these elements were in a great measure excluded by the intense

personality which was the ground-work of their religion. Each man felt his relation to God to be that of a weak and disobedient servant to a High and Holy Master, and this feeling dictated those sacred hymns and confessions beside which all other human utterances are feeble. The same element is as strongly, though less admirably, displayed in their belief of the relation of God to the Jewish nation and to mankind. He had, as one man with others, arbitrarily chosen to enter into a contract with them to do certain things for them at the expense of other nations, on their performing certain conditions. He had perpetually assisted them as he assisted no others, and had appeared in person to their national heroes; every event which affected them was attributed to His special interference. But the Jew had no room for the tranquil and meditative spiritualism of the East; and any attempt to comprehend and admire the order and harmony of the Universe by means of science or art was beyond his wants and powers—Law was lost in Will. These separate elements met for the first time on purely neutral ground in Alexandria under the tolerant and eclectic Ptolemies. This could not last long, especially in that age of criticism and comparison, without arousing men's consciousness to the fact, that the elements of their opinions were separated by vast chasms which required some effort of no common character to bridge over. If God was an invisible Spirit, how could He have appeared personally to the Jews? If His purity was liable to contamination and His tranquillity to disturbance by contact with the material world, how could He be working in the Laws and Powers which govern the Universe? Nay, how could they themselves be proper objects of wonder and admiration? If He in his spiritual Essence is pure, and if men from their contact with flesh and matter are necessarily impure, and yet as responsible servants are to be punished for their impurity, how are they to be pardoned and restored to communion with Him? If again He is simply a personal Being, and His mode of action arbitrary and undetermined, what room is there for Law and its exponent, Science? If He has chosen one nation and intends to aggrandize them at the expense of others, what place is left for a General Providential Government of the world? These and other similar difficulties are more or

less distinctly intimated in every page of Philo. Some of them have now lost their interest; others of them men still seek to solve, though any complete solution is, perhaps, beyond the reach of the human intellect. But this the Alexandrian Jews, like our modern German neighbours, would or could (for the growth of their system was probably gradual and unconscious) by no means admit; the elements were assumed to be true, and some means of reconciling them, some bond of union between them, must be discovered. Of all the different expedients invented for this purpose, the most important is the Logos. We cannot give a definition of this being; we hardly know whether to use a personal pronoun; Emanation, Power, Quality, Genius, Law, Idea, Reason, Providence, Angel, Personal Mediator, Viceroy of God, inferior God,—it is all these in turn. There is one idea and one only which is constant, viz., *the holding a middle place between God on the one hand, and Man and the World on the other*. But we must, in order to give any clear notion of Philo's views on the subject, follow Gfrörer a little more closely, taking first those notions which are abstract and impersonal, and proceeding through a mist of similes and allegories, to the distinct personification of the Logos.—(I. Philo, pp. 168—326.)

The Logos, with the epithet *νοητός*, is used as signifying the mind of God, which is the seat of the (Platonic) *Ideas*, after which, as after a pattern, the world and things in the world are framed.* Each of these *Ideas*, for which the word *λόγοι* is sometimes used, is a genus, and, as such, opposed and superior to species: *the λόγος* is called *γενικότατος*, the supreme or all-embracing Idea. So far

* The doctrine of ideas, in its original form, is much too abstract for the New Testament writers; traces of it are however to be found in Heb. viii. 2, 5, and ix. 8, 9, 11, 23, 24, which speak of the Mosaic ordinances as though framed after the pattern of heavenly realities. This is a gross rendering of the doctrine, such as might be expected from men as little versed in the subtleties of abstract speculation, as the generality of the Jews. That the doctrine should be applied to the institutions of Moses is not surprising, when we consider that these were regarded with much the same veneration as the laws of Creation (I. Philo, 64). The same doctrine, still more grossly rendered, probably gave rise to the notion of a heavenly Jerusalem. Gal. iv. 26; Heb. xii. 22; Rev. iii. 12, and xxi. 2, 10. That the idea of the existence in heaven of actual models of the things upon earth was a common one with the Jews, see II. Jahrhundert des Heils, 25.

the Logos is immaterial, spiritual and incomprehensible, and has no active functions. But it is also material, and has active work to do. In this latter sense it frequently has the epithet *προφορικός*, and is used indiscriminately with *ῥῆμα* ;* it is something which comes forth from God and is distinct from Him, bearing as it seems much the same relation to His mind that human speech bears to the mind of man. It is the instrument by which God made the world, *ὄργανον δι' οὗ ὁ κόσμος κατεσκευάσθη* :† and in this character it is sometimes spoken of as a distinct being, which produces species by imitating the Divine Ideas ; sometimes as the stamp or seal, (*σφραγίς*), with which God stamped and formed (*ἔτυπωσε, ἐμόρφωσε*) pre-existing matter. Again it is the divine Power indwelling in the world ; it puts on the world as a garment, pervades it, upholds it, is the bond of harmony, which keeps it together, and, finally, its law and order.‡ And this not only in the world of matter ; it is the providence which guides the fate of nations, the giver of all good things to men. Indeed, the special occupation of the Logos is with the noblest part of creation, man ; wisdom and goodness are its gifts. *Σοφία* itself, as we shall see, is but another name for it. The metaphors, if they are not something more, under which it is spoken of as imparting wisdom to men, are very striking. It is spiritual drink,§ under the form of the stream that watered Eden, or the spring from the rock of which the Israelites drank in the wilderness ;|| it is the manna, or spiritual bread.¶

* Compare Heb. xi. 3, and i. 3 ; in both of which *ῥῆμα* is used in the same sense as *λόγος* : in the latter it is the *ῥῆμα* of the Son, but this naturally arose from investing the *λόγος* with the distinct personality of Jesus : the influence proceeding from him received a name and character similar to those which had been attributed to the influence proceeding from God the Father.

† Compare John i. 3, 10 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; Col. i. 16 ; 2 Pet. iii. 5, 7 ; Heb. i. 2, 10, and xi. 3. In the last passage somewhat of the impersonal, emanating character of the Logos, so common in Philo and so rare in the New Testament, is traceable. In the others, though the work attributed to him is the same, the impersonal instrument has become a personal being.

‡ Compare Heb. i. 3 ; Col. i. 17. Here again it is only the effect, viz., upholding the world, that remains : the idea of Law and Power disappears.

§ Compare John iv. 10-14, vi. 35, vii. 37-39 ; Rev. xxii. 17.

|| Compare 1 Cor. x. 4. The rock itself, which is in this passage identified with Christ, is identified by Philo with *Σοφία*, another name for the Logos. See II. Philo, 220.

¶ Compare 1 Cor. x. 3 ; John vi. 31-35, 47-58. In the last passage the human personification of the Logos has caused the addition of a new form or image, viz., the eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ.

It is the country or home in which wise souls dwell;* the guide, the father of the wise; the husband† who sows the good seed of wisdom in the fruitful field of the soul; it is the unwritten law of truth which makes free (ἄφενδής νόμος, οὐ φθαρτός ἐν καρτιδίαις ἢ στήλαις ἄψυχος ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοία τυπωθείς).‡ It is moreover the source of goodness as well as wisdom. As the indwelling Reason it rules the senses and passions; it is frequently used indiscriminately with conscience (ἐλεγχος),§ which makes men aware of their sin, much in the same way as the Law with Paul (Rom. vii.); but having a wider operation, since it not only, like Paul's Law, brings death by the knowledge of sin, but, like Paul's Christ, restores to life by freeing from sin.

But Logos, though the most frequent, is not the only name by which Philo designates this being in the view of it which we have hitherto been considering, and which is confined to its more abstract and impersonal qualities. He frequently uses the word Wisdom (Σοφία) as a synonym.|| This title is Alexandrian, and probably much older and less Hellenistic than Logos.

There is also another name, Holy Spirit, πνεῦμα ἅγιον, seldom used, except where the text of the Septuagint has it, to which many of the ordinary predicates of the Logos are applied, with a turn that savours of a Hebrew origin. Thus the spirit (πνεῦμα) is the ordinary reasonable or spiritual part of man breathed into him at creation, according to Genesis ii. 7. It then becomes his reason, conscience, or spirit. But since most men give way to the flesh, the spirit does not dwell constantly and evenly with them. It becomes an intermitting, and consequently an

* Compare the passages in John in which union with Christ is spoken of as a dwelling in him.

† This image may possibly have some connection with the mystical relation between Christ and his church, in Eph. v. 23-32. Compare 1 Cor. xi. 3.

‡ Compare 2 Cor. iii. 3.

§ The character of the Logos as Reason or Conscience common to all humanity is almost too abstract and philosophical for the New Testament writers. It does, however, appear in John i. 9, though in the following verses and in other passages in John which bear traces of the same idea, it is confined to some following or belief in the person of Jesus.

|| Traces of this use of the word Σοφία are to be found in Luke xi. 49; Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35. See also 1 Cor. i. 24-30, in which Christ is called the Wisdom of God.

external and interfering power, and from this easily glides into the prophetic and miraculous Spirit, which is, both as to the individuals and the occasions it chooses, a supernatural influence acting upon rather than in and through man.*

We pass to the less abstract attributes of the Logos. Here, as elsewhere in this mystical philosophy, we have a large class of expressions of which it is very difficult to say whether they are meant as statements of facts, or as metaphors and similes. They are for the most part derived from passages in the Old Testament—First, from the office of the High Priest.† This is, considering the extreme veneration of the Jews for that office, the type which we should naturally expect would be most used for this purpose; and accordingly, the perversion of some parts of the Pentateuch which relate to the High Priest, for the purpose of making their allegorical interpretation suit the Logos, as well as the frequency and minuteness with which a similar meaning is given to the prescribed sacerdotal vestments and ceremonies, show that this application was commonly received in Alexandria. In these passages occur some remarkable expressions,—such as, *πρωτόνις* and *δημιουργός*, which seem to convey a distinct notion of per-

* These fluctuating meanings of this word are very much the same as those attributed to it in the New Testament: in which it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the all-pervading spirit which forms the reason of man; the spirit in and by which all believers live; and the spirit of miraculous gifts and prophecy. The writers themselves did not draw these distinctions with the analytical distinctness of modern theology.

There is another point in which the Logos, Wisdom, or Spirit of Philo, is very like the Holy Spirit of the New Testament, viz., in its half personal, half impersonal and pervading or Pantheistic character. It seems as though the native Jewish mind could not long endure abstractions, but always turned them into concrete persons. Even in Alexandria this was the case to a considerable extent; much more in Palestine. Hence the personification of the abstract qualities of the Logos. When this was completely effected by its incorporation, together with the office of the Messiah, in the person of Jesus Christ, it was impossible any longer to retain to any extent the Pantheistic or pervading element. Some element of the kind was, however, as in Christendom it has always been, absolutely required to satisfy one class of wants of the religious mind: hence the Holy Spirit took this part of the office of the Logos; whilst it afterwards again in turn itself received a dubious personality.

† It is scarcely necessary to notice how full the Epistle to the Hebrews is of comparisons between the High Priest and Jesus Christ. There they take the form of contrast, as was natural after the Logos had become identified with his person.

sonality. They turn out however, when compared with the context, to be little more than extremely bold metaphors. The second class of personifications is derived from the image of God mentioned in Genesis i. 27.* They had their origin in the Oriental or Platonic doctrine of Divine Ideas, or abstract types of the actual creation. Of these this image was one and the chief. In some passages the notion of an abstract idea prevails to the exclusion of personality, but in others the course of thought appears to be as follows:—Man exists really in his reason; this therefore is the part of him which was made after the pattern of the Divine Logos or image of God. But since the former is really man, the model on which he was made must be also man, that is, the ideal or generic man.† This is the man of whose creation Gen. i. 27 speaks; the second account in Gen. ii. referring to the actual Adam, who was made after the pattern of the other. Thus the Logos attains personal existence as the Ideal Man. He is contrasted with the actual Adam.‡ He is heavenly, made after the image of God, having no part in a substance corruptible, and altogether earthy (οὐράνιος, ἅτε κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγωνώς, φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γεώδους οὐσίας ἀμετόχος); whilst the human or earthly Adam was made of a handful of dust (ὁ δὲ γήινος, ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης ἣν χοῦν κέκληκεν ἐπάγη). Hence he is called the first and eldest born of created things, the first begotten Son of God§ (πρεσβύτατος τῶν γένεσιν λαβόντων—πρεσβύτατος υἱὸς Θεοῦ—πρωτόγονος υἱὸς). In the government of the

* Compare 2 Cor. iv. 4; Philipp. ii. 6; Coloss. i. 15; Heb. i. 3. See also John i. 18, xii. 45, xiv. 9.

† On comparing Rom. xiii. 14, and Gal. iii. 27, passages quite accordant with the general tenor of those parts of the New Testament which retain traces of the impersonal qualities of the Logos, with such passages as Eph. iv. 24, and Coloss. iii. 10, which are also quite in the general spirit of Paul's writings, it becomes clear that with him Christ was *the man κατ' εἰκόνην*, the *voûs*, or image of God.

‡ So Adam is contrasted with Christ, Rom. v. 12-21; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45-49. The former is indeed said to be first, but this has reference to the coming of Christ in the flesh, and also probably to the regeneration of each Christian.

§ So Coloss. i. 15, Christ is called *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*. See also vv. 16, 17; Rom. viii. 29; Heb. i. 6, v. 5; Rev. iii. 13, 14. "First born from the dead." Coloss. i. 18; Rev. i. 5, is an expression probably connected with the same idea. It is quite unnecessary to specify passages analogous in other respects to those quoted in the text.

world he is the Viceroy of God* (ὅς τὴν ἐπιμελείαν τῆς ἱεράς τάντης ἀγέλης, i. e. the universe, *ὅσα τις μεγάλου βασιλείως ὑπαρχος διαδέχεται*). Nay, he is so completely the representative of God upon earth, as to be styled more than once the second, or secondary, God (δεύτερος θεός). Further, he is a Mediator (μεθόριος), and this in several ways. He stands, like Aaron, between the dead and the living,—i. e., between the good and the bad,—and prevents the contagion extending from the one to the other. He goes, like the cloud, between the Egyptians, or the evil and carnal minded, and the Israelites, or the spiritual, as a protection to the latter and a punishment to the former. But his principal mediation is between the Creator and the creature. "God has," says Philo, "given to him the choice gift of standing as a mediator between the creature and its maker. He helps mortality to communicate with the incorruptible; he is an ambassador from the ruler to the subject. He rejoices in the gift, and glorifies it, saying, 'I stood in the midst between the Lord and you, being neither uncreated like God, nor created like you, but the mean betwixt the extremes, bordering on both; a pledge to God that creation shall not wholly rebel, to the creature that the merciful God will never forsake his own work. For I have to proclaim the tidings of peace from Him who can put an end to war, the peace-loving God.'" The passage is so important that we subjoin the somewhat fuller original:—Τῷ δὲ ἀρχαγγέλῳ καὶ πρεσβυτάτῳ λόγῳ δωρεὰν ἐξαίρετον ἔδωκεν ὁ τὰ ὅλα γεννήσας πατήρ, ἵνα μεθόριος στίς τὸ γενόμενον διακρίνῃ τοῦ πεποιηκóτος. Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἰκέτης μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ κηραινόντος αἰὲς πρὸς τὸ ἀφθαρτον, πρεσβευτὴς δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος πρὸς τὸ ὑπήκοον. Ἀγάλλεται δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ δωρεᾷ, καὶ σεμνυνόμενος αὐτὴν ἐκδιηγεῖται φάσκων. "Καὶ ἐγὼ εἰστίκειν ἀνὰ μέσον κυρίου καὶ ὑμῶν, οὔτε ἀγέννητος ὡς ὁ Θεός ὢν, οὔτε γεννητός ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἄκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων· παρὰ μὲν τῷ φυτεύσαντι, πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ μὴ σύμπαν ἀφηνίασαι ποτὲ καὶ ἀποστῆναι τὸ γένος, ἀκοσμίαν ἀντὶ κόσμου ἐλόμενον, παρὰ δὲ τῷ φύντι, πρὸς εὐελπιστίαν τοῦ μήποτε τὸν ἰλέων θεὸν περιῶδεῖν τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον.

* The same office is in the New Testament constantly ascribed to Christ; only that there it is most frequently spoken of as though Christ had obtained a victory over the world for God, and had been appointed his viceroy. See 1 Cor. xv. 27; Eph. i. 20, 22; Philip. ii. 9, 10, 11; Heb. i. passim, ii. 7, 8.

Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐπικηρυκέομαι τὰ εἰρηναῖα γένεσει παρὰ τοῦ καθερεῖν πολέμους ἰγνωκότες, εἰρηνοφύλακος αἰὲ θεοῦ.— (I. Philo, 274.) Further he is the Paraclete* (παράκλητος), who assists men in their prayers; the intercessor, and co-suppliant for the forgiveness of sins and abundant good gifts (παράκλητος τελειότατος πρὸς τε ἀμνηστειὰν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ χορηγίαν ἀφθονωτάτων ἀγαθῶν).

He has moreover frequently taken a visible form. We have seen that one of the great problems for the Alexandrian Jew was the reconciliation of his transcendental ideas concerning God with the personal and material theophanies of the Old Testament. Philo distinctly says that in all such cases it was the Logos who appeared as the Image of God, or the Second God; and as such was taken by men for God himself, whom whilst in the flesh they could not see. Thus also in the particular interpretations of many of these passages, and especially of those in which the words "Angel of the Lord," or "Word of the Lord," as well as words applicable to God himself, are used, the Logos is stated to be the being intended. He it was who formed the world out of matter; who appeared to Hagar; who destroyed Sodom; who stood at the head of Jacob's Ladder; who changed Jacob's name to Israel; who spoke with Moses from the burning bush; who rebuked Balaam; who was present in the manna and the rock, and more especially in the pillar of cloud; and who throughout guided the Israelites from Egypt into Canaan.† This last instance is of great importance, both because it illustrates one of the commonest topics of Alexandrian mysticism, in which Egypt signified the flesh, Canaan the spirit, and the Exodus conversion; and because it gives Philo images for the part which the Logos is to play in the last times, when, after the victories of the Messiah, who is to be a Jewish hero, it is to lead the favoured people out of captivity in triumph to their native land.

It only remains to notice that Melchisedek, and more frequently Moses and Aaron, are brought in as types and

* It is not a little remarkable that in John xiv. 16, where Jesus is speaking of his own departure, he says that the Father will send *another* Comforter; ἄλλον παράκλητον.

† Compare 1 Cor. x. 1-9.

symbols of the Logos. This is important as an illustration of the allusions to those persons in the Epistle to the Hebrews: though the less abstract and mystical character of the latter, and the complete human personification of the Logos in Christ, converts into a decided contrast what is in Philo a type or metaphor.

Such is the outline of the doctrine of the Logos in the form which it assumed in a mind disposed to abstract speculation, and not unskilled in logic. If the doctrine is still to be received, it must be on grounds similar to those of the Alexandrian Jews; for it is impossible, after reading Philo, to believe that, either in this shape or in the less abstract form which it wears in the New Testament, it was a direct Revelation from God, communicated for the first time to the followers of Jesus Christ.

The same spirit of eclecticism which rendered necessary the invention of the Logos pervades the whole of Philo's system, and we meet therefore at every turn with inconsistencies and difficulties and expedients for removing them, analogous in character to those above noticed. In no case is this more conspicuous than in his treatment of the Jewish Canon. Inspiration itself is ambiguous. At one time it is the special revelation of things unknown to man by an extraordinary supernatural power; at another it is only the strong voice of the indwelling Reason. There is however no doubt that Philo looked upon the whole of the Old Testament as specially and divinely inspired: he even thought that Divine assistance prompted the language of the Septuagint translation. But Moses is far above all other inspired writers. He was Mediator, Prophet, Priest, and King. He was admitted into the abstract and invisible world, and became acquainted with the ideas or realities after which, as models, and by which, as laws, the outward world is framed and governed. Hence his laws and writings contain the deepest truths; nay, all truth. Plato and all true philosophers derived what they knew from him. His words therefore must carry much more than their literal meaning, which is but the body, whilst the important part, the spirit, is to be found by those who have eyes to see it in a typical and allegorical representation of abstract and general truths. In other words, Philo and his school were compelled, if they would preserve the national

reverence for the Pentateuch, to read into it by means of allegory those parts of their system which its simple and literal meaning could not supply. This is done with great ingenuity and not without method. The literal signification is preserved, except in a few passages, relating for the most part to visible appearances of God ; but along with it comes the more important hidden meaning, the real substance, of which the other is but the shadow. Thus the Fall is the debasement of the spiritual part of man by means of fleshy lusts ; the begetting of Cain is the conception of worldly pride occasioned by the union of Adam or reason, with Eve or the senses ; Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are different states or dispositions of the human mind : Abraham's journey from Ur in the Chaldees signifies the relinquishment of trust in astrology and the powers of nature, and the acceptance of a belief in the guidance of the world by God ; the Exodus from Egypt is conversion from a worldly and carnal to a heavenly and spiritual life ; the Levitical ceremonies are all of them types of abstract realities. Still Philo clings, as he expressly tells us, to body as well as spirit, and defends the literal meaning of the text and an outward obedience of the Mosaic precepts against some of his contemporaries who more thoroughly carried out the allegorical principle, and professedly neglected all external observances. He was the orthodox mystic, not the Quaker, of Judaism.

On the subject of creation we find a double set of discrepancies. On the one hand there is the Mosaic cosmogony, on the other his philosophy, which again is inconsistent with itself. Sometimes it would appear as if the Mosaic account were to be taken literally ; more often all its facts are dissolved in allegory. The six days signify, not time, but the order and dignity of created things ; the creation of the first day are ideas or models ; the Adam created in Gen. i. is the ideal man or Logos—the Adam mentioned in Gen. ii. is the actual man Adam. There is however a still more important discrepancy in his philosophical opinions. In some places he appears to condemn in very strong terms those who would attribute to any part of the Universe an existence independent of God : whilst his general view certainly is that matter was pre-existent and self-existing, and that at Creation it was formed and

stamped, as it were with a die, by God, through the medium of the Logos. Hence the wide chasm between God and the world, and the attribution of all evil to the influence of matter, or, as regards man, of the flesh.

When he turns however from Creation to the existing Universe the scene is entirely changed. On this subject he is altogether Greek, and flies directly in the face of his theory concerning God and matter. The world is a beautiful and wonderful whole, composed on a system of *ὁμοιομέρεια*: each part requires the other, and each, man included, exists for the sake of the whole. Even inorganic nature is in its substance spiritual. The stars are different in character from any earthly beings; they are pure, immaterial, not capable, like mortals, of sin, and exercise influence over everything but the will of man: they are contained in the eight infolded spheres, each of which forms a string in the lyre on which the Universe sounds the praise of God. The whole world is perfect, eternal, and the real temple of the Almighty.

Of Angels we have frequent mention, but they, like their chief, the Logos, fluctuate between abstract qualities, laws, or powers, and personal spiritual beings. They appear, however, most frequently in the latter capacity; they are ministering servants of God, and are of like nature with the disembodied souls of men. The latter have sunk from their pure spiritual state into the flesh; there they either struggle upwards and get free from it at last, or they sink and become imbruted by sensualism. This is the lowest pitch of degradation. No evil spirits are mentioned by Philo.

In the account of man again the Mosaic accounts are at variance with Philo's own belief. Sometimes we are told, for the purpose of explaining the plural in Gen. i. 26, that God with the assistance of Angels created Adam, the former contributing the better part or spirit,—the latter the body; and hence the struggle and division in man's nature. But his own view no doubt was that the soul of man is an emanation from God, pre-existing, extended not divided, but free, and generally sinking into the flesh through its own choice and fault; sojourning there awhile, and, if faithful, returning at last to its heavenly home. In his analysis of man's nature, we find him at times

following Aristotle or Plato, whilst in other places he adopts the language of the Septuagint, makes the *ψυχή* the seat of animal or carnal life, and spiritualises the *πνεῦμα* in precisely the same manner as Paul. In his views of duty and virtue, whilst there is much which differs from, there is much that reminds us of, the New Testament. Partly owing to his own speculative character, partly to the circumstances of the time, active and practical social duties are little insisted on. A contemplative and ascetic subordination of the flesh to the spirit, and meditation upon God, seem to be his ideal. The qualities he praises are graces rather than active virtues. The principal are Repentance and Humility; Faith, which has Abraham as its constant example, and which fluctuates between a trust in the revealed promise of future national and individual prosperity, and a practical preference of conscience and reason to the pleasures of sense and the world; Hope; and above all, Love to God, necessarily accompanied by Love to man. External worship, although, as we have seen, necessary, is of little intrinsic value. Philo's very expressions on these subjects are familiar to us. Men see as in a glass darkly: beginners are fed as babes with milk: the good however know and dispense the mysteries of God; God takes of his own and shows it them: they are known of Him; some have so brought the flesh into subjection, that they can before death be wrapt out of the body and be lost in God.

It remains only to notice Philo's opinions concerning Providence and its dealings with mankind in general and with the Jews in particular. We find in him precisely the same arguments in favour of a general Providence, with the same difficulties and the same more or less successful solutions, the same discussions on the origin of evil and the inequalities and apparent injustice of human fortune, as are current in our own time. But side by side with this, and ill reconciled with it by the utmost efforts of Philo's ingenuity, is his account of the special destiny reserved by God for the Jews, and of their future trials and their ultimate triumph over other nations, conceived in the most thoroughly exclusive Jewish spirit, and clothed in forms and images drawn from the Pentateuch.

Such is a mere outline of Philo's doctrines: but we

should give a false impression of the man, if we left it to be supposed that there is nothing in him but inconsistency and ingenuity. He tries to reconcile too much; but his language is forcible and eloquent, and he has a tolerant and kindly spirit, a keen eye and delicate feeling for what is really good in the different systems from which he compiles his own. Take for example the following passage from a comment on the reply made to Joseph by his brethren, containing a statement of one of the most important truths which Christianity has impressed on the world:—

“ ‘We are all one man’s sons.’ How striking is the deep meaning of this passage! ‘We are all one man’s sons, and therefore men of peace.’ Yes indeed! how could you do otherwise than hate war and love peace, being the children of one Eternal Father? For those who believe our race to have sprung from different sources, and accept the falsehoods of Polytheism, are envious of one another, and stir up strife at home and abroad, so that their life is spent in savage and treacherous wars. But they who acknowledge one source of being, and one Father, live a calm and peaceful life in the love of harmonious virtues.”

We wish there were more room for quotation; as it is, we must quit Philo with the remark that it would not be difficult to point out men who fill a very analogous position in our present world of thought; men of some talent for speculation, of wide sympathies, of great knowledge, ingenuity, and powers of expression, conservative in feeling, loving the past and desirous to retain whatever can be retained; but whom these last motives, pushed to the extreme, coupled with some want of clearness of intellect, or of moral decision, perhaps with some desire to see deeper into an insoluble problem than other people, induce to clothe new things with old names, to patch and eke out and explain what is really inconsistent and unintelligible, and to adopt as the conclusions of reason that which was only credible on the hypothesis of its being dictated by a competent authority, or supported by irrefragable external evidence.

The second volume is occupied with an endeavour to trace the doctrines which are so fully developed in Philo in other authors and in widely-extended sects; the object being to prove that these doctrines were not peculiar to

Philo, but were widely received with various modifications both in Egypt and in Palestine. The sources are not numerous. The Septuagint, The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Sirach, the Second and Third Book of Maccabees, Aristeas, Aristobulus, some of the Sibylline Prophecies, the Fourth Book of Maccabees, and finally the Wisdom of Solomon, constitute however a class of writings extending over a period of about 250 years before the Christian era, in which the main point of the Alexandrian system,—viz., the invisibility of God and his total separation from the world, and the consequent doctrine of the unholy nature and inherent evil of matter, or, when applied to man, of the flesh, with a number of minor opinions and forms of thought and expression,—are more or less distinctly contained. In the last of these works the Logos of Philo, under the name of Wisdom, plays a most prominent part. Amongst the Therapeutæ, a sect of Jewish Egyptian ascetics, with whom Philo appears to have had some connection, these doctrines appear to have held unlimited sway, and by their means to have been transplanted into Palestine with the Essenes, who were no doubt a Jewish branch of the same sect. The intimate connection of the early Christian Church with the Essenes has been frequently urged, and is made out in a manner that admits of no reply by Gfrörer in his last volume (*“Heiligthum und Wahrheit,”* p. 355—384). There was moreover, as we know from 2 John v. 7, in the times of the apostles, a Jewish sect, the Docetæ, who admitted the divine character of the Logos, as taught by the Christians, but denied his incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ; whilst from the early Fathers we learn that other Jewish sects held the doctrine of a self-incarnating Logos, and that this character was assumed by Simon Magus, and probably attributed to Elxai, a leader of a branch of the Essenes, by his followers. Hence, Gfrörer argues, we are fully justified in looking among the Theosophists of Egypt, and their followers, the mystics of Palestine, for an explanation of some of the doctrines and practices of the early church which are otherwise unintelligible. It is no doubt a most remarkable fact in support of this view, that the only Jewish teacher mentioned as tolerant to the Christians was Gamaliel; that this Gamaliel and his school, though too

great to be openly attacked, was suspected by the more strict of the Pharisaical party of want of orthodoxy on account of his teaching the wisdom of the Greeks (that is, the mixture of Grecian philosophy and Jewish theology which prevailed among the Jews of Alexandria); and that Paul, in whose teaching the doctrine of the Logos forms so important an element, was a pupil of this Gamaliel. (II. Philo, 402.)

The second part of Gfrörer's work, entitled "the Century of Salvation," contains an account of the more purely Jewish opinions and habits of thought which were prevalent in Palestine itself at the time of the rise of Christianity. Want of space forbids any attempt to give a systematic sketch of these, which must indeed, unless very full, afford a most imperfect idea of the subject in consequence of the very unsystematic character of Jewish thought. Nor have we sufficient knowledge of Rabbinical literature to be able to judge of the conclusiveness of the arguments adduced to prove the antiquity of the sources from which the materials for this part of the work are extracted. We can do no more than call attention to the statement of two or three important points, viz., that the same tendencies of the human mind which have produced different parties in Christendom produced analogous differences in Judaism; the Pharisees corresponding to the High Church party in their high value for the principle of authority, with its concomitants, rigid orthodoxy and externalism; the Sadducees resembling the rationalizing and intellectual of modern times; while the Essenes and the different sects connected with them constantly remind one of the Quakers and other mystical sects and parties among Christians: that a kind of Trinitarianism prevailed among the Jewish mystics (vol. i. ch. 4); that Predestination (vol. ii. p. 110) and the vicarious value of good works and of the death and sufferings of good men (vol. ii. p. 179) were received doctrines: that prophecies abounded concerning the Messiah and the end of all things, drawn chiefly from Moses and the Pentateuch, which throw the greatest light upon the most wonderful stories in the Synoptical Gospels; upon the last prophetic discourse of Christ; upon the first chapter of the acts; and upon the Apocalypse (vol. ii. ch. x.): and that, lastly, of all the fantastic notions concerning the universe which

ever entered into the mind of man, those which were taught in the later Jewish schools were the most fantastic. The deep feeling of the personal relation of God to man had, with the learned class, degenerated into an intellectual *caput mortuum*, which found an answer to every question that could possibly be put upon any subject in the unlimited action of an arbitrary personal Being. Those who have been accustomed to see questions of evidence for miracles argued as if the Jewish mind eighteen hundred years ago was precisely of the same character as the scientific mind of Europe in the eighteenth century, will be astonished to find that sifting documentary evidence is but a small part of their task; they must do their utmost to transport themselves to the point of view from which the writers and actors themselves contemplated the facts they relate, and then, and not till then, can they judge of the character and value of their testimony.*

The next two volumes of Gfrörer's work, called "The Sacred Legends," are occupied with a criticism on the synoptical Gospels, and an endeavour to solve some of the questions as to their origin by reference to the information contained in the previous volumes. This perhaps is not carried out as completely as might have been expected considering the vast mass and variety of the materials collected. The criticism is however deep and searching, fair, and in many points satisfactory. Comparing it

* There are some observations in this part of the work on the fixity of Jewish character and opinion which we would at this time have gladly quoted. Gfrörer says (vol. i. 194-203,) that the only occasions on which any impressions from without have been made on Judaism, are those of the Babylonian captivity, in which the greater part of the nation acquired a fixed belief in a future state; the reigns of the Ptolemies, in which many of the numerous Jews settled in Alexandria received the theosophy of the far East and the philosophy of Greece; the short period of prosperity under Julian the Apostate, when the exclusive Jewish Institutions remaining in Palestine were nearly destroyed; and the period which has elapsed since the middle of the last century. In the three last instances unexampled toleration and countenance had been shown to the Jews by those in power, and in the two first instances periods of intolerance and persecution followed, which at once restored the exclusive spirit of Judaism. Hence Gfrörer argues that experience confirms what reason teaches, viz., that Judaism can only be destroyed by treating it in a spirit opposite to its own: that Jewish exclusiveness transported into Christianity has preserved Jewish Institutions by persecuting them; and that if the triumph of the Christian spirit is to be complete, its professors must totally abandon all relics of later Judaism, and especially the most distinctive feature, exclusiveness and intolerance.

with Strauss's *Leben Jesu* it may be said to have in view a different object, and to be far more interesting. The strained expedients of harmonizing commentators which Strauss has so thoroughly hunted down, Gfrörer passes by, and, assuming on these occasions the old view to be untenable, he endeavours to ascertain how much of what is told is founded on real events, and how much is to be attributed to the minds and media through which the stories have come. It is impossible here to give anything more than an outline of the conclusions to which this criticism leads; which are briefly these,—that we know nothing of the names or persons of the authors or compilers of the first three Gospels; that the Gospel of Luke is the oldest, and consists of a compilation made about the year A.D. 100 in Galilee from the stories then current there, which had down to that time existed in company with others, and for the most part in writing; that the Gospel of Matthew was a similar compilation, made in the same place at a little later period, more artificial in its construction, and containing more that is purely legendary; and that the Gospel of Mark is the result of a critical comparison of the two former, with the addition of one or two things from extraneous sources. The criticism on the Gospels is accompanied by one on the Acts of the Apostles, the first half of which Gfrörer considers to be of the same character as the synoptical Gospels. The latter half, containing an account, really historical in character, of a part of the life of Paul, he thinks was written by a companion shortly after his death, and adopted by the compiler of the whole book, who was the same person who compiled the Gospel which bears the name of Luke. These conclusions appear to be founded on good reasons, though we think that the author has in many places represented the results of his ingenious and sensible endeavours to entirely untwist the strands of these narratives as more certain than they really are, or than facts admit of their being made; and also that he is disposed, from his desire to exalt the Gospel of John, to underrate the moral and biographical value of the Synoptists. Whatever may be the difficulty of accurately distinguishing between what is really historical and what is legendary, there can be no doubt that these three narratives give an outline of a human life and

character which is sufficiently distinct to be the ideal and example for the noblest and best of mankind, and which in this respect there is the more reason to credit, since the qualities which make it to be so are precisely those which were least acceptable to the Jewish prejudices of the narrators.

We pass to what Gfrörer himself considers, though we do not agree with him, the most important part of his book, viz., his criticism on John's Gospel, contained in the last volume, to which he gives the name of "The Sanctuary and the Truth." He does not overlook many of the objections which have been urged to its genuineness and credibility. He admits, nay distinctly proves, that it could not have been written till long after the events which it relates; that it was written with a distinct object, which gives a colour to the whole; that the discourses could not have been uttered as given; that many of them must have been John's own productions, and that most of them, as well as many of the events narrated, especially of those mentioned as miraculous, were distorted by the mind of the writer so as to have entirely lost their true character. Still Gfrörer concludes that the Gospel was written by the Apostle John, the friend of Jesus, and that from it may be drawn a really historical view of the character of the latter. The chief arguments on which he relies are, briefly stated, as follows: the absence of those stories and discourses which in the Synoptists are most open to criticism and yet are quite consistent with John's own views, e. g. the Conception, the Birth in Bethlehem, the Temptation, the Transfiguration, the Miracles at the Crucifixion, the Ascension, and the Prophecies of the Last Resurrection and the Second Advent; the positive traces of the belief of the writer that Jesus was the Son of Joseph and was born at Nazareth; the chronological order in which the events are recorded, and the different successive journeys to and from Jerusalem; the obvious correctness of the chronology of the narrative of the passion week, and the consistent and intelligible account of the trial, with the opening given by the account of the death for a natural explanation of the Resurrection: the very remarkable way in which many events and speeches of Jesus are narrated, showing that whilst the writer is speaking of things which really hap-

pened in his presence, his own mind has, in consequence of subsequent events, attributed to them a totally different form and meaning from that which they really bore: the consistency of the account of Jesus' character, life, and conduct, as given by John, with the well-established fact that the Jewish, and not the Roman, governors were the real authors of his death; the mention of sayings in which Jesus attributes to his own future death the effect of strengthening the faith and spiritual character of his disciples, which is very different from the effect which John himself, in common with the other early Christians, attributed to it, viz., that of operating as an expiatory sin offering; the admission that the Baptist continued to hold a school separate from that of Jesus, which we know to have been the fact from Acts xviii. and xix., and which is so inconsistent with John's own opinions and his obviously distorted record of the recognition of Jesus by the Baptist; lastly, the very early testimony to the genuineness of the book contained in the last chapter, which was so clearly added by another hand. These arguments have, in spite of much which is strongly urged on the other side, considerable weight in establishing the genuineness of the fourth Gospel. What effect they have, supposing it to be genuine, in establishing the truth of any particular story, is, considering the character of John's mind, his professed object in writing, and the time which elapsed before he wrote, a very different question. Most persons will probably place reliance on those parts of the narrative only which either bear internal marks of probability or are confirmed by other evidence.

Another chapter contains a notice of the principal circumstances which aided the growth of the Christian Church; these, so far as the general history of the world is concerned, Gfrörer considers to be—first, the conquests of Alexander, which gave occasion for an union between the mystic spiritualism of the East, the philosophy of Greece, and the personal religion of the Jews; and, secondly, in the Roman conquests, which destroyed belief in the Gods who specially protected particular nations, and by preventing active occupation in public political life, made men disposed towards the inwardness of Christianity. For the more immediate causes of the peculiar organiza-

tion of the Christian community, Gfrörer looks to the connection between the early church and the Essenes, a connection which he proves beyond dispute, showing that doctrines, customs, and practices, and therefore, in all probability, forms and rules of society, were borrowed by the former from the latter. But it must not be supposed that he attributes that which is deepest and most vital in Christianity to the Essenes: for this he looks exclusively to the person of Jesus Christ. Christ he thinks in his early life probably belonged to this sect. But from the beginning of his public teaching he stood alone. He had no crowd of sectarian followers; he won his few disciples with difficulty, and they misunderstood him: he broke through Essenic mysticisms, asceticisms, and sectarianisms: burst asunder the bonds of national exclusiveness, and established a religion for humanity. Whence his power to do this, can only be understood by men in proportion as they bear his character.

We have, as we proposed, attempted to give an outline rather than a criticism; there are, however, one or two points of quarrel which we cannot pass over. In the first place, as to the execution: with the exception of meagre headings to long chapters and an imperfect list of references to the passages quoted from the New Testament, the book, which contains some three thousand pages of miscellaneous matter, is destitute of index or table of contents; even where other parts of the work are alluded to and relied on in the text, we are often left with no better guide to them than "mentioned above" or "proved below." We have ourselves wasted hours in hunting for the detached links necessary to support an argument. A more important fault in the internal character of the book is the violence and personal abuse with which Hegel and the modern German Philosophers are assailed. This ferocity is most obvious in the argument in support of the credibility of miracles (*Heiligthum und Wahrheit*, page 265—290), in which moreover he does not fairly state the whole of his opponent's case. He treats it as if it rested simply on the position that a miracle is on metaphysical grounds an impossibility; whereas the real question, at any rate with the most reasonable, is, whether the particular evidence in favour of any recorded miracle is, when sifted as Gfrörer

himself has sifted much of the New Testament, sufficient to support a belief in it against the general improbability arising from the results of *modern physical science*, that the physical world should by way of exception show any more immediate sympathy with what is moral and spiritual in man, than is to be found in the harmony of its general laws with man's nature.

The last and gravest fault we have to find is the thorough adoption of the German principle of accommodation. For instance, after adducing proof after proof to show that the Christian Sacrament of the Lord's Supper grew out of external circumstances and mistaken notions; that its form was derived from the sacred meals of the Essenes; that the mystical feeding on the body and blood of Christ was a notion which arose from a total misapprehension of words used on a different occasion and with a different object; that the Romish notion of an actual propitiatory sacrifice, as well as the Protestant one of a commemoration of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ's death, sprang from a thoroughly false and ungrounded attribution to him of the character of the Paschal Lamb,—having thus stripped this rite of all that has rendered it sacred and valuable to nine-tenths of Christendom, Gfrörer congratulates himself with the utmost complacency on having done no injury to any existing institution, because, he says, feasts are necessary in every religious society, and in one which accepts Christ as its head nothing is more worthy of being commemorated by a feast than his death! (*Heiligtum und Wahrheit*, p. 197—222). But the principle is in so many words acknowledged in the concluding sentences of the same book (p. 407, 408). After contrasting in a manner very inconsistent with his previous free and uncompromising criticism of the New Testament, the binding authority of certain religious doctrines contained in parts of it with the greater fallibility of the ordinary results of human thought and feeling, he proceeds:—

“I trust that every unprejudiced man will allow that the view of Jesus to which strict historical inquiry has led us in no material respect differs from that which has always been entertained by reasonable orthodox Christians concerning the founder of our church. Nay, further, the historical results may be reconciled with many

Confessions of Faith, though there are some few of our principles of investigation which are inconsistent with them. What then is to be the conduct of the religious teacher who is convinced of the truth of the above account of Jesus? When received dogmas clash with history, must he sacrifice the former? God forbid! Men have long ceased to think that each is bound to present to the people his own individual opinion: they know that the same things said by two persons are not really the same. The confessions of the different sects express the opinion of the vast majority, to which each individual must accommodate himself as well as he can; they are moreover a form which has lasted for centuries. To these let each teacher subordinate his own convictions: he may do it without hypocrisy, because history, which changes not, is in unison with the essential points of every Christian creed. So long as the kernel is the same, what signifies the outward shell?"

These are the conclusions of a book which would leave standing about four articles, if so many, in the Apostles' Creed, and probably not one in the Athanasian! It is perhaps as strong an example as can be found of the professed neglect of the practical consequences of speculation, which is so common in Germany. Whether it is a greater evil to seek for intellectual Truth without acting on it, or not to seek for it at all, may be a matter of question. It is to be hoped that in Germany the new state of things may promote the habit of turning thought into action; and that here in England we may acquire a deeper love of speculative truth, without failing to exercise our ordinary practical energy in the performance of the duties it brings with it.

ART. II.—PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Principles of Political Economy, with some of their applications to Social Philosophy. By J. S. Mill.

THE work on which we are about to comment, seems to us unavoidably to present great difficulties to a reviewer. The admirable qualities of mind displayed in it, and the extensive research out of which it has sprung, make it necessary for the critic to practise a humility, to which he is perchance but little accustomed. Moreover the great size of the work, the number of valuable discussions which it contains, and, more than all, the great importance of almost the whole of its subject-matter, exact from us a difficult selection of topics, in order that our article may not be displeasing to our readers or altogether unworthy of the work under review.

The course which we shall take will be first to mark Mr. Mill's position among economical and, so far as a few words will go, among general thinkers: and after this introduction to select a single large class of considerations, viz., those bearing on the condition of the labouring classes: and to devote our attention to these exclusively. We choose this branch of the subject, not only because of its own intrinsic interest, but also because it contains a large proportion of Mr. Mill's peculiar and characteristic ideas. He is the first among great English Economists who has ventured to maintain, that the present division of the industrial community into labourers and capitalists is neither destined nor adapted for a long-continued existence: that a large production of wealth is much less important than a good distribution of it: that a state of industry in which both capital and population are stationary is as favourable to national well-being as one in which they are advancing: that fixed customs are perpetually modifying the effects which unrestrained competition would of itself inevitably produce: that a large body of peasant proprietors is usually a source of great national advantage: and that a system of Emigration on a great scale would be productive of much benefit to the English peasantry

by raising their habitual standard of comfort, and therefore putting a check on the reckless increase of a miserable population. These propositions (which are not all that might be set down) will be enough to prove that the subject we have selected for discussion with Mr. Mill contains a sufficient number of his peculiar opinions, and therefore asking our readers to acquiesce in our selection of a special topic, we shall pass on to the general and introductory portion of our article.

In the preface to his work Mr. Mill states that he wishes his work to comprise both the theoretic exposition of purely economical doctrine, and also the extraneous considerations most necessary for its correct application to the real world in which we have to live and act. This he says, because he habitually bears in mind that Political Economy is founded on certain assumptions of which it is very convenient to trace out the consequences separately, but which being seldom accurately true, and being often very wide of the mark, will lead logically to consequences that it may be hazardous to apply without correction to the actual condition of mankind. Thus it is perpetually assumed that men will always buy what they want as cheaply as they can; whereas in matter of fact, vanity, liberality and indolence are perpetually preventing purchasers from beating down prices to the full extent of their ability.

The existence of such exceptional considerations distributes economists into two classes. What we may call common-sense thinkers have always seen that these extraneous influences were very important matters for their attention wherever actual practice was at all concerned. Adam Smith for example is the most striking specimen of this class of thinkers. He is very eminent in making short inductions from admitted facts, and in applying them with consistency and skill. He is not eminent for precision of statement or for microscopic accuracy of thought: but he is in general very successful in rather vague descriptions of conspicuous phenomena, and in tracing them back to the most influential of their proximate causes. It is evident that a mind so habitually starting with observed fact would be unlikely to neglect important agencies or to bind itself by purely hypothetical assumptions. Ricardo on the other

hand is the most important of what may be called the abstract thinkers on the philosophy of wealth. He sets out from certain primitive assumptions, and from these he proceeds to evolve all his results by mere deduction. He but rarely comes into contact with the actual world at all : but frames a hypothetical one which exists nowhere out of his own imagination. Accordingly his views of his subject must be called deep rather than wide : explaining a little very well, but leaving much without remark : giving a little truth which it was difficult to arrive at, rather than a comprehensive summary of all the principles that modify the phenomena which he is considering. In reference to these peculiarities of their minds, it is certainly very remarkable that Adam Smith should have been a recluse student, during his whole life almost exclusively with abstractions, and that Ricardo, who is so eminently an abstract thinker, should have been bred up in actual business, and should have attained his powers of deductive reasoning without any early philosophical discipline. It would certainly have been expected, if we had not known how little outward circumstances avail against the intrinsic aptitudes of a strong mind, that Adam Smith would have looked on nature principally "through the spectacles of books," and that Ricardo would have taken that general, vague, but in the main sufficient, judgment upon matters of fact which is generally called "common sense," and which alone among the higher intellectual gifts is habitually exercised in every-day practical life.

In that part of his preface to which we just now alluded, Mr. Mill has substantially expressed his intention of conciliating the two modes of dealing with his subject ; that is, of combining the abstract deduction and logical accuracy which are exemplified in Ricardo with that largeness of view and thorough acquaintance with diversified matters of fact for which the "Wealth of Nations" is so eminently remarkable.

And this great undertaking he has, so far as we can judge, admirably accomplished. The principal applications of abstract science are here treated of with a fulness of information, an impartiality of judgment, and a command over general principles, any one of which would have by itself been enough to make the work take rank as one of

eminent merit, and to the union of which we have never seen anything in an economical writer, even approximating equal. No great subject within the range of Political Economy appears to us to have been wholly omitted, and if we acknowledge that all the larger considerations which we could wish for, are not on all occasions introduced, we also admit that minds trained in different schools of thought, and seeing life generally under a somewhat different aspect, must inevitably form conflicting judgments as to what was, and what was not, relevant to particular social problems. We are bound to add, that in almost all cases there is evidence that Mr. Mill has given much and earnest attention to all the kinds of argument which seemed to him capable of being opposed to his opinions. Nor with the exception of the 'System of Logic' have we read any contemporary publication in which the desire for the mere discovery of truth was either so strong in itself or so immensely preponderant over every other consideration. The false colours of prejudice and passion have no place in an intellect so thoroughly achromatic.

We feel it, therefore, to be almost presumption in us to attempt, as we promised, a description, even in the most general way, of Mr. Mill's position in the list of general thinkers. Yet it seems to us incumbent on the critic of such a man to try his hand at some such task. Mr. Mill has treated with first-rate ability of subjects which involve a discussion of many problems which concern most intimately the highest interests of man; and if we give a notion of the place he appears to us to occupy among important thinkers, it will be seen why, in some instances, we differ from him, and agree with those whom we should place higher on the scale of worth. Mr. Mill then belongs we think to the Aristotelic or unspiritual order of great thinkers. A Philosopher of this sort starts always from considerations of pure intellect. He never assumes the teachings of conscience: he never, that is, treats as primordial facts, either the existence of a law of duty independent of consequences, nor a moral government of the world, nor a connection either between virtue and a reward, or between sin and retribution. He may have a great mastery over trains of reasoning, a great skill in applying comprehensive principles to complicated phe-

nomena ; he may have robust sense like Locke or Adam Smith, a power of exhausting a subject like Aristotle or Bentham, or subtlety like the former, or definiteness in scheming like the latter : but whatever be his merits or deficiencies, this remains as his great characteristic, that the light of his intellect is exactly what Bacon calls "dry light ;" it is "unsteeped in the humours of the affections : " it rests on what is observed to be : it never grounds itself on any inward assurance of what ought to be : it disregards what Butler calls the "presages of conscience," and attends only to the senses and the inductive intellect. In Physical Science and even in Metaphysics, the views of such men may be extensive, subtle or profound : in Politics also they may and often will excel, in tracing the different kinds of administrative machinery : they will in general be excellent judges of means, though not well fitted to appreciate what a thinker of a different order would be apt to consider, the highest ends of Government : in morals their views will in general be vague and not seldom erroneous, for their conscience is not luminous enough to give them vivid or well-defined convictions on the subject of duty : and on religion it is well if their tone be not that of Protagoras : Ὡ γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεζόμενοι, Θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξαίρω.

Such are the leading characteristics attaching to the school of thinkers, of whom Locke and Aristotle are perhaps the most attractive representatives, and among whom Auguste Comte is assuredly the least valuable specimen compatible with any remarkable ability. It would lead us too far from our subject to explain at length, that the extreme opposite of that School of thinkers is to be found in the School of Plato, and Butler, and Kant, who practically make the conscience the ultimate basis of all certainty : who infer from its inward suggestion the moral government of the world ; the connection between shame and fear, and between sin and retribution : from whose principles it may perhaps be deduced, that the ground for trusting our other faculties is the duty revealed by conscience, of trusting those of them essential to the performance of the task assigned by God to

Man : thinkers, in short, whose peculiar function it is to establish in the minds of thoughtful persons that primitive Theology which is the necessary basis of all positive Revelation.

To what may be called the *moral genius* of these writers, the author before us makes no pretension : he would, we apprehend, indeed, deny that it was possible for any man to possess what we reckon as their characteristic merits. On the other hand, in all the merits of the purely intellectual class of thinkers, we must travel far back into the past, before we can find any one whom we know to be possessed of them in an equal measure. Our author is not indeed in our judgment eminently qualified either to perceive or to appreciate nice and exquisite distinctions : he does not therefore at all make pretension to that combination of metaphysical subtlety and practical shrewdness which so many ages have agreed to wonder at in Aristotle : but nevertheless we hardly know of any one who has so much of that union of sense and science so remarkable in the Aristotelic treatises on the business of mankind. And in the firmness of grasp with which his understanding retains whatever has once come within its range, and in the undeviating consistency with which he applies every principle that he esteems ascertained, to every case that fairly comes within its scope, we know not where to find his equal.

From the shortcomings habitual to the school to which he belongs, we cannot hold him altogether exempt ; but we are bound to add that these blemishes have rarely been presented in a form so little calculated to offend those whose conception of life may be cast into a somewhat different form. It is, as we have hinted, always evident that Mr. Mill has studiously endeavoured to master the opinions of those from whom he differs : to master them we mean, not in order to collect all arguments that may possibly be made available in their confutation, but what is much rarer, with a view of eliciting from them, if possible, the latent truth which all large masses of human belief may be charitably supposed to contain. With these few words we must abruptly conclude a train of thought which would not stop of itself until our limits were exhausted. It is seldom indeed that in this age of books we come into

contact with a mind worthy to be compared with the few great authors of the past ; and it is but seldom, therefore, that we are called to begin a discussion such as the brief one which we are in the act of ending.

We shall now go on to the more special purpose of our Article, namely, of describing and, so far as we can, discussing, those of Mr. Mill's speculations which most intimately concern the condition of the labouring classes. We shall first discuss the question on the supposition that the population which we are considering is like that of England divided into the three classes of rent-owners, capitalists, and labourers : each with separate interests, and each capable of separate and, with respect to the others, antagonistic action. And this discussion will naturally subdivide itself into two parts : first, what settles the rates of wages in a country with any given amount of capital and any given number of labourers ; secondly, what is the law of the growth of capital, and what the law according to which population is augmented. We shall afterwards make some remarks on the changes which Mr. Mill would introduce into the social framework of Great Britain and Ireland : inasmuch as he has two plans for altering the present threefold division of the productive classes, and one plan for raising the wages paid to the hired labourer under the present system or under any other at all similar to it.

The first question then before us is, what in such a community as England settles the rate of wages when the number of labourers and the amount of capital are both given ? On this point we think Mr. Mill's exposition much less complete than in any other equally important portion of his work ; and it will therefore be most convenient to us to state shortly our own view, and then to show what portions of the truth seems to us to be omitted in Mr. Mill's solution of the problem.

Among the circumstances which would first strike a philosophical observer of a country possessing much accumulated wealth, one we think is, that the portion of the existing accumulation which is employed in obtaining new additional wealth naturally divides itself into two classes : one which may be called the Co-operative, and which assists and economizes the productive agency of Man ; and another which may be fairly called the Remunerative, the

characteristic function of which is to reward the exertion of human labour, by subsisting, for example, the labourer and his family, or by conferring on them any enjoyments in which their habitual circumstances enable them to find a pleasure. The most obvious instances of co-operative capital are steam-engines, power-looms, and machinery in general. Remunerative capital (or what is sometimes called the wages-fund of a nation) consists of corn and clothing, tea and sugar, and other similar commodities which the labourer consents, for the sake of their intrinsic qualities, to receive as a compensation for his mental or muscular exertion. It is obvious that in considering the rate of wages, the latter kind of capital is the one more certainly to our purpose. These two commodities, Labour and Remunerative Capital, come into the market and exchange one against the other, and their relative value seems to be settled exactly as in other cases, by the supply of each and also the demand for it: if there be an additional supply of corn or coarse clothing, and the demand for labour be unaltered, the working classes will be able to command more of these articles: if their supply be less, the same classes will certainly, more or less, be straitened. The intervention of money makes no difference here: it is the same thing, except for convenience sake, whether the capitalist purchase the commodities desired by the labourer, and barter them directly for their labour, or whether he gives the labourers money-tickets, by presenting which they will obtain from certain sellers those identical commodities.

Also it is to be borne in mind that the quantity of such commodities and of labour is not the only point which it is necessary to consider: the demand for these commodities also deserves much careful attention. If an additional number of unproductive consumers were to come into a nation and were not to employ any of its labourers, it is apparent that their consumption entrenches on the fund set apart for the maintenance of the industrial classes, unless the evil be corrected by the importation of corn from abroad, or by increased economy in the unproductive classes previously forming part of the nation. On the other hand, if these unproductive consumers were to bring with them a stock of necessities adequate to their own

consumption, and if they were to employ labourers on a large scale, and to pay them either in money or in commodities, it is evident that the command of labourers over wages-paying commodities would be increased, and that the unproductive classes must expend a larger sum in order to obtain the same quantities of the necessaries of life. Undoubtedly if in this instance there was no importation from abroad and no decrease in the consumption of the more opulent classes, the labouring classes would derive no benefit from the increase in the demand for labour: the demand for wages-paying commodities would have been also increased and their price would have risen: but as a rule that higher price would enforce a stricter economy in the more opulent classes, and thus the labourers would be benefitted though not to the full extent of the increased demand for the article in which they deal. In the first case which we noticed, the remuneration for labour was attended by an increased demand in other quarters for wages-paying commodities; and in the second by an increased demand for labour itself at a time when the supply and demand for remunerative capital received—from other causes—neither increase nor diminution. The relative value of labour and of wages-paying commodities is settled exactly as the relative value of Cloth and Hats is ascertained. The intervention of money complicates the phenomena in either case, but, as every one acquainted with the elements of the subject will admit, without introducing any new matter of fundamental principle.

Before proceeding further we shall quote Mr. Mill's observations on this portion of the subject. The following passage does not strike us as a complete rationale of the entire topic: but it contains a valuable summary of our author's opinion:—

“Wages like all other things may be regulated either by competition or by custom; but the last is not a common case. A custom on this subject could not easily maintain itself in any other than a stationary state of Society. An increase or a falling off in the demand for labour, an increase or diminution of the labouring population, could hardly fail to engender a competition which would break down any custom respecting wages by giving either to one side or the other a strong direct interest in infringing it. We may

at all events speak of the wages of labour as determined in ordinary circumstances by competition.

"Wages then depend upon the demand and supply of labour, or, as it is often expressed, on the proportion between Population and Capital. By Population is here meant the number only of the working class, or rather of those who work for hire, and by Capital only circulating Capital, and not the whole of that, but the part which is expended in the direct purchase of labour,—to this however must be added all the funds which without forming a part of Capital are paid in exchange for labour, such as the wages of soldiers, domestic servants, and other unproductive labourers. There is unfortunately no mode of expressing by one familiar term the aggregate of what may be called the wages-fund of a country, and as the wages of productive labour form nearly the whole of that fund, it is usual to overlook the smaller and less important part, and to say that wages depend on population and capital. It will be convenient to employ this expression, remembering however to consider it as elliptical and not as a literal statement of the entire truth.

"With these limitations of the terms, wages not only depend upon the relative amount of capital and population, but cannot be affected by anything else. Wages (meaning thereby of course the general rate) cannot rise except by an increase in the aggregate funds employed in hiring labourers, or a diminution in the number of competitors for rise: nor fall, except either by a diminution of the funds devolvable on paying labour, or by an increase in the number of labourers to be paid."

We think the simpler formula which we have ventured to lay down will obviate the necessity of a recourse to an expression which is not correct, and which is calculated to throw a mist over the real relations between machinery and manual labour. Mr. Mill is also inconsistent with himself in speaking of the wages-fund as a part of "circulating capital," for he has defined the latter to be "the portion of capital which is only capable of being used once:" now food is the only wages-paying commodity of importance that is only capable of a single use: in every sense in which machinery is capable of being used, often clothing and cottages are so too. Ricardo it is true uses habitually language of this sort, but then he defines circulating capital to be all capital rapidly perishable, and the error is therefore in him much less considerable, but nevertheless it is on every account undesirable to pay such special attention to that shortness of duration which

is at best but an accidental quality of remunerative capital.

From this passage, in spite of the ambiguity in its concluding formula, it is evident that Mr. Mill must in consistency hold that an increase of machinery *may* be injurious to the lower classes. In other parts of his work he fully explains that such is his opinion, and in this we entirely agree with him. If, for example, a shifting of industrial relations should ever diminish the remunerative kind of capital, and at the same time increase the co-operative, the proportion, as it is phrased, of labour and capital has indeed remained unaltered; but the amount of that portion of capital which is set apart for the compensation of human industry has undergone a diminution which may be very serious. Again, if capital has been transferred from Agriculture to the production of Railroads, or Steam Engines, there is no question but that *ceteris paribus* the working classes will be straitened by the change: their labour was before devoted to increasing the fund out of which labour would be remunerated; after the alteration it is devoted to manufacturing articles which, though perpetually productive of new wealth, do not in the same degree contribute to the maintenance of a labouring population.

In this case machinery has been shown to be hurtful to the lower classes, because its creation has diverted resources which would otherwise have been employed in remunerating labour to the essentially different function of aiding the production of commodities which the labourers do not consume. It is also quite possible that the introduction of machinery may be injurious to the lower classes by diminishing the demand for their labour. If machinery be substituted for manual labour in any manufacturing employment, common sense, as Mr. Mill observes, sees that the labourers are worse off in that particular employment, and the *onus probandi* clearly lies upon those who assert that the labouring classes are not worse off generally for the change. What is usually said is, that the wages-fund or remunerative capital of the country remains the same: the use of a certain portion of it is rendered unnecessary in a particular department of industry; but the same aggregate amount exists: it *can* (it is said) only be

shifted from one employment to another, and it is believed that the depression of a sort of labourers will infallibly be compensated by the extra remuneration of another. But it is in our judgment an entire mistake to contend that remunerative capital if released from one employment is necessarily employed in a similar capacity in some other. It is one of the points in which this description of capital differs from the co-operative sort, that the latter, if not used for its own characteristic function of aiding human labour, cannot be put to any other use. Machinery if not worked as such in producing wealth, can never be made to produce pleasure to any one; but remunerative capital, which consists of food, clothing, and other commodities adapted to satisfy certain primitive wants of man, can at once be turned in part at least to the production of transitory enjoyment. This sort of capital, when released from one manufacturing employment, is evidently capable of being used in satisfying the wants of unproductive consumers. The process would be, that less money-wages would be paid in consequence of the substitution of machinery for manual labour; that the working classes would have less to spend on such articles as food and clothing: that these commodities would therefore fall in price: that the fall in price would cause an increased consumption by the unproductive classes, and that their extra consumption would entrench on the fund that previous to the introduction of Machinery was set apart as a compensation for industrial exertion. On this point we have some reason to think that Mr. Mill would agree with us; though this is inconsistent with his general principle which we have quoted, and with many arguments which assume that the demand for labour is not an effective force operating on the rate of wages. But our author is continually right in detail where his formulæ would lead him wrong: and we know of no intellectual quality more thoroughly characteristic of a first-rate thinker.

There is we believe also another case in which the introduction of machinery is detrimental to the labouring classes. It was pointed out by Mr. Senior several years ago. Mr. Mill has omitted all consideration of it, probably because its practical importance is exceedingly slight. This case is, where the machinery consumed more wages-paying com-

modities than the labourers whose exertions it has superseded. Of this kind it is supposed that certain employments of the lower animals may be reckoned: these creatures being for our present purpose, simply animated machines, and it being perfectly possible that they might consume more food than the labourers whose work they were employed to perform. The peculiarity of this case is an additional demand for remunerative capital consequent on the increased use of machinery. The price of the former would consequently rise, and a certain portion of it be put beyond the reach of those labourers who would otherwise have consumed it.

Another mode exists beside that just now mentioned in which the substitution of co-operative for remunerative capital may be effected, and in which that substitution might be detrimental to the interests of the labouring classes. Ricardo was, it is believed, the first who worked out this view of the subject, which is somewhat more recondite than any consideration with which we have yet had to deal. His instance is in principle as follows: Suppose that a manufacturer of remunerative commodities should be in the habit of employing £1,000 per annum in paying labourers; then if profits were ten per cent. it is clear that he would have a revenue of £1,100 annually; but if instead of so doing, he choose to expend the same sum in the purchase of a machine, which will last ten years, it is apparent that his thousand pounds will be returned to him together with the ordinary profit by a revenue of £110 per annum, and it is clearly immaterial to him as a capitalist which course he decide to pursue. But if the commodities represented by the £110 be not so numerous as those represented by the £1,100, the consumer of those commodities will obviously be worse off than before. In the case we are supposing the subjects of manufacture are wages-paying commodities, and the consumers we are speaking of are the labouring classes. It is clear, therefore, that they are straitened by whatever diminishes the aggregate annual proceeds of agriculture and of what may be called for shortness wages-making manufactures; but that the capitalist is benefitted only by the profit which is left after deducting the expense. In mercantile language this is expressed by saying that

the consumer is dependent on the *gross* and the capitalist on the *net* return: in more popular phraseology it may be said that the consumer has only to heed the amount of commodities produced, whereas the capitalist is exclusively concerned with the pecuniary excess of income over outlay. It is evident that the operating cause is, as we said, the substitution of co-operative for remunerative capital: there *was* a certain amount produced to support the labourers during the ensuing year: there *is* in lieu of them a machine of equal pecuniary value: the national capital is the same in amount and the capitalist obtains as before his accustomed profit: but nevertheless the condition of the labourer and the consumer is deteriorated because they have a diminished supply of articles adapted to satisfy their wants.

To sum up then, the three cases in which the increase of machinery is detrimental to the labouring population are first when its introduction diminishes the supply of remunerative capital; secondly, when the introduction increases the demand for such capital; thirdly, when the demand for labour is diminished by the change. We are very far from thinking that any one of these cases is of frequent occurrence, or that any part of the present depressed state of the lower orders is in any considerable degree owing to an extension of machinery. In our judgment Mr. Mill has ample grounds for contending that by far the greater part of new machinery is merely an investment for the annual *savings* of the country; and being on that account a new creation of wealth does not diminish the existing amount of remunerative capital: nor do wages-paying commodities, except in the not very important instance of coal, appear to be consumed to any considerable extent by existing machinery. We should also hold, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Mill, that the increased demand for labour sometimes eventually caused by the introduction of machinery is decidedly beneficial to the lower orders. The cotton trade is an obvious instance of this: there is no reason however for wearying our readers with an examination of our differences on this point from Mr. Mill, because our reasons are only the reverse side of those which we have already exhibited in behalf of our opinion that any decrease in the demand for labour from a similar

cause is detrimental to the real interests of the labouring classes.

We have now examined the whole of what Mr. Mill calls the statics of the subject; that is, we have inquired what in any given state of capital and population adjusts the remuneration of labour; and we have found that the two efficient causes were the supply and demand for labour and the supply and demand for a particular species of capital. We have now to treat of what in the continuation of the new scientific metaphor is called the Dynamics of Political Economy: in other words, we must consider the Laws according to which Capital is augmented and Population increases. We shall incidentally treat of a problem which Mr. Mill has omitted formally to consider: viz., what in a progressive state of capital apportioned how much of it shall be of the remunerative and how much of the co-operative sort. It is obvious that in our view this question is of great importance in reference to the interests of the labouring classes; we believe also that we shall show strong reasons for thinking that Mr. Mill's omission to consider it has led him into somewhat serious error.

The growth of capital, which we select for first consideration, varies, it is clear, directly with the productiveness of industry and the disposition to save. The productiveness or efficiency depends on a variety of causes, of which only the principal can here be specified, and of which Mr. Mill has nowhere attempted a complete enumeration. However, it may be stated with sufficient truth for all really important purposes, that the efficiency of industry increases with the knowledge of the productive arts, the general intelligence of the people, and in agricultural communities with the natural fertility and favourable situation of cultivable land. Fifty years ago it might have been not unimportant to dwell on the importance of the cultivation of the productive sciences and their corresponding arts, but the prodigious and evident strides which the scientific arts have recently made and the existence of such conspicuous results as railroads, and steam-engines, and electric telegraphs, make it no longer necessary to dilate on what has become a matter of familiar and popular knowledge. It will now also be generally admitted that the intelligence of the workmen employed both in agri-

culture and still more in manufactures is an important element in the efficiency of industry. It is incumbent on us to remark that Mr. Mill has collected considerable evidence to prove that of all workmen the English stand particularly in need of some general education; other nations, the Italian it is said especially, seem to possess a natural quickness of perception, by which they are able readily to master, at any time of their lives, new single processes of manufacture. English labourers on the other hand have no such natural powers, but are, as a rule, indebted to a general education for whatever power they possess of working at any branch of industry save the particular one in which they have been brought up. The great authority for this observation is the evidence taken before the Poor Law Commission on the subject of the training of Pauper Children. There was, if we remember right, in the same evidence, and we are a little surprised that Mr. Mill omits to refer to it, a rather remarkable body of testimony to the effect, that though special branches and single processes of manufacture might be learnt by persons almost entirely uneducated, yet that the power of making general arrangements or superintending efficiently the work of others was almost always dependent on school teaching or on an equivalent self-education. These two elements in the productiveness of industry are in an advancing state of society almost always on the increase. It is very different with the third element, the intrinsic fertility of the soil. It is obvious that, as a rule, the most productive land will be the first taken into cultivation, those who have the first choice will in a general way choose the best. Moreover, the situation of land has an exactly similar effect: the lands from which the greatest produce can be most easily obtained are those nearest to the consumer; and these will in general be the first selected for cultivation. We may add, though it is a matter more of curiosity than of importance, that there is a case in which this last cause will counteract the effect of the first,—viz., where the lands least favourably situated have the greatest natural fertility. Here it might happen that the additional labour required to bring food from a greater distance was exactly counterbalanced by the additional fertility possessed by the more distant soils, and therefore that their cultivation

would not increase the cost-price of food. But this case of exception is too improbable to need any particular attention, and in general it may be laid down that the first soils taken into cultivation will yield a greater return to the same labour than those that are left without tillage until a later period. It is also a fact of experience, and is deducible from somewhat similar considerations, that doubling the capital and labour on the same land will not double the produce in an unaltered state of agricultural knowledge. It is obvious that men will choose to use first the best means of cultivation which they know of. Hence it appears that in the progress of civilisation the productive arts and the general intelligence of the country are in constant increase, but that this increase is ever in part counteracted and sometimes more than overbalanced by the constant necessity of resorting to the cultivation of poorer soils.

So much of the productiveness of industry, which is one cause of the increase of capital. The propensity to save, which is the other cause, means, in more distinct words, the disposition of the people to postpone a present enjoyment for the future advantage of themselves and others. This will obviously vary with the estimate which the people in question are able to form of what is distantly future—a kind of intelligence in which children, savages, and all uninstructed persons, are peculiarly deficient, and on the effects of which Mr. Mill has accumulated various interesting testimonies. The saving habit will also be fostered by a general security, that those who save to-day will be able to enjoy to-morrow, or at least be able to make over their enjoyment to whom they please; by a boldness to meet whatever risk there is that this event will not take place; and by the comparative desirableness of the station which is conferred by accumulated wealth. The two first seem as a rule to augment in strength during an advance of civilisation; the third is perhaps at its maximum in a rather rude and boisterous condition of society; the fourth attains its greatest efficiency in that state of purely commercial industry through which the mercantile and manufacturing classes of England, as well as the Northern States of the American Union, appear at present to be passing. To these four causes must be added the rate of

the profit which can be derived from the employment of capital. It is evident that men will be more likely to save, *cæteris paribus*, when they get twenty per cent. on their capital, than when they can get two per cent.: but the efficiency of this cause at different times and circumstances, it will be better to consider after examining the subject of population. Then also we shall be better able to estimate the causes which apportion capital into the two divisions that have been before mentioned.

We have now then examined the disposition to save and the productiveness of industry. We have found that the great causes accelerating the growth of capital are the increase of foresight and productive power consequent on the advance of civilisation: the great retarding cause is the diminishing proportion of return with which the soil of the earth rewards the increasing industry of the cultivator. And this is all which can at present be said with advantage with reference to the growth of capital.

We now go to the subject of Population—a topic which is of obvious importance in reference to our peculiar subject, and about which there has been, and still is, a considerable amount of controversy. We are not, however, able to afford to it a portion of our space proportionable either to its interest or its difficulty. It may be broadly stated at the outset that Mr. Mill does not believe the doctrine of Malthus and Ricardo, that an increase of the comforts or a decrease in the misery of the labouring classes is invariably followed by an accelerated increase of population; or, on the other hand, that a diminution of their comforts or an increase in their misery will invariably retard the increase of their numbers.* Our author is habitually aware that extreme misery is a great stimulant to population, by begetting recklessness and improvidence: since it may be safely affirmed that an Irishman who is as badly off as he can be, and who has no hope and scarcely an opportunity of becoming better, will, as a general rule, practise no prudential restraint whatever.

* This was the original Malthusian doctrine, though its author much modified it in the later editions of the *Essay on Population*. Ricardo, however, who thought himself a Malthusian, asserts it in terms (*Works*, p. 248, Ed. M'Culloch), and everywhere tacitly or avowedly reasons on the assumption of it.

Mr. Mill also holds what is less obvious, that a very great increase in the comforts of the population, though it may be an immediate stimulus to population, will nevertheless in all likelihood, on the whole, retard its increase. This proposition was admirably brought into view by Mr. Thornton, in his essay on Over-Population. It is still, however, opposed by many reasoners; there is in the minds of some Economists an inveterate idea, almost, if not quite, amounting to a prejudice, to the effect that the most comfortable classes will always increase the most rapidly. If this proposition were not a frequent assumption, silently or expressly taken for granted in many influential arguments, it would have no intrinsic merit requiring a particular notice. Few ideas on this or on any other subject can be more clearly opposed to very obvious facts. It might be urged that in Norway, where the population is nearly stationary, the mass of the population enjoy a degree of comfort certainly unsurpassed, and most probably unequalled, in any other portion of Europe. But far more obvious facts are in every country at hand to correct this very erroneous idea. Is it by the increase of the *Noblesse* that the population of any country is particularly augmented? Do the middle, the opulent, or the commercial portions of any nation increase too rapidly? It is clear that, as we ascend in the social scale, we pass through classes which have at each step of ascent a diminishing rate of increase; the fact being that comfort, the habitual sense of having something valuable to lose, and the desire of parents that their children shall not be below, but, if possible, above the position in which they themselves live, are all motives which operate most as a check on population among the opulent and comfortable classes.

This being so, it is clear that it is the habit of the several classes of mankind to have a rate of increase of their own, fairly determined by the desire of not falling themselves and not allowing their children to fall below the condition which they themselves have been used to occupy. As a consequence of this, it is contended, as we think justly, that though a large improvement in the condition of the people might be attended with an immediate acceleration in the rate of increase, yet the next generation would grow up in habits which they would be unwilling to

forfeit by a general system of improvident marriage. As a practical question, Mr. Mill thinks that no prudential restraint is practised by the agricultural labourers, and that, if the increase of population were in the hands of that class only, the English people would increase as fast as the American. So that there can be no ground for saying that an increase of comfort would in our case, at least, diminish the providence of the labouring class. On the means by which Mr. Mill would effect this desirable change we shall speak hereafter, and at present shall only add, that he would very largely increase the funds expended on national education, so as to obtain, if possible, not only the economic, but also the moral and intellectual requisites of a provident population.

As to the general doctrine, that a great increase in the comforts of the labouring classes is often a check to the increase of their numbers, it fortunately happens that there is a case in point to which Mr. Mill has an opportunity of appealing. An immense increase in the comforts of the French peasantry was, it is well known, an immediate consequence of their first Revolution. Over and above this, the depopulation and extra demand for labour caused by the wars of Napoleon were all circumstances tending to raise the rate of wages, and therefore, according to the vulgar doctrine, to stimulate population. Yet the fact has been, that the increased comfort and the new distribution of landed property have produced a slackened increase of population, and that the French population increases very much more slowly than the average rate of European nations.

We have purposely used language which implies our assent to this portion of Mr. Mill's doctrine. It is not, however, to be looked upon as a principle which, like a physical law, will certainly operate with an unvarying energy under all times and circumstances. The multiplicity of motives that incline men to contract marriages render the theory of population the most complex part of elementary political economy; the conclusions of science upon it are as yet very rough and general. Particular cases of natural habit and unlooked-for conjunctures of events may well render futile the best adjusted theory of human action. On this special subject political economy is more vague

than perhaps it need be; but all that it can ever do, is to indicate general rules; and no one can ever be exempted from the necessity of studying each case that occurs in practice, with a due attention to disturbing agencies. On this particular point we may say that it is considerably more likely than not that a general increase of habitual comfort will slacken the advance of population, but not that it will do so of necessity and invariably.

In this chapter of Mr. Mill's book, and also in some other parts of it, there seems to us to be a want of concise formulæ summing up and stamping on the memory the previous proof and explanation. We cannot attempt here fully to supply this deficiency; but we will set down a few brief sentences for the consideration of others. We do not mean that none of the principles which we are about to mention can be reduced to more elementary considerations: but we wish to see drawn out a set of intermediate principles to obviate the tiresome necessity of a continual resort to the first assumptions and axioms of science. It should be remembered that the founders of both the great schools of logic have combined to teach that in the skilful use of those *axiomata media* consists the practical utility of knowledge. It may then be perhaps said,—1st. That misery so extreme as to cause disease and death is an obvious check to the increase of population. 2ndly. That extreme degrees of misery short of this stimulate population by producing recklessness; in technical Malthusian language this is expressed by saying that the positive and preventive check never act together in any force. 3rdly. That the greatest economical preventive check on population is the desire of not falling in consequence of marriage into a state of society lower than that which when unmarried they have been accustomed to occupy; and next in efficiency is the desire that their children shall not occupy a position in life inferior to their own. 4thly. That these desires at least among the industrial classes increase with amount of comfort enjoyed. 5thly. That improvements in the condition of a people sufficient to raise the habitual standard of comfort act as a check, and, not like smaller improvements, as a stimulus to the increase of population: and the converse principle that an accession of misery and discomfort sufficient to depreciate that standard will be an

incentive and not a check to such an increase. 6thly. That the desire of preserving their own condition is a more and more efficacious preservative against over-population in proportion as persons feel that their own condition is dependent on themselves and not on others: and so also the desire for their children's welfare strengthens proportionably to the certainty of the children's condition being dependent on the conduct of their own parents and not on the actions of other people.

This last consideration of the absence of uncertainty is a point on which Sismondi has powerfully enlarged in various of his writings. It is a great reason with him for preferring the status of a present proprietor to that of a hired labourer. The latter is at the mercy of the speculations of capitalists and the vicissitudes of commerce. Without knowing why, his trade may be depressed for years; neither his prosperity nor his adversity are of his own creation. Very different is the position of a peasantry who have a footing on the soil—if each man can cultivate his own land thoroughly, his position is secured: as he cannot be ruined by the conduct of others, his comfort is not dependent on either capitalist or landlord; he may suffer from the elements and from Providence, but so far as man is concerned, he has within reach the "Saxon Utopia," a fair day's wages for a fair day's work.

Very similar is the effect of the two systems on population. A peasant proprietor feels that his children will certainly descend in the scale of society if his freehold be at his death divided among a numerous family. He either therefore does not have so many children, or he saves a fund out of which those who do not inherit the land may be provided for. He knows how many persons his land will maintain, and for how many he is likely to have other funds. It is of no importance at all to him what others of his class may do; if he is himself provident, the condition of his children is in the main secure. This kind of causes keep the population of Norway, as the returns show, very nearly stationary. Far different is the position of a country like England, where the lower orders are mere hired labourers, possessing, as a rule, no accumulated capital. All this class knows is that they are dependent on the present position of the labour-market, and that their children

will be in like manner dependent on its future condition. Each individual feels that the number of *his* children is but a slight point in determining the condition of each. He has no reason at all to think that if he has only one child that one will necessarily or probably be better off than if he have a dozen. This depends on the conduct of the whole class to which he belongs, and he has no data, and at present no mental ability, to determine what that conduct is likely to be.

A capitalist, it should be observed, is in a position exactly similar to that of the peasant proprietor. If he can leave each of his children the amount with which he started in life, he has every reason to think that they will on an average be in a position not inferior to his own. It is no matter to him that his neighbours are not equally saving: if his children have capital they will not be worse, but possibly better off, for their neighbours not being possessed of it too. This certainly is a main element in producing the providence in marriage, which perhaps even to an unfavourable extent is characteristic of the middle classes in England.

From this it is clear that if the working classes could be raised to a state in which saving was a preliminary to marriage there would be an efficacious obstacle to their reckless and indefinite increase. If dependence on mere wages could in any way be superseded by the habit of saving for themselves and for their children, if the working classes could be brought within the range of the motives which now act on the rest of the community, we might confidently anticipate a great immediate improvement in their physical condition. It is consolatory to remember that this is one of the points on which purely intellectual education is really most serviceable. Instruction is to the mind what the telescope is to the eye. To an uncultivated intellect what is distant will always be invisible, but a well-trained mind is habitually able to look into the future, and to deal with the absent as though it were present. It is to be hoped, and perhaps expected, that the present exertions for the spread of education will not fail in a few years to increase materially the forethought of the labouring classes.

Yet by itself this intellectual improvement will not be

sufficient. Before people can save, they must have a surplus to save out of. It will be necessary to raise the condition of the lower orders considerably above their present condition before they will become habitually a saving class. In the middle ranks a small amount of self-restraint will make a considerable difference both in their property and in their social position: but it would take much more than can be expected of mankind generally to make much improvement in the condition of the lower orders. Hesiod's proverb that the half is more than the whole, amounts in Economics to saying, that the smaller the income the harder it is to save any given proportion of it.

Mr. Mill, however, we must pause to observe, is of opinion that population will be checked in a somewhat different manner. He expects that there will arise an unfavourable popular sentiment against those who overstock the labour-market, and that operating as a penalty, this feeling will diminish the number of such offenders. We will not assert that this is impossible. Mr. Mills has pronounced that all who deny it are profoundly ignorant of the true motives of human action. When the teacher gets dogmatical, the learner becomes nervous, and we feel therefore inclined to be cautious. We only wish to observe, that there is as yet no sufficient basis of fact for us to look upon it as a very well established doctrine. We doubt also if the act of overstocking the labour-market be an act sufficiently marked and definite to excite popular reprobation. Mr. Mill admits that no such feeling anywhere exists now, not even where there is the greater amount of this sort of restraint; but as in these countries the labouring population are mainly peasant proprietors, there is no occasion and indeed no opportunity for any such popular sentiment. We can understand that where saving is an habitual preliminary to marriage, those will be looked down upon and disliked who neglect it. As to much more than this we are inclined to be sceptical. We do not know enough to speak confidently as to the factory population; but though we are not used to be over timid in theorizing, we are not bold enough to expect anything at all like this of English agricultural labourers. At all events it is safer and more practical to assert that the existence of a strong saving habit among the lower classes is both

a necessary and a sufficient condition of their economical welfare.

We have now discussed the subjects of the growth of Capital and the increase of Population. In the course of the discussion we omitted avowedly to consider two questions: What is the cause which divides Capital into its two distinct divisions? secondly, What are the causes regulating the rate of profit? We shall now discuss the former, which as we stated is omitted by our author. The latter it will be expedient still further to postpone.

We do not here enjoy the benefit of Mr. Mill's guidance, but the problem does not appear to contain any peculiar difficulty. It is a principle in the theory of value, that articles producible at equal cost will be supplied in proportion to the demand for them: those most in demand will be most in number; those least in demand will be fewest in supply. For if the supply of any should fall short of this proportion, their price will rise, and an extra profit will be obtained by the producer, in consequence of which capital will be attracted to the employment, and the supply will be augmented. This principle applies to the case before us. The respective amounts in which equally costly portions of the two kinds of capital are supplied, will be determined by the demand for each. The demand for remunerative capital depends on the rate of remuneration, (which will be discussed presently,) multiplied by the number of labourers employed at that rate. The demand for the co-operative sort of capital depends on its efficiency in satisfying existing wants. If new discoveries in machinery make that portion of capital able to supply more readily any desirable articles, profit will be higher in the improved department of industry, and an increased portion of the annual savings of the country will be attracted towards it. Improvements in machinery may therefore be detrimental to the working classes, by drawing off some capital which would have been devoted to their maintenance to aid the production of commodities which they have no opportunity of consuming. All improvements which increase the supply of wages-paying commodities are of course beneficial to the labourer. It may also happen that as all machinery requires labour to work it, the demand for the latter may be a benefit compensating the labourer for the harm done in the way which we have

pointed out. Other advantages of machinery might also be named, but each of them are consistent with saying that an increase in the efficiency of machinery may affect the distribution of capital between its divisions, in a manner detrimental to the working classes.

The rate of remuneration has been mentioned above, as a cause influential in deciding how much of a country's capital shall be remunerative, and how much co-operative. It has been shown in our remarks on Population, under how many limitations it is true there is a certain amount of commodities which the lower classes will be content to receive, and without which they will not continue to increase. It has been shown that this minimum of remuneration is of two sorts, one physical, which is the minimum that will keep alive the existing number of labourers; secondly, a moral minimum, susceptible under proper circumstances both of increase and diminution. Now it is clear that if the demand for labour be unaltered, it is essential to the industry of the country that the working classes shall have the physical minimum of wages; and also that unless circumstances occur to depreciate the moral standard, they will receive what that standard metes out to them. Although Mr. Mill has not inquired into the causes which determine how much capital shall take the form of wages-paying commodities, he has repeatedly declared his belief that the labouring classes will in general enjoy the comforts accompanying this latter variable minimum of remuneration. He has also in some places gone further, and attempted to show that they cannot permanently receive more. He has indeed an entire chapter on popular remedies for low wages, which is devoted to the elucidation of this opinion. The popular remedies to which he refers, are those in which law or public opinion afford a higher remuneration to labour than would be given by unrestricted competition. Mr. Mill teaches that such laws or customs must be wholly inoperative. He appears to think that there is a *prima facie* absurdity in attempting to support more labourers than the "capital" of the country will maintain, or to give the same number of labourers a larger recompense for their exertions. Now if, as certain economists are prone to assume, all capital were of one sort, and if it could be used only for production, and were not

consumable by unproductive consumers, if in short, by some law of nature, capital could only be used in supporting labourers, this argument would certainly be a good one. Nature would in that case have enacted that the remuneration shall be of such and such an amount, and no human legislature could go further, or impair her work.

But since remunerative capital can be consumed by unproductive consumers, this argument will not hold. If wages were raised ten per cent. by law, wages-paying commodities would rise in price, and the more opulent consumers would probably restrict their consumption, and labourers would command more of the existing supply. Moreover, the rise of price would cause an increased production of wages-paying commodities. Capital which was going to be employed in manufacturing steam-engines or plate, or some such articles, would be employed in agriculture, or in preparing the coarser kinds of manufacture which are used by labourers. Capital would be shifted from the manufacture of luxuries for the opulent, to the production of necessities for the indigent. How much the labouring classes would gain would depend on the agricultural circumstances of the time. If the new application of capital to the land only yielded such a return as would keep the price at the level which it occupied when the law came into operation, the labouring classes would obviously gain still exactly what they gained in that year, and no more. If, on the other hand, food could be supplied at the price it occupied previous to the enactment of the new law, it is obvious also that the labourers would gain by the full amount in which the law raised their pecuniary resources; the price would be as before, and their money-wages would be greater. In general, something intermediate between these two cases would happen; the labourer would gain more than in the first, and less than in the second. But in either case such a law would be advantageous to labourers: and in relation to all remunerative commodities except food, the most favourable contingency is almost certain to happen.

We do not defend such a law; not only because it could not be worked in any known system of industry, but also because it could not be urged on the capitalist as a duty to give so much additional wages. Something

must be known of his position in life, his duties to his family and those dependent upon him, before any such principle could be affirmed. But it seems to us obvious that capitalists ought not to beat down labourers to the lowest possible amount. They have no more right to be greedy and avaricious than any other class; and it is discreditable in economists to teach that such conduct is not hurtful to the public and indefensible in itself.

The effect of such a law on population is a distinct question. Ricardo would of course assume that if it were for the benefit of the lower orders it would stimulate their increase, and wages would be reduced to their former standard. Even so, the wages-fund of the country is increased, the rate of remuneration is the same, but the persons paid are more. Mr. Mill reasons here after the manner of Ricardo. Nor do we pretend to say that any such law or custom could of itself and alone raise the rate of wages materially. But it may be one of many concurrent agencies in so raising it, and its existence may prevent its decline by counteracting other agencies that may be depreciating the labourer's habitual standard of comfort; and therefore might be rather a check on population than a stimulus to it.

On the whole, therefore, as to the rate of remuneration, it may be said, without wearying our readers by unnecessary details, first, that when the demand for labour is unaltered, the physical minimum must be maintained; secondly, that moral minimum will always be maintained when the demand for labour is not much raised or much diminished, or when the supply of wages-paying commodities does not become much more easy or more difficult; thirdly, that the benevolence of the higher classes answers all the purposes of an extra demand for labour. These are the main principles regulating the rate of remuneration. The proportion between wages-paying and what may be called instrumental capital is settled, as has been seen by the demand for each sort; the demand for the first varying directly as the rate of remuneration multiplied by the number of labourers employed: the demand for the second being determined by the productive power of machinery in ministering to human wants.

Reviewing therefore what has been said, we find that

we have considered the demand and supply of remunerative capital, and under the head of Population we have discussed the supply of labour. The demand for labour, the only remaining factor of our original formula, will not perhaps detain us long. It depends as a whole on the power which each single act of immediate labour possesses to satisfy human wants, multiplied by the number of such acts which are desired. From this it is clear, that it is more beneficial to the lower classes to be employed in quickly-recurring acts, than in acts which when once done do not require any second or at all events any but a deferred repetition. The pyramids of Egypt once built, no one cared about the builders: and it is to be feared they were put on reduced rations of onions. This is the ground of a part of the truth implied in Ricardo's doctrine that it was better for labourers that capital should be laid out in services than in commodities. Supposing that the labourer sold the commodities, this would only be true when the service required more frequent repetition than the acts necessary to the production of the commodities. When the capitalist sells the commodity, as is now most usual, it is not so good, if we look only to the interest of the labourers, to buy the article as to employ labour more directly; since the capitalist will not always, or indeed often, employ the whole purchase-money for their benefit.

We have therefore now pretty nearly solved the problem with which we set out, namely, what under present circumstances regulates the rate of wages? We found that this was determined temporarily by the supply and demand for remunerative capital as compared with supply of labour, and the demand for it. We have now inquired, so far as our limits will allow, what are the causes permanently determining the supply and demand both for remunerative capital and for labour. One problem has been omitted, viz., the cause of determining the rate of profit, and these will even now be treated of more conveniently hereafter.

We are now therefore able to go on to discuss Mr. Mill's plans for the benefit of the lower orders. The difficulty is, that the rate of wages is so low; and the great problem for European and especially for English statesmen in the nineteenth century is, how shall that rate be raised, and

how shall the lower orders be improved. Whatever be the evil or the good of Democracy, in itself it is evident, that the combination of democracy and low wages will infallibly be bad. In all ages, the rulers of mankind have for the most part agreed in having a predominating inclination for making themselves comfortable. If power be given to a miserable democracy, that democracy will above all things endeavour not to be miserable. This it will attempt by whatever schemes are congenial to minds and consciences, corrupted by ages of hereditary ignorance and hereditary suffering. And woe to those who, under such a Government, propound plans for the benefit of their rulers: *Sævi proximis ingruunt*. The favourite theorist of yesterday is punished to-day because the Millennium is not yet come. Such is the lesson which the annals of Europe in the year 1848 teach to English statesmen. The only effectual security against the rule of an ignorant, miserable and vicious democracy, is to take care that the democracy shall be educated, and comfortable and moral. Now is the time for scheming, deliberating and acting. To tell a mob how their condition may be improved is talking hydrostatics to the ocean. Science is of use now because she may be heard and understood. If she be not heard before the democracy come, when it is come her voice will be drowned in the uproar.

So great and so urgent is in our judgment the importance of plans for the improvement of the working classes: we regret, therefore, that so much of our space has been taken up with the explanation of the existing state of things in England, that we must be brief in our account of Mr. Mill's schemes for the elevation of the labouring classes. He has schemes for both England and Ireland; and we will take the latter first.

The economical condition of Ireland is probably far worse than that of any other country possessing equal natural advantages. The rate of wages scarcely comes up to the minimum that will support life, and falls far short of that needful to maintain the human body in full working strength. The land tenure appears to be about the worst possible. It has nearly all the disadvantages both of *la grande* and *la petite culture*, without any of their corresponding advantages. This tenure is known as the cottier

system, which Mr. Mill has here defined as the system in which the peasant rents by competition only, and not at all by fixed custom. It is not difficult to see, that in a country with a rapidly increasing population, and but a little non-agricultural employment, a great preponderance of such a land tenure ensures the utter misery of the labouring classes. Land is, in such a country, the first necessary of life, and the landlords have a monopoly of it. The peasants will promise to pay *any* rent in order to obtain possession of the soil. This nominal rent they will be unable to pay, and the landlord will take whatever more is produced than is necessary to give the tenant a bare subsistence. As population increases, the competition strengthens: the rents increase in amount, the tenant is more and more oppressed with debt, and he has to work harder and harder in order to obtain the most meagre sustenance. Necessaries are being bartered for luxuries, and those who need the former are at the mercy of those who possess them. It is obvious that what has been described as the prevalent practice of Irish landlords is morally unjustifiable. We do not charge all the Irish landlords with abetting such a system. The better part of them do not take into account the biddings of the peasants in settling the rent, but act on their own notion of what he is able and ought to pay: yet though the evidence taken before Lord Devon's commission shows that such more respectable landlords are not absolutely few, it seems also certain that they form an inconsiderable fraction of the whole rent-owning class. The ownership of land however gives no moral title to inflict suffering on its occupants. The landlord under this system takes habitually a cruel advantage of the necessities of the poor: and that such can be the constant course of events in a Christian country, shows how little the Jewish Prophets are heeded by those who profess at least to acknowledge their authority.

The question then arises, how are these cottiers to be got rid of? No man defends them; but it is difficult to devise plans for introducing a better system. Mr. Mill's answer is that a large number of them may be provided for by making them peasant proprietors. There are in round num-

bers a million and a half* of waste lands in Ireland, which there is every reason to think would repay tillage. This land is now lying useless, and it does seem a very obvious course to bring it into cultivation. To any such scheme as Mr. Mill's there is however a strong dislike in very many English minds. It seems to us that the evils of Ireland have created a prejudice against this their appropriate remedy. An inveterate idea prevails that the existence of small holdings is the cause of Irish misery, and that the scheme of peasant proprietorship is a mode of perpetuating the existing system of land tenure. We feel sure that this is a fair statement of much influential opinion. But yet both these two propositions are ridiculously untrue. It is not the smallness of the holdings that is the cause of the evils of Ireland; for in Ulster, where the condition of Irish society is far better than elsewhere, the division of land is more minute than in any other portion of the country. Again, the system which now prevails is one of rack rents, where all surplus beyond the bare subsistence of the tenant goes of necessity to the landlord: the system proposed as a remedy is, that in some cases no rent at all should be paid; and in the case of more fertile soil, that a fixed sum should be reserved, a system which would obviously give the tenant a secure enjoyment of whatever surplus produce his industry might extract from the soil. Is there any connection therefore between the existing system and that proposed as a remedy for it? In the one the main feature is unlimited exaction; in the other the main feature is the fixity of the quit rent which is to be paid. This point of fixity is one which Mr. Mill has in all its bearings admirably elucidated, and as it seems to us with very great originality.

The only other remedy proposed for Ireland is the whole-

* The exact numbers are :—

	Cultivable.	Fitted for pasture.
Leinster	186,000	345,000
Ulster	419,000	629,000
Connaught	430,000	726,000
Munster	390,000	630,000
Total	1,425,000	2,330,000

This is not the calculation of a theorist; but the estimate of Mr. Griffith, the land-valuer for the Irish land-tax; who is not in any way pledged to the waste land scheme. The figures are given in the report of Lord Devon's commission.

sale eviction system. Some persons who wish to adapt Ireland in all respects to the model of England have wished to introduce large tillage farms, and to make day labourers of the lower classes. We have before given some reason, and Mr. Mill has collected almost demonstrative evidence, that on grounds principally derived from the theory of population a nation of peasant proprietors is much preferable to one of hired agricultural labourers. But, putting this aside, there is strong reason peculiar to the individual case for preferring to introduce into Ireland the system of peasant proprietors. The Poor Law Commissioners for Ireland state "that agricultural wages vary from sixpence to one shilling a-day: that the average of the country in general is about $8\frac{1}{2}d.$, and that the earnings of labourers come, on an average, to from $2s.$, to $2s. 6d.$ a-week or thereabouts." Now the number of the cottier population is exceedingly large, and it is evident that the addition of anything like it to the number of hired labourers would bring down the rate of wages enormously. It is obvious that, bad as the cottier system may be, this remedy for it is worse than the disease. Wages are now $2s. 6d.$ a-week; what will they be after a great reduction?

It is said that capital will come from England to employ the additional labourers. But Mr. Mill justly replies that capital will not come from England until the social state of the lower classes is improved, and therefore if we adopt the scheme of large farms we are forced on the dilemma that capital will not come till the people are improved, and that the people will not be improved before the capital comes. Also there is no likelihood that a sufficient amount of capital would come. The Poor Law Commissioners state that there are in Ireland five agricultural labourers to the extent of soil which employs two in Great Britain. It is obvious that if the agriculture of Ireland is assimilated to that of England, this immense surplus of labourers would be thrown out of employment.

Moreover the system of peasant proprietors has been tried in Ireland and has worked well. There exists in Ulster a kind of incipient copyhold, from which a tenant at will cannot be turned out so long as he pays a fixed customary rent. From this it is an obvious consequence that the consent of the occupying tenant must be purchased

before a new one can have possession of the soil. It is this institution of tenant-right which has made the people of Ulster so superior to those in other parts of Ireland. They have this system because being English and Scotch they were a better race of people in the beginning; but peculiarities of race act not by magic, but by creating social habits and institutions: the cause of a well-organized industry when it is not improved from without must always be an appropriate disposition of the industrious classes, yet it is not the less true that the happiness of the labourers results immediately from the beneficial organization. Hence it appears that the institution which it is proposed to extend has been already tried and has succeeded admirably.

As to the effect of peasant proprietorship on Irish population, there is every reason to believe that the class of people whom we are now concerned with practise no prudential restraint whatever, and there can therefore be no reason for saying that any new system will be productive of increased improvidence. It has also been shown that Mr. Mill has ground for saying that, against over-population, peasant proprietorship is the best preservative yet known. But, besides these two weighty considerations, there is reason to prefer this system to that of hired labourers, because Government may lay down rules to preserve the integrity of properties, and these rules may act as a check on population over and above the natural effects of peasant proprietorship. These rules should be enforced because "brute custom" is of great force in matters of population, and habits of improvidence cannot be suddenly eradicated. But on the opposite plan of replacing the cottiers by hired labourers, no check at all would be put to the increase of population; the labourers would be abandoned entirely to their own control, and as they most likely would not become a saving class, they would in all likelihood soon be no better off than at present, although we grant the false assumption that their condition would for a brief period be improved. On this account therefore we should hold that, whether or not the nominal proprietorship should be reserved for the government, it would be certainly advisable to keep a watch over the subdivision of properties exactly as is now done by the more intelligent and respectable of Irish landlords.

These arguments are, it is obvious, quite independent of any opinion on the intrinsic merits of the small system of cultivation. All that it is necessary to show for our present purpose is, that there is no such enormous evil in the small system of cultivation as to overbalance that good which we hope would accrue from the institution of peasant proprietorship. Mr. Mill's judgment seems, however, to us so admirable on this point, that we will sum it up and present it entire to our readers; a study of it will serve to remove from the minds of many economists those opinions which, where they are not mere prejudices, are conclusions drawn from a very limited and exceptional experience. Mr. Mill's conclusions are, that the small system is a social nuisance when the rent is unfixed, and can be raised in consequence of the improvement of the property, and that it does more harm than good when the properties are too small to employ the whole time of the proprietor and those dependent on him; when the property is too small to give the owner a full security against any probable accidents of crop: and also that this system wastes much time when the properties do not lie in one place, but are divided into smaller holdings, between which the tenant has often to go to and fro. Also that in the case of crops not requiring very minute attention, the same labour will extract from the same land a greater return under the large system of cultivation, but that the small system will yield a larger gross produce than the large to the same number of hands employed, because of the greater industry and forethought which are developed in the minds of the peasant proprietors by the certain hope of enjoying the fruits of their own labour.

It is a consequence of this last proposition that the surplus produce available for supporting a non-agricultural population will be greater under a system of peasant proprietor than under any system of large farms on which the hired labourers are equally well fed. It is out of this surplus that all the most valuable portions of the community—all those whose trade it is to instruct, govern and educate the community—are for the most part subsisted. When therefore the agricultural population have a fair share of comfort, this surplus is the real test of the advantages or disadvantages accruing from any agricul-

tural system; but in any other case it is no test at all. There is no advantage but much evil in giving the labourers (as is done in Somersetshire* and Wiltshire) less food than will keep men in full working condition, in order that a large surplus may be left to support non-agricultural classes. Large masses of men are always degraded morally by extreme physical suffering. In matter of fact, a large portion of this surplus is expended on the producers of luxuries and on those non-productive classes who do nothing either for the wealth or the improvement of the community, and it is preposterous to benefit these at the expense of a more useful class. But even if the whole surplus were expended on the educators of the community it would be no adequate compensation for the moral degradation of a large portion of those who are to be educated. "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox which treadeth out the corn," is the true rule of Economics, and it is disgraceful that thinkers enough are found to hold and imply, if not in terms to state, a different doctrine.

On the whole, therefore, there is no ground for universally preferring the large system of cultivation, which, indeed, appears to be more beneficial only where it is necessary to enforce the utmost economy of labour. There is therefore no objection arising from the theory of agriculture against introducing the small system into Ireland. We have advanced strong positive reasons almost wholly derived from Mr. Mill's work, for recommending their immediate introduction: we have only to add on this point, that if the waste lands should prove insufficient to provide for the whole of the cottier population, Mr. Mill would turn their present holdings, under proper restrictions as to size, into farms, at a fair quit-rent, tendering of course to the proprietors of the soil the fair market-value of the land; a measure which assumes no more powers over the soil than an ordinary railway bill, and which is certainly justifiable if experience should prove it to be necessary.

Such is Mr. Mill's remedy for Ireland. For England he has two remedies: one, which we will mention first, is

* Mr. Thornton, the best authority on the subject, states that recruiting-sergeants find a marked difference of muscular strength between the south-west of England and the better-fed counties of the north and east. (*Overpopulation*, p. 24.)

designed to modify the intense and angry feeling of competition between labourers and capitalists that is observable at present. This is the scheme which was first recommended for general adoption by Mr. Babbage, and which, according to Mr. Mill, has been tried with excellent results both in America and in France, and also in this country for a long time past, in the Northern Whale Fisheries and the Cornish Mines. It essentially consists in making the workman the partner of the capitalist: in other words, it is proposed to pay them not a fixed salary, but a proportion of the profits. We need not here dwell much on the merits of this scheme, because it was not long since discussed in this Review by one more competent to the task. Its merit chiefly consists in giving the labourers an interest in the success of their work. From this it would ensue that industry would be stimulated and the gross produce be augmented both of manufacture and agriculture. A good feeling between labourers and capitalist would also facilitate all productive operations: and on this account there is every reason to believe that the adoption of this plan would raise to some extent the remuneration of labour, because the fund out of which labourers are paid would be greater than under the present system. But it is not in the least likely that this alteration in the mode of paying wages would in itself be adequate to meet the present difficulty. It may be doubted whether a plan could not be devised as a development of this scheme for combining the advantages both of the large and the small systems of cultivation, and also for making the condition of children as exclusively dependent on the actions of their parents, as is the case with the children of peasant proprietors. But whether this be so or not, it is clear the present rate of wages is too low to be sufficiently raised by any improvement in the mechanism of distribution. The additional amount produced would be quite insufficient to effect so great a change as is necessary.

Mr. Mill has therefore provided another scheme more capable of producing great and immediate effect. This remedy is a large scheme of Emigration. He recommends the transplantation of a number of labourers large enough to change the standard of comfort in which the remainder would live, and in which the next generation would be habitually

reared. This plan is not to be confounded with that recommended by the *Times* newspaper, and extensively countenanced by many influential persons. This latter scheme apparently contemplates an annual emigration as a permanent outlet for the overflow of the population. This latter will not remedy the present state of the lower classes, though it might keep one which was already good from any deterioration. Mr. Mill's scheme, on the other hand, is designed for the elevation of the lower orders as a whole. It will be evident that we are in consistency bound to maintain that no objections from the theory of population could be raised to this scheme, because we have laid down that large alterations in the standard of comfort generally raise what has been called the moral minimum of wages.

The only other important difficulty likely to be started is the expense, and this Mr. Mill has a theory to encounter. He remarks that it is of no consequence that taxation entrench on the capital of a country, if the capital appropriated by Government were about to expatriate itself on account of a prevailing low rate of profit. If Government borrow the money, the process is that the coming of a new trustworthy borrower into the market raises the rate of interest and keeps capital at home. If the amount is raised by taxation, the effect is, that a certain portion of capital which was on its way to the loan-market, and from thence to foreign countries, is intercepted by the Government, and transferred to purposes of a national instead of an individual utility. In the case of England this argument certainly applies. It is a fact of experience, that when the interest of money* is two per cent., capital habitually emigrates, or, what is here the same thing, is wasted on foolish speculations, which never yield any adequate return. It would clearly be no national loss if this capital were appropriated by the Government for national purposes: the best mode, perhaps, being to take it direct from capital on a terminable annuity of thirty years' duration. So that Mr. Mill has clearly answered those Economists and Manchester manufacturers who exclaim against entrenching on the National Capital for any purposes, however

* See Fullerton on the Currency, p. 161.

philanthropic. He has shown, by an argument which is so obvious when seen, as to disguise the merit of seeing it, that there exists an ample fund out of which all the higher interests of state can be satisfied, without diminishing the permanent opulence of the country. Nor is there any service so much needed from a political philosopher at the present time.

This argument, though weighty as it stands, cannot be fully appreciated, except by taking into account one or two general circumstances affecting the rate of profit, the consideration of which we accordingly postponed until the present time. The first of these propositions is, that an unlimited amount of capital cannot be employed in an old country without a diminution of the rate of profit. It has been shown that an increase of co-operative capital is of necessity accompanied by some increase of remunerative, because machinery cannot be worked without manual labour, and the extra demand for labour will require more funds to compensate for its exertion. But a large portion of remunerative capital consists of food, which as we have seen requires the application of capital to land under circumstances which in any fixed condition of the productive arts reduce the rate of return in proportion as the capital expended is from time to time augmented. The price of corn therefore rises, and it may be assumed that either the physical minimum of wages exists and must be maintained, or that the moral minimum exists and will be maintained. In either of these cases, the money-wages of labour must rise or the real remuneration of labour will fall off. Moreover, it is clear that if money-wages rise, and the price of commodities do not rise also, profits must fall. The capitalist has more to pay for getting his work done, and he has also less for himself in consequence. That prices cannot rise is clear, because the cause here assigned acts, with an exception here unimportant, equally on all employments. If money were produced in the country, the wages of the miners would rise, as well as the wages of other labourers, or the same cause which is supposed to operate to raise the value of commodities, as compared with money, is equally operative to raise the value of money as compared with commodities. It is obvious that no circumstance can change the relative value of two commodities which affects equally the

supply of both, and does not at all affect the demand for either.

Therefore with an increase of capital, it is proved that there must be an increase of food; that an increase of food is most frequently accompanied by an increased cost of handwork,* and that an increased outlay on manual labour will be accompanied by a diminution of profit.

This assumes, that the industrial arts undergo no improvement sufficient to compensate for the inferior return from poorer soils, and to prevent the price of food from rising. Mr. Mill is of opinion, that in general the progress of industrial improvement is a less powerful force than the necessity of resorting to inferior land. The price of food from century to century is the obvious criterion of this fact, if only money be of an unaltered cost. Taking into account any deranging circumstances affecting the rate of wages, it is also clear that the history of the rate of interest will be an adequate indication of the force respectively exerted by each of these two antagonistic agencies. The history of the rate of interest in England has yet to be written, and therefore we cannot find any complete test, by which to discover the relative progress of these two forces. Few subjects so interesting to a philosopher, yet remain so thoroughly uninvestigated.

The obvious bearing of this theory on the Emigration of capital is, that since the rate of profit is being gradually lowered in an old country, sometimes it will come to a point at which persons will rather seek a higher rate abroad. There is always a certain minimum rate for anything below which persons will not think it worth while to accumulate. That minimum varies indeed with the habits of a people, yet in any one generation there is a point beyond which it will not go; and there is obviously a minimum beyond which it will not go at all. In an old country like England this minimum rate will not bear

* What we call in the text the art of work or handwork, is usually called the cost of labour; but this phrase expresses naturally the rate of a labourer's wages per diem. The only use of a special phrase is to mark that the labourer is concerned with what he gets as pay for a given exertion during a given time, i. e. his wages: and that the capitalist is concerned with the result of that exertion, i. e. the work done. The common phrase seems to us to fail signally in working out this distinction.

much reduction, and therefore we must contentedly look for the emigration of capital, and, what is worse to the world, though nationally the same, its destruction by foolish speculations, of which commercial crises are the inevitable results.

Hence it is clear that there will be in this country, for many years, a fund from which the higher purposes of Government may be achieved without entrenching on the support of the labouring people or the real opulence of the nation. In reference to the Emigration scheme, it may be said, that the effect of Government interference simply is to determine, that capital, which was going to leave the country, shall go to that particular foreign country, to which the labourer has been removed. It was before fixed that capital should emigrate: the direction of that migration is settled by the operations of Government. On such grounds as these, therefore, Mr. Mill contends that his scheme if adopted is in the highest degree beneficial. It is greatly preferable to any that we have ever seen proposed for remedying the economical wants of the lower classes: and its adoption is in our judgment the very best measure open to the selection of an English Government. To us it seems the best attainable means of attaining a necessary condition of all future social improvement.

We have now arrived at the end of our long labour. We have discussed the circumstances now affecting the condition of the labouring classes, and also the schemes proposed for their advantage. Of Mr. Mill's speculations on this subject we have shown ourselves no lukewarm admirers. And on this account we are at liberty to say that his chapter on the future condition of the labouring classes very much disappointed us. The lower orders are there treated as if they were beings of pure intellect. We do not for a moment deny that it is of great consequence to give the working classes intellectual cultivation, and to develop in their minds a relish for intellectual pleasures, yet we also think that the peculiar qualities of Mr. Mill's mind have led him to assign to such considerations a space out of proportion to their importance. The most important matters for the labouring classes, as for all others, are restraining discipline over their passions and an effec-

tual culture of their consciences. In recent times these wants are more pressing than ever. Great towns are depots of temptation, and, unless care be taken, corrupters of all deep moral feeling. The passions also act with more violence than elsewhere in the intervals of a monotonous occupation, and owing to the increasing division of labour the industrial tasks of mankind are every day becoming more and more monotonous. To these considerations Mr. Mill has not alluded, nor has he enlarged on the dangers of that union between democracy and low wages which in our view make his plans for the elevation of the populace of such urgent and practical interest. If Mr. Mill had been a mere political economist, no blame would have attached to him. But he considers, beside the abstract and isolated consequences of the mere desire for wealth, the application also of these consequences, with all necessary corrections, to the real world of human action. He was therefore bound to have noticed the deeper considerations we have named, and to have neglected to notice them is an omission not less unpleasing because decidedly congenial to a purely intellectual and secular thinker.

And now as we are in the act of concluding our remarks on this admirable work, it is full time to mention what is perhaps its most peculiar merit. It has been well remarked that a writer on detached points in a science need only show his reader where he has succeeded: the author of a systematic treatise must also show them where he has failed. The latter must follow the course of his subject, though it lead him to problems which he fails to solve—the former by selecting his favourite points may easily conceal from his readers that he has ever been vanquished at all. The most appropriate praise to this work is, that it evades no difficulty, and of the problems which occur solves rightly a proportion, on its peculiar subject, beyond all precedent large. No doubt a severe judge will decide that this book is far from perfect. He will we think find there some indistinctness of expression and some diffuseness of explanation, an occasional dogmatism where there is ground for doubt, an excessive averseness to subtle speculation, and a defective appreciation of some moral and religious considerations. But after all abatements have been made, the severest judge will unhesitatingly pronounce that though

there have been in England many acute speculators who have by their economical writings gained much credit in their day and generation, three men only have by such means attained permanent rank among the great thinkers of their country, and that these three are Adam Smith, Ricardo, and John Mill.

ART. III.—HALLAM'S SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES.

Supplemental Notes to the View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages. By Henry Hallam. 1848. One Volume, pp. 418.

THE publication of Mr. Hallam's "Middle Ages" in the year 1817 forms an æra in our historical literature. Two great faults are evident in the works which previously enjoyed the highest reputation,—one, that their authors wrote with a preconceived idea of the Middle Ages, and selected only such facts as tended to confirm it; the other, that they generalized too hastily, and attributed to this whole period, usages, institutions, and above all ideas, which really belonged only to particular places and times. The history of political institutions especially had been distorted to suit the views of opposing partisans. When the struggle between the privileged orders and the people began in England in the 17th century and in France early in the 18th, the idea of prescription in politics was as firmly fixed in the minds of the advocates of liberty as of their antagonists, and each endeavoured to appropriate this argument to himself. Popular rights were supposed to rest on charters or unwritten traditionary usage; the reciprocal claims of governors and the governed were deduced from an original compact; and each generation was compelled to establish its title to security from oppression by proving that its predecessors had been free. To ascend to first principles in government, and claim social and political liberty as RIGHTS OF MAN, was a flight far beyond that age. Hence mediæval times became the battle-field of modern political parties. Each sought, in the spirit of an advocate, not of an historical inquirer, the facts which were favourable to his own client, and as those times really exhibited the operation of popular as well as monarchical and aristocratic influences, it was easy to make out a case for either, according to the prepossession of the writer, without any direct violation of the truth. In France, the monarchical Velly, the aristocratical Boulainvilliers and the democratic Abbé de Mably could find plausible

reasons for maintaining the most opposite views of the early French Monarchy. In Britain, Hume could persuade his readers, and perhaps himself, that in the reign of Elizabeth the government of England was as despotic as that of Turkey, and that till the time of the Stuarts Englishmen had no idea that they lived under a limited monarchy; while Millar found the Bill of Rights in the whole previous history of the constitution.

The French Revolution took away much of their interest from these antiquarian genealogies of prerogative and liberty. A Frenchman of the Republic, to whom Liberty and Equality had been decreed by law, cared little for the share of either possessed by his progenitors under the Carlovingian kings; to a subject of the Empire, Napoleon and his code stood in the place of the Ordonnances of Louis XI., the *Etablissements* of St. Louis and the *Capitularies* of Charlemagne. In England too, the eagerness with which constitutional antiquities had been discussed gave place to a more interesting question, whether the whole fabric of our mixed monarchy was not to be swept away, and a simple democracy established in its place, or even its independent existence merged in the overwhelming flood of military conquest. In all the governments of continental Europe, the same indifference to inquiries into their ancient constitutions was produced; these had been either wholly changed, or had undergone such modifications that the continuity of tradition was broken. The overthrow of the French power in 1815 restored the connection between the past and the present which the Revolution had interrupted; legitimacy, after a long abeyance, was again acknowledged as a principle of the public law of Europe; and as sovereigns returned to history for the foundation of their titles, subjects began to look to the same source as the origin of their liberties. Mr. Hallam's *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages* appeared just at this interesting crisis, and soon obtained a place, both in England and on the continent, among works of the highest authority. The marked difference of its tone from that of the books which had been previously written on the same subjects, was not less remarkable than the wide range of knowledge which it displayed. This was owing no doubt in part to the character of

the author's mind, candid, grave, impartial, loving the truth, and sparing no labour for its discovery. But the temper of the times also contributed to raise him above those eager party disputes which had infected our previous constitutional histories with their virulence and heat. What had before been vital questions of constitutional law between Whigs and Tories had become curious historical problems to be worked out by learned research. No one dreamt of placing the right of popular representation on the constitution of the Witenagemote; or reviving the dispensing power of the crown by the precedent of the Tudors. The events of the preceding twenty-five years had strengthened the attachment of the English to the forms of their ancient government, but had also accustomed them to a more comprehensive mode of judging political questions. Some other plea than mere antiquity was necessary for the maintenance of our traditionary institutions; it was evident that nothing could be permanently maintained, which did not prove itself suited to the exigencies of the present times or capable of being adapted to them.

The impartiality which the testimony of all sides allots to Mr. Hallam does not imply any indifference to the great questions of constitutional history. His sympathies everywhere show themselves to be with the cause of liberty and progress—liberty within the bounds of law, and progress by the peaceful impulses of research and discussion. To those ardent admirers of political progress, who would welcome anarchy as a means of its advancement, he will appear coldly cautious; yet we believe that his *Medieval and Constitutional Histories* have had a very important influence in modifying both extremes of political party, reclaiming radicals and tempering the rabid Toryism of George the Third's reign into modern conservatism. He himself appears to have remained where he was in 1818, firm in his devotion to the constitution of 1688, and not to have fully apprehended the lessons which his own works have taught to a younger generation. An ominous passage in the preface to his *History of Literature* alludes to "the gathering in the heavens," the passing of the Reform Bill, as a "warning to bind up his sheaves while he may," as if he thought a storm of revolution was impending. In 1848,

we think, he can scarcely avoid regarding that measure as having drawn off, quietly and seasonably, the electric matter, which might otherwise have convulsed our atmosphere as it has done that of neighbouring countries, striking down the pinnacles of the palace and firing the roof of the cottage. Indeed we hardly see in what respect the Revolution Settlement has been disturbed by the Reform Bill. The time-honoured constitution of England still flourishes, in its four great branches of King, Lords, Commons, and Rotten Boroughs. The slight pruning which this fourth estate has undergone only seems to have caused it to put forth more luxuriant shoots.

The interval which has elapsed since Mr. Hallam's first publication has greatly increased the materials of history. Many original documents have been published, in France, Germany and England, and histories written, by which new lights have been thrown either on the whole series of events or on detached periods. The names of Sismondi, Michelet and Guizot are sufficient to suggest what French history has gained during the last thirty years; it has in fact been created; before that time, with an unexampled richness in Memoirs, and a noble series of original documents, France had really no history. Mr. Hallam has wisely abstained from interweaving in each successive edition the improvements which he derived from these sources, and reserved them till they were sufficient to form a supplemental volume. In his preface he enumerates and characterizes the authors to whose labours he has been principally indebted. When he says of Michelet that he is "a poet in all but his fidelity to truth," we think he has sacrificed—an occasional fault of Mr. Hallam's style—accuracy to antithesis. Such praise is hardly reconcileable with the charge which he himself brings against Michelet, of "ridiculous exaggeration," in his bitterness against England. The mention of Guizot gives occasion to a generous expression of admiration and sympathy.

"I turn with more respect to a great name in historical literature, and which is only less great in that sense than it might have been, because it belongs also to the groundwork of all future history—the whole series of events which have been developed on the scene of Europe for twenty years now past. No envy of faction, no caprice

of fortune, can tear from M. Guizot the trophy which time has bestowed, that he, for nearly eight years, past and irrevocable, held in his firm grasp a power so fleeting before, and felt only, with the monarchy which he had sustained, in the convulsive throes of his country.

‘ . . . cras vel atrâ
Nube polum Pater occupato
Vel sole puro: non tamen irritum
Quodcunque retro est, efficiet.’ *Hor. Od. iii. 29.*

“It has remained for my distinguished friend to manifest that high attribute of a great man’s mind—a constant and unsubdued spirit in adversity, and to turn once more to those tranquil pursuits of earlier days which bestow a more unmingled enjoyment and a more unenvied glory, than the favour of kings or the applause of senates.”

We rejoice to find from this passage that M. Guizot is returning to those historical studies for which he is qualified by a union of accurate knowledge, profound philosophy and power of style, beyond any man living. The review of his administration, however, suggests to our minds a different passage of the poet from that which Mr. Hallam has applied to him. He could resist the “civium ardor prava jubentium,” the clamours of an irritated and ambitious people for war; had he shown an equally solid mind in opposition to the “vultus instantis tyranni,” and not suffered a self-willed and ambitious master to involve him in those diplomatic intrigues in which the noblest can hardly keep their garments white, he would really have sustained the monarchy of France, instead of assisting to dig its grave.

The additions which Mr. Hallam has made to his history are in the form of notes upon passages which required amplification or correction, and they could not always be understood without quotation of the passage to which they refer. In speaking of the decline of the Carlovingian power under the successors of Charlemagne, he has occasion to touch on the question of the influence of the difference of races upon the history of the Kingdoms which were formed out of the ruins of the Roman Empire. It is only within the last few years that the attention of historians has been drawn to this influence, as affecting remoter periods of history, though Great Britain had within her own bosom living evidences of its power in the

*Hor. Od. }
iii. 3.*

feelings with which the Saxon, Norman and Celtic elements of her own population have regarded and still regard each other. It was a Frenchman, M. Thierry, who first pointed out how the animosity of the Saxon and Norman population of England affected our history for many reigns subsequent to the Conquest. The same writer has applied his principle to France, and has found a key to all the revolutions of two centuries from the reign of Charles the Bald to Hugh Capet, in the antipathy of the Romans, that is the ancient inhabitants, to the Franks and Germans. The latter were represented by the house of Charlemagne; the former by that of Robert the Brave, through its valiant descendants, Eudes, Robert and Hugh the Great. Sismondi and Guizot have partially adopted the same principle, without carrying it to such a length as Thierry, whose disposition to push every thing to an extreme is strongly marked in his History of England under the Normans. It is very difficult to arrive at any thing like a distinct conception of national sentiment, when the annals of a people are so meagre and jejune as those of France during the period in question, and no popular literature exists from which the cold outline of the chronicler can be filled up with warm and vivid colours. Thierry, we believe, would never have discovered in our histories the mutual hatred of Saxon and Norman, in such distinct features, had not *Ivanhoe* preceded him. An historical Romance from a master's hand may thus be of use even to the historian, by refreshing the faded tints of antique manners and sentiments;—it is the remark of Aristotle, that “poetry is more philosophical than history.” The danger is that as the romance-writer creates as well as revives, the historian should endeavour to realize his pictures by exaggeration or misconception of the ancient authorities. Mr. Hallam justly thinks that Thierry and his school have attributed too much influence to the difference of race, in accomplishing the change of dynasty from the Carolingians to the Capets:—

“Though the differences of origin and language, so far as they existed, might be by no means unimportant in the great revolution near the close of the tenth century, they cannot be relied upon as sufficiently explaining its cause. The partisans of either family were not exclusively of one blood. The house of Capet itself was

not of Roman but probably of Saxon descent. The difference of races had been much effaced after Charles the Bald, but the great beneficiaries, the most wealthy and potent families in Neustria or France, were of Barbarian origin. One people, as far as we can distinguish them, was by far the most numerous; the other of more influence in political affairs."

After observing, as a further proof that the division in sentiment was not one of race, that the people south of the Loire, the most purely Roman, were faithful adherents of the house of Charlemagne, to whom according to Thierry's theory they should have been most hostile, he proceeds:—

"The long greatness of one family, its manifest influence over the succession to the throne, the conspicuous men whom it produced in Eudes and Hugh the Great, had silently prepared the way for a revolution neither unnatural nor premature, nor in any way dangerous to the public interests. It is certainly probable that the Neustrian French had come to feel a greater sympathy with the house of Capet than with a line of kings who rarely visited their country, and whom they could not but contemplate as in some adverse relation to their natural and popular chiefs. But the national voice was not greatly consulted in those ages. It is remarkable that several writers of the nineteenth century, however they may sometimes place the true condition of the people in a vivid light, are constantly relapsing into a democratic theory. They do not by any means underrate the oppressed and almost servile condition of the peasantry and burghesses, when it is their aim to draw a picture of society, yet in reasoning on a political revolution, such as the decline and fall of the German Dynasty, they ascribe to these degraded classes both the will and the power to effect it. The proud nationality which spurned a foreign line of princes could not be felt by an impoverished and afflicted commonalty. Among the nobles of France, I fear that self-interest, personal attachments and a predominant desire of maintaining their independence against the crown were motives far more in operation than the wish to hear the king speak French instead of German. It seems upon the whole that M. Thierry's hypothesis, countenanced by M. Guizot, will not afford a complete explanation of the history of France between Charles the Fat and Hugh Capet. The truth is, that the accidents of personal character have far more to do with the revolutions of nations than either philosophical historians or democratic politicians like to admit."—P. 40.

In speaking of the reign of Philip IV. of France, Mr. Hallam has a curious note on the Knights Templars, whose Order was suppressed, with circumstances of great

cruelty by that sovereign, in conjunction with Pope Clement V., a Frenchman whom his intrigues had raised to the papal throne. In his original work he had entirely passed over this event of Philip's reign, for the not very sufficient reason, that he could not satisfy his mind on the disputed problem as to the guilt attributed to that Order. Since that time it has been much discussed on the Continent, and although he confesses that he is not yet prepared to give an absolutely determinate judgment, he winds up his statement with a strong intimation of the preponderant probability of the Templars' guilt.

This change appears to have been wrought in his mind chiefly by a publication of the celebrated orientalist Von Hammer in the "*Fundgruben des Orients*," Vol. 6, entitled "Mysterium Baphometis Revelatum, seu Fratres Militiæ Templi, quæ Gnostici et quidem Ophiani, Apostasiæ, Idololatriæ et Impuritatis convicti per ipsa eorum monumenta."* Its object is to establish the identity of the idolatry ascribed to the Templars with that of the ancient Gnostic sects, and especially those denominated Ophites, or worshippers of the serpent, and to prove also that the extreme impurity which forms one of the revolting and hardly credible charges adduced by Philip IV. is similar in all its details to the practice of the Gnostics. Mr. Hallam admits that the attack is not conducted with all the coolness which bespeaks impartiality; but thinks the evidence sufficiently startling to make refutation difficult. We feel hesitation in opposing our judgment to that of an author so much habituated to the investigation and comparison of evidence as Mr. Hallam; but to us M. Von Hammer's paper appears a string of groundless assumptions and vague conjectures, while his charges are urged with as much heat and bitterness against the unfortunate Templars as if he had been Attorney-General under Philip IV.

We should clearly understand what the charge is. We believe the tendency of all institutions involving vows of celibacy is to produce impurity of morals, which nothing but supervision and the free influence of public opinion

* Mr. Addison in his *History of the Knights Templars* (2nd Ed. 1842) appears to be entirely ignorant of Von Hammer's paper and the discussion which it has occasioned on the continent.

can counteract. Even vows of poverty and an ascetic life avail nothing against natural impulses, and we do not affect to think that at the time of the dissolution of the Order of the Templars, the rigid purity which the rules of St. Bernard enforced had not been grossly infringed. Their wealth, their military life, their exemption from episcopal control, all tended to increase the licentiousness to which the monastic life is prone. Nor would we question the truth of the imputation of unbelief in Christianity and the doctrines of the Church, especially of the real presence, which their accusers brought against them. Free thinking, repressed by a jealous spiritual despotism, like a disease unskillfully repelled from the surface, falls with the more virulence upon the inward and vital parts; the Inquisitor makes the deist and the atheist. While the dominion of the Church was supreme, a secret and confidential assemblage, such as a refectory of the Templars, was the only place in which freedom of thought could be indulged; and as stolen waters are the sweetest, the very secrecy and confidence of the meeting would increase the zest of petulant and licentious speech. Suppose that a short-hand writer behind the screen had taken down the table-talk of naval and military messes during the last century, even when the chaplains were present, would the record have given a high idea of the Christian belief and morals of the soldiers and sailors of Great Britain? But though M. Von Hammer takes advantage of the evil repute into which the Templars had fallen, perhaps justly, to bespeak credit for his charges against them, his accusation is of something much more definite, than a loose morality and sceptical principles. He distinctly charges them with initiating their members by ceremonies in which a blasphemous contempt of the founder of the Christian religion was united with revolting indecency: with the practice of promiscuous impurities; with Gnostic heresies, and especially with the worship of the serpent, and of those emblems which in the ancient world sanctified excess under the veil of religion. Now we confess that nothing but the most damning evidence could bring us to believe, in this or any case of similar accusations, that men have united themselves together under the hypocritical pretence of religion, in order to have an opportunity of licentious indulgence. Corruption is not the

germ of existence but the commencement of dissolution. We have great faith in the *honour of human nature*, and recommend this faith as a very useful antidote to the calumnies which the *odium theologicum* has so abundantly invented, and of which direct confutation is not always possible. Strong in this faith, we should, even in the absence of all positive evidence, take the part of the Jews against Tacitus,* who declares that there was no degree of licentiousness which they did not allow themselves, and against Christians and Mahometans who have charged them with sacrificing infants at the Passover—of the early Christians themselves against the heathens—of heretics against orthodox fathers—of the Albigenses against Popes and Inquisitors—and of the Templars against M. Von Hammer. Let us however examine his proofs.

The enemies of the Templars alleged, that they worshipped an image which they called *Baphomet*. Now there are found in collections of antiquities small human figures of stone with singular inscriptions and ornaments, and he supposes these to be the Baphomet in question. But the proof entirely fails that any such name properly belongs to them, or that they belong to the Templars. In a subsequent number of the same work which contains M. Von Hammer's paper, there is a dissertation by a German author, whose very name, *Gruber von Grubensfels*, is a pledge of his laborious research, in which it is shown, by arguments, to say the least, as good as M. Von H.'s, that these are the work of the alchemists; one of them which exhibits the moon and stars with the words $\tau\omega\nu\ \upsilon\delta\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu\ \chi\rho\upsilon\sigma\sigma\omicron\varsigma$ certainly has a very alchemical aspect. On another M. Von H. reads an inscription in barbarous Latin, in which the words *me* and *gno* occur. Now *me* he says is short for *metis* (which is found at full length on others of them), and *gno* for *gnosis*, and thus he connects the Templars with the Gnostics; $\mu\eta\tau\iota\varsigma = \sigma\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha = \gamma\nu\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$, i. e. the Gnostic doctrine, and Baphomet is $\beta\alpha\phi\eta\ \mu\eta\tau\iota\omicron\varsigma$, initiation in Gnosticism. When we consider that the question at issue is whether the Templars were justly burnt to death at a slow fire, we can scarcely laugh at this egregious piece of ety-

* Inter se nihil illicitum; nec quidquam prius imbuuntur transgressi in modum eorum quam contemnere deos, exuere patriam, parentes, liberos fratres vilia habere."—Hist. I. 5. 5.

mological trifling. Baphomet is we believe, like *Mahound*, a corruption of the name of Mahomet. M. Von Hammer quotes an Arabic inscription on a cup, which he thinks contains a revelation of the mystery of iniquity which was the bond of the Templars' association : on such a subject we can only oppose authority to authority. The *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* for March 1822 contains a notice of M. Von H.'s paper, supposed to be written by the eminent orientalist Gesenius, who says that if the Arabic words mean what he supposes, they are heaped together without order or grammar ; that many other things may be made out of them with equal plausibility, and that they seem to be the work of the alchemists. The identification of the secret doctrine of the Templars with the Ophianite form of the Gnostic heresy is supported by very slight evidence. Of all symbols the serpent is the most slippery, sometimes denoting the Good and sometimes the Evil Principle ; in the Gnostic emblems, which were borrowed from the old Egyptian, it certainly represented the Agathodæmon. Even were the proofs of a derivation of the emblems attributed to the Templars from those of the Gnostics more certain than it is, the inference of blasphemy and idolatry on the part of the former would be wholly unwarranted. On the subject of the images and symbols of a gross kind, alleged to have been used by the Templars, M. Von Hammer displays none of that sobriety of judgment by which an historical critic should be distinguished. Anything may become "evil to him that evil thinks," and we firmly believe that the author has invented a great part of the impurity which he charges on the Templars. He sees it in the form of T in which their churches were sometimes built ; in the form of a bowl ; and even ascribes the same vile origin to the renowned *Sangreal* of the romances. There remains the fact that these churches exhibit in their sculpture and ornaments representations of objects and scenes strangely at variance with the sanctity of the places in which they are found. But this is no special charge against the Templars ; other ecclesiastical structures of the Middle Ages are disfigured by similar representations. We leave it to the Durandists and M. Von Hammer to settle, whether they are the fruit of a profound symbolism or of a polluted imagination and corrupt manners. To us they seem indi-

cative of a reaction against an enforced asceticism and overstrained devotion ; but at all events the regular and even the parochial clergy of the Middle Ages must bear in common with the Templars any imputation of secret iniquities which they may justify. Indeed M. Von Hammer himself lays the blame upon the Free Masons, who built many of these churches, and whom he supposes also to draw their descent from the Gnostics. Thus one arbitrary supposition is added to another, and the whole is called a chain of evidence. He concludes his paper by observing that the accusations made against the Templars tally with his discoveries. It would have been extraordinary if they had not ; for he had the accusations before him, and has made his discoveries tally with them. The connection between them, however, is wholly of his imagining. We find a charge of worshipping Baphomet, described as an image with three faces, and two carbuncles for eyes, which they adored as their God and Saviour, believing that it had given the Order all its wealth, that it caused the earth to bring forth seed and the trees to flourish ; but no production of images with *me* or *metis* upon them in proof of the charge : we find accusations of impure lives, but no appeal in confirmation of them to the form of the letter T, or to the sculptures on bowls or in churches.

If we advert to the manner in which the suppression of the Order of the Templars was effected, we cannot consider it in any other light than as an act of judicial murder and confiscation. The grand Master, Jacques de Molay, was treacherously induced to leave Cyprus and come to France with sixty of his knights by a pretence of consulting him respecting a new crusade and the union of the Templars and Knights of the Hospital ; the Templars were imprisoned, but no confession of the crimes imputed to them by a recreant member of the Order could be gained from them, and torture was then applied, under the direction of the Dominican Inquisitors. We should needlessly shock the feelings of our readers were we to detail the diabolical expedients which these practised torturers employed to force a confession ; in several instances they were successful ; but those who survived (for many expired under the question) when subsequently brought before an ecclesiastical commission, authorized by the Pope, generally revoked

these confessions, and protested that if under the influence of similar tortures in future they should be induced to acknowledge themselves guilty, such acknowledgment would be false. The Templars in England when pressed with the confessions of their brethren in France, protested against them as having been obtained by torture. This revocation of their extorted confessions was made the plea for their destruction. The archbishop of Sens, who had newly been placed in that See, on the urgent recommendation of Philip IV. to the Pope, convoked a council, before which the Templars were brought. By their confession that on their admission into the Order they had renounced Jesus Christ, they had declared themselves heretics, but had also reconciled themselves with the Church; in revoking that confession it was declared they had relapsed into heresy, and thereby made themselves obnoxious to the penalty of burning. The next day they were carried to the place of execution, without the Porte St. Antoine at Paris, and while surrounded with the faggots with which they were to be consumed, the executioners holding in their hands the lighted torches with which they were to be kindled, they were again offered their lives if they would confess their guilt, but unanimously refused, and died with protestations of their innocence. The stake is not always a test of truth; witches have acknowledged a crime which we know to be imaginary; the martyrdom of Craumer proved only the earnestness of his own faith and the recovered ascendancy of conscience. But the dying Templars bore witness to a *fact* of which they could not be ignorant, their Order's innocence of the imputations of spitting on the cross at their admission, killing infants and anointing idols with their blood, and practising revolting impurities in their secret conclaves. We can neither refuse to believe them sincere, nor to conclude that the Order was unjustly condemned, whatever may have been the sins or crimes of individuals.

The most plausible ground for believing that the testimony given against the Templars was not suborned is, that Philip IV. did not really convert to his own use any considerable portion of their forfeited estates, which were either given to the Knights Hospitallers, or to the Church, or squandered in gifts to the nobility. The same remark holds good of England: in Spain, Naples, Bohemia, the

sovereigns gave the goods of the Templars to other military Orders, but united the masterships and commanderships of these Orders to the Crown. We are therefore inclined to believe that jealousy rather than avarice was the primary motive to their suppression. They were no dutiful sons of the Church; freethinking is a probable charge against them; their Grand Master exercised something very like the power of absolution. There was therefore abundant reason for the enmity of the Pope. The jealousy of sovereigns bent on establishing their prerogative, like Philip IV. and Edward I., was excited by the wealth of the Order, their ramifications throughout Europe, their military prowess, and their secret organization under a chief of their own. We may seem perhaps to have dwelt too long upon this subject; but the name of Mr. Hallam, notwithstanding the qualification with which his unfavourable judgment is expressed, might give currency to what we believe to be the revival of an exploded calumny.

Mr. Hallam has carefully revised that part of his work which relates to the feudal system, and in many instances corrected his original statements from the elaborate works which have been published on this subject in England, France and Germany. The tendency of these corrections is to limit the application of general positions respecting feudal usages, and show how various were the forms of that polity in different countries, and how unsafe are all arguments from analogy. Our readers, however, could be little interested in his learned notes on Alodial Land, and Salic Laws, Feuds, Commendation and Relief, or the condition of Tributarii, Lidi and Coloni. More interest may be felt in his additional remarks on the subject of municipal institutions which have lately received so great a development amongst us, and which are a most important part of the heritage which we have derived from the Middle Ages. In his first edition Mr. Hallam had pronounced, that though it would not have been perhaps repugnant to the spirit of the Frank and Gothic conquerors to have left the provincial cities in the possession of the privileges which they had enjoyed under the Roman Empire, yet there was no satisfactory proof that they were preserved, either in France or Italy; or if they existed at all, they were swept away in the former country, during the confusion of the ninth century,

which ended in the establishment of the feudal system. The works of Savigny and Raynouard have induced him considerably to modify this opinion. He fully admits the continuance of the curial constitution in the cities of the South of France, which far exceeded those of the North in wealth, and were much more deeply imbued with the spirit of Roman civilization, which came to them earlier and departed later. To those of the North he is disposed to assign a different origin, deducing them from the guilds or companies of merchants, without any direct derivation from the Roman institutions (p. 163). We apprehend, however, that he in fact concedes all that the advocate of the Roman origin of municipal institutions would contend for. If they had been everywhere extinct, in fact and even in tradition, then they might be claimed as an institution of the Middle Ages and the Teutonic conquerors; but if they remained from the Roman times in the South, then it is fair to presume that it was by imitation that the guilds of the northern cities grow into corporations. A similar remark may be made respecting the municipal institutions which communities extorted by insurrection from their lords or which they granted them upon due consideration. They were not devised, but framed after existing models. There was one important difference in the municipalities of the North; a more democratic spirit prevailed in them from the first; even in the South their offices were elective instead of being hereditary, as in the curial system of the Empire. The kings of France, who have been supposed to favour the establishment of municipalities, in order to use them as a counterpoise to the nobles, generally consented to their erection only as a matter of necessity, or sold them their charters at a very dear rate. Louis XI., however, who was one of the most sagacious though most unprincipled of the French monarchs, did perceive how much the prosperity of his kingdom and the stability of the monarchy depended on the encouragement of the cities, and gave several of them the power of choosing their own magistrates and arming for their own defence. In regard to England, Mr. Hallam admits that he had been too much swayed in his former edition, in estimating the state of our towns before the Conquest, by the opinion of the

last century, that municipal privileges were derived primarily from charters of the twelfth century. There was, however, a marked difference between the germinal principle of our Anglo-Norman corporations and those of the continent. With us they evidently sprung from territorial divisions and jurisdictions, which included alike the country and the town, but which naturally developed themselves differently in such different soils. The name of alderman belonged properly to the county; the name *ward*, which in *wardmote* marks the governing and anciently judicial body of a civic division, is found also in the counties, as in Northumberland and Lanarkshire. This, however, which may be presumed to have existed even in Saxon times, gives us only the rudiments of a municipal corporation in the modern sense. The city of London, whose history is best known, obtained under the Norman princes a chief magistrate under the name of mayor, the liberty of choosing its own sheriffs and of electing from its own citizens a body of councillors. And it is probable that, notwithstanding their difference of origin, the corporations of the continental cities may have served to influence the subsequent modifications of our own.

Our constitutional and judicial antiquities have been the subject of very learned and acute investigation in the last thirty years, in Mr. Allen's *View of the Prerogative of the Kings of England*, Sir Francis Palgrave's *Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, and the *Report of the Lords' Committee*, which though professing to relate to the Dignity of a Peer, really embraces all the difficult questions respecting the early constitution of both Houses of Parliament. The two former writers have each their own theoretical views to maintain, and Mr. Hallam's *Notes* are peculiarly valuable as correctives to their tendency to interpret evidence to the support of these views. Nothing is so captivating as to believe that we have discovered a principle which explains all phenomena, a formula which meets all cases; and nothing is so rare, as to find in history a principle or formula so comprehensive. The tendency of Mr. Hallam's mind is directly the reverse: he suspects all such generalizations, and usually concludes by some middle view, accordant with the mixed and varying

causes by which human affairs are influenced. The student of history will not find any guide to whom he may so safely give himself up.

One of the subjects on which he has considerably modified his statements is the original nature of Jury Trial. The popular idea of this venerable institution is, that it has existed from the days of King Alfred very much in the same form in which it was vindicated by Erskine on the State Trials. But development is the law of institutions as well as of opinions, and when we come to look narrowly into their history we find that while their name remains unchanged an entirely new spirit has been infused into them. Those who were acquainted with our legal antiquities had long been aware that in causes regarding the right to lands the jury were not brought together to hear parole and documentary evidence, and to decide nice questions of genealogy, but of *their own knowledge* to award the thing in dispute to him whom they considered to be its lawful claimant. Nor was this so absurd as it may seem to us; for the facts by which the claim was to be decided were generally notorious to the vicinage in which they had occurred. As Sir Francis Palgrave has observed,—“By the declaration of the husband at the church door, the wife was endowed in the presence of the assembled relatives and the attendants of the bridal train; the birth of the heir was recollected by the retainers who had participated in the cheer of the baronial hall; and the death of the ancestor was proved by the friends who had heard the wailings of the widow or had followed the corpse to the grave.” Trial by Jury was therefore not an appeal to the judgment but to the knowledge of the country, and a panel was summoned of those who were best acquainted with the point at issue. The *afforcement* as it is called of the jury, the origin of that law of unanimity which now produces such embarrassing results, consisted in dismissing from the panel those jurors who declared their knowledge to be insufficient, and supplying their place with others, till they could agree in their decision. Even in regard to questions of succession, however, it would be impossible long to continue this limitation of evidence to that which existed within the minds of the jurors themselves; in criminal cases, as we see from the practice of compurgation, great weight

was indeed allowed to a general reputation of innocence or guilt, but extraneous evidence can never have been excluded, though we have no means of ascertaining by what steps, or at what times, the ancient ordeal and trial by combat were superseded. It is only when changes were nearly consummated in practice in those ages, that they were authorised by statute; their progress can usually be traced only by incidental evidence or allusion. It appears, however, that by the time of Edw. III. the distinction between the witness and the juror who was to decide on his credibility was fully established. Yet even after this time, as late, according to Mr. Amos, as the reigns of Edw. VI. and Mary, jurors are often called *testes*, as if they still were allowed or even required to frame their verdict according to their own knowledge as well as the evidence laid before them. The exhortation now so common, to lay aside every impression received before entering the jury-box, is equally modern in spirit and in letter. The first description Mr. Hallam has found of a jury in the sense in which we understand the word—twelve good and true men, who after hearing the counsel on both sides and the witnesses whom they choose to produce, confer together till they agree in a verdict on the issue joined between the parties—is in Fortescue's *Laudes Legum Angliæ*, which is not older than 1450. The result of the investigation which has been instituted is to sweep away from the ancient constitution of England what has always been considered both the best pledge of its freedom and the distinctive type of its organization, trial by jury in the modern sense of the word and according to modern functions. Mr. Hallam however justly observes that "in its most imperfect form, the trial by a sworn inquest was far superior to the impious superstition of ordeals, the hardly less preposterous and unequal duel, the unjust deference to power in compurgation, when the oath of one thane counterbalanced those of six ceorls, and even to the free-spirited but tumultuary and unenlightened decisions of the hundred or the county." The history of the gradual changes by which it has been adapted to the wants of successive ages, till little but the name remains, is a curious proof of the reverence for ancient forms and words, combined with a steady endeavour after practical improvement, which characterizes the English mind.

The wisdom of our ancestors was shown in a very different course from that which it is often invoked to justify ; and when it shall be appealed to, as it soon may be, to uphold what Mr. Hallam calls "that preposterous relic of barbarism, the requirement of unanimity in a jury," let it be recollected how little of a blind deference they showed towards the wisdom of *their* ancestors.

There remains a question of much higher interest than all which we have hitherto touched upon—a question which involves our whole philosophy of history, and our views of the Providence of God. We confess ourselves to have grown up in the belief, that the Middle Ages were Dark Ages, times of ignorance which God winked at, using them as other things evil in themselves for the production of eventual good. Mr. Hallam's motto is a proof that his view of them was the same.

Ἐκ Χάος δ' Ἐρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο
Νυκτὸς δ' αὖτ' Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο.

The modern doctrine is the reverse ; it is we who are walking in darkness and fast tending towards Chaos, and if we desire order in the social state or true light in religion, must return if we can to the condition of the calumniated Middle Ages. We opened this volume of Mr. Hallam's *Δευτεραι Φροντιδες* with considerable curiosity to see if the altered language which is common in the society in which he moves had produced any effect upon him. He is certainly disposed to speak less harshly of the Church of the Middle ages and almost fears that he has written in too Protestant a spirit on this subject. The difference, however, is only such as time usually produces in moderating the severity of earlier judgments ; he is not disposed to call their superstitions religion, or their crimes virtues, but only to admit that he may heretofore have looked too exclusively at the superstition and undervalued the religion which was associated with it. His high admiration of Guizot, who has judged the Catholic Church in so candid and liberal a spirit, would alone have led to some modification of his language. But as to the general character of the Middle Ages, his convictions remain the same, and we cannot conclude our extracts more appropriately than by a passage in which he criticizes a well-known attempt to exalt them above modern times :—

"A considerable impression has been made on the predisposed by the Letters on the Dark Ages which we owe to Dr. Maitland. Nor is this by any means surprising; both because the predisposed are soon convinced, and because the Letters are written with great ability, accurate learning, and a spirited and lively pen, and consequently with a success in skirmishing warfare which many readily mistake for the gain of a pitched battle. The result of my own reflections is that everything which Dr. M. asserts as matter of fact, I do not say suggests in all his language, may be perfectly true, without affecting the great proposition that the ages from the sixth to the eleventh were ages of ignorance. Nor does he, as far as I collect, attempt to deny this evident truth; it is merely his object to prove that they were less ignorant, less dark, and in all points of view less worthy of condemnation, than many suppose. I do not gainsay this, being aware, as I have observed both in this and in another work, that the mere ignorance of these ages, striking as it is in comparison with earlier and later times, has been sometimes exaggerated; and that Europeans and particularly Christians, could not fall back into the absolute barbarism of the Esquimaux. But what a man of profound learning puts forward with limitations, sometimes expressed and always present to his own mind, a heady and shallow retailer takes up and exaggerates in conformity with his own prejudices.

"The Letters on the Dark Ages relate principally to the theological attainments of the clergy during that period which the author assumes rather singularly to extend from A. D. 800 to 1200; thus excluding midnight from his definition of darkness, and replacing it by break of day. And in many respects, especially as to the knowledge of the Vulgate Scriptures possessed by the better informed clergy, he obtains no very difficult victory over those who have formed extravagant notions, both as to the ignorance of the Sacred Writings in those times and the desire to keep them from the people. This latter prejudice is obviously derived from a confusion of the subsequent period, the centuries preceding the Reformation, with those which we have immediately before us. But as the word *dark* is commonly used, either in reference to the body of the laity or to the general extent of liberal studies in the church, and as it involves a comparison with prior or subsequent ages, it cannot be improper in such a sense, even if the manuscripts of the Bible should have been as common in monasteries as Dr. Maitland supposes; and yet his proofs seem much too doubtful to sustain that hypothesis.

"I shall conclude by remarking that one is a little tempted to inquire, why so much anxiety is felt by the advocates of the Mediæval Church, to rescue her from the charge of ignorance. For this ignorance she was not generally speaking to be blamed. It was no crime of the clergy that the Huns burned their churches and the

Normans pillaged their monasteries. It was not by their means that the Saracens shut up the supply of papyrus, and that sheepskins bore a great price. Europe was altogether decayed in intellectual character, partly in consequence of the barbarian incursions, partly of other sinister influences. We certainly owe to the Church every spark of learning which then glimmered and which she preserved through that darkness, to rekindle the light of a happier age."—P. 394.

We think we could help Mr. Hallam to a reason, if he is really at a loss for one, why Puseyite clergymen are unwilling that the Church of the Middle Ages should bear the imputation of ignorance. Whether Dr. Maitland have or have not renounced the name of Protestant he is certainly of a school which exalts Church authority to Dictatorship in religion. Now though men are ready to be led blindfold they must believe that their guides see; and will not long submit to take their standard of faith and morals from an age notoriously inferior in knowledge to their own. Hence the efforts of such writers as Dr. Maitland in his *Letters* and Mr. Digby in his *Mores Catholici* to remove the imputations under which the Middle Ages have laboured. Mr. Hallam has not noticed one of the gravest of these imputations and the best founded—the hostility of the Mediæval Church to freedom of thought and intellectual progress. She called her own darkness light, and persecuted those who were endeavouring to kindle a better light. And this offence against the truth cannot be compensated by the longest list of schools founded, or libraries collected, or men advanced for their learning to high stations in the Church. It may be an exaggeration to say that she hated knowledge, but she certainly loved spiritual power better than knowledge.

ART. IV.—MISS MARTINEAU'S EASTERN LIFE.

Eastern Life, Present and Past. By Harriet Martineau.
Three vols. London: Moxon. 1848.

WE are somewhat late in our notice of this clever and interesting book. It is of rather a miscellaneous character, and presents itself to us under a threefold aspect. We may view it as a descriptive work; as a popular summary of the results of learned research in those regions of the earth to which the eye of civilised and religious man has always turned with strange wonder and deep reverence; and as a frank utterance of the writer's own thoughts and feelings in the course of her travels—of her reflections on what she saw, and her inferences from what she was taught. The judgments on the several parts of her work have been, as might be expected, very different. With regard to her descriptions—we believe there is an unanimous concession of their great excellence. They are vivid, realising and *true*. We speak of truth in the artistic sense—not as comprehending a minute representation of particulars, but as expressing the general effect of the actual scene on the observing mind. Her fidelity here may be tested by comparison with the admirable sketches of Roberts. But the impression of the pen is stronger than that of the pencil, as it opens more varied sources of association. Those who have read the "*Eastern Life*," will not soon lose the sense—as of some past reality—of those purple-tinted hills of the West bathed in the rich after-glow of sunset, and the moonlit piles of Philæ girdled by a solemn expanse of silvery waters—or cease, as it were in memory's ear, to hear the grand music of the everlasting cataracts. On this subject nothing more need be said. Had her work chiefly interested us in this respect, we should not have thought of adding our feeble voice to the general chorus of approval.

For her display of archaeological lore, Miss Martineau puts forth no claim to originality. She gives her authorities in the margin, and plainly tells the reader that she follows them, because she believes that they know better than

any body else, what is the truth. If she has misquoted or misrepresented them, she has furnished the means of convicting herself. But so far as we have been able to make the comparison, we are not aware that there is any ground for such a charge against her.

It is in her third character—as a reasoner on what she observed and learned—that she has exposed herself to the greatest diversity of judgments, and in some quarters brought down severe censures on herself and her book. Had she been content to appeal to the eye alone, and filled her pages with beautiful pictures, and merely garnished them with such extracts from learned works, as sufficed to throw an air of antiquarian and historical interest over her narrative—she might, with her unquestioned ability in this kind of writing, have produced a work of the highest popularity and won golden opinions from all sides. And this *is* the course which many whose opinions on the high questions she has agitated, are not materially different from her own—would have taken : and not a few perhaps even of her friends and admirers may think, that in a book of travels she would have acted more judiciously and shown better taste, in abstaining from all discussions likely to call the strong feelings of theological prepossession into play. They do not object to her honesty, but to the *occasion* of manifesting it.

It cannot, however, be contested, that every author worth reading will have his own strong conviction of the way in which his subject should be treated. It will be a matter of conscience with him to execute his work in this way and no other. If he is an earnest man, and has that within him which he desires to say, he must run the risk of displeasing some portion of the public. Now Miss Martineau has evidently had a clear feeling of duty in this matter : and whether she be right or wrong, whether her taste and judgment are in fault or not—unless we are to cry down by an intolerant fastidiousness, every decided expression of mental individuality (the only thing after all in literature which is worth preserving), we must assert her perfect right to act as she has done, and claim respect for her fidelity to the biddings of her own mind. It is but just, she should speak for herself. Her words are noble and wise :—

"The thoughtful traveller must have some knowledge, and some ideas which he could not have obtained at home, and which the generality of people at home cannot obtain for themselves. These he cannot, in fidelity to himself and his fellow-men, ignore, or bury out of the way of his convenience and repose. If he derives from his travels nothing but picturesque and amusing impressions,—nothing but mere pastime,—he uses like a child a most serious and manlike privilege. The humblest thinker, the most diffident inquirer, may be ashamed to make so mean a use of so gracious an opportunity. Moreover, he will be afraid of so selfish and undutiful a levity. He feels that, however lowly his powers, he must use such knowledge and reflective faculty as he has: and again, he feels that if he can speak, he must.

"He must speak; and with fidelity. Bringing together, and testing with his best care, what he knows, he must say what he thinks, and all that he thinks, on the topics of which his mind is full. It is no concern of his whether what he thinks is new; nor, in this relation, whether it is abstractedly and absolutely true. Probably no one can say anything which is abstractedly and absolutely true. When all thinkers say freely what is to them true, we shall know more of abstract and absolute truth than we have ever known yet. It is no concern of the thoughtful traveller's, whether what he says is familiar or strange, agreeable or unacceptable, to the prejudiced or to the wise. His only concern is to keep his fidelity to truth and man: to say simply, and, if he can, fearlessly, what he has learned and concluded. If he be mistaken, his errors will be all the less pernicious for being laid open to correction. If he be right, there will be so much accession, be it little or much, to the wisdom of mankind. Either way, he will have discharged his errand; and it is so important to him to have done that, that he will think little in comparison of how his avowals will be received by any man or any number of men."*

The right of every mind that communicates with the public, to deliver itself as it chooses, being fully conceded—it is of course quite another question, whether the utterance itself be just and true, and the spirit it breathes, loving and reverential. The feeling is widely-spread, that in both these respects Miss Martineau has grievously offended. In Journals professing unbounded liberalism and loudly denouncing all State interference with freedom of conscience, we have seen the young solemnly warned from her pages as a tainted region that would strike an insidious

* Vol. iii. pp. 333, 4.

poison into their hearts. Even from quarters where we should have expected other things, we have heard suspicions whispered of evil tendency, and observed grave-looks of disapproval, as if our authoress had committed some sin against the eternal laws of religion and morality. We have actually been told of one pious clergyman, who as he read the book took each sheet in succession and committed it to the flames, and watched with holy satisfaction the consumption of so much pestiferous error. In fact, we had heard such a character of the work, that although not so wedded to the conventional forms of reverence as some people, we certainly did fear that we might find its general tone and leading tendency objectionable and repulsive.

We have read the book twice—and though there are some things in it which we do not assent to or approve, we cannot subscribe to this sweeping sentence of unqualified condemnation. To us the book seems anything but irreverential. On the contrary, a pervading spirit of reverence, not indeed in the form which the so-called religious world has struck with its own die and chooses to take exclusively as the sterling gold—but a fresh natural reverence, warm-gushing from the heart, and blended with humane and open sympathies—has struck our mind as its distinguishing character.

Religion in *all* its genuine aspects is to us a sacred thing; and nothing excites in us such intense disgust as irreverence, especially in the form of scoffing and mockery. Had we discerned any traces of such a spirit, our condemnation would have been the strongest that we could have found words to express. But some pious people fall into the very sin they protest against. They have no idea of religion but in the forms and the phrases—sometimes a mere accident of history—in which it has become familiar to them. Of the living thing itself—that sense of the eternal and the infinite—that spirit of quenchless trust and hope and love—which works unseen in the deepest heart of humanity—they have scarce a perception. It is overlaid by their own formulas. The sum total of these makes up with them the true religion. For these they claim an inviolable majesty; while no epithets are too foul and scurrilous for every other manifestation of the indwelling-life of man. Against this narrowness Miss

Martineau has lifted up her voice; and therefore she is called irreverent. It is in truth her real reverence, that has most exposed her to obloquy. The genuine tenderness and veneration with which in full accordance, we doubt not, with her profound conviction, she always speaks of the great authors of the Mosaic and Christian faiths—is complained of as artful and insidious, and stigmatised as the most dangerous form of infidelity. Significant looks are interchanged and suspicions are whispered round, as if some plot of deadly destruction were in progress under this outward show of respect. What could these objectors have said more, if instead of unaffected reverence, a tone of studied depreciation and open contempt had been employed?—It almost comes to this, that those who cannot symbolize with the recognized forms of speech, have no alternative left them but silence.—If they take the unhallowed way of the old Freethinkers and *Esprits Forts* of the last century, they would be charged—and we think, not unjustly—with blasphemy against what is highest in the Universe. If with our authoress, they speak—as they feel—of all true expressions of the religious principle—they are then wolves in sheep's clothing, compassing some evil design under cover of specious words. Really, the procedure of some religious people is most extraordinary. They treat Religion, as southern lovers treat a mistress—lock her up from the world and let nobody look on her but themselves, or only through the *jalousie* which they have opened in the walls of the prison-house. The selfishness and presumption of their conduct never strikes them. Who made them exclusive guardians of the universal wealth? Who gave them the key that secretes the heavenly treasure? Who authorised them to circulate it in miserable dribblets on warrants issued by themselves?—We write this, not as apologists for Miss Martineau, for she is perfectly competent to maintain her own ground;—but from jealousy of a great principle, endangered not by enactments and magistracies, but by certain morbid tendencies of opinion, which have manifested themselves recently even among the professed friends of religious liberty, and which seem to us to threaten in their final effects the vitality of Christianity itself.

What then is the pervading idea of Miss Martineau's

book, which has produced such extensive disgust?—She believes in the universal diffusion of the religious principle in man. She cannot think, that from the beginning of time, the Divine Spirit has illuminated one solitary line of human development, and left the vast spaces on either side in Cimmerian darkness. In her view, religion is co-extensive with humanity—an element of its interior life, and a necessary condition of its development. Thus all faiths which have had any lasting influence, must express through forms and conceptions corresponding to the mental constitution of the age and country—something which is permanent in the ideas and aspirations of man. So long as a faith is genuine, its rites and dogmas represent to the mind of its professors, some portion at least of the hidden truth that lies within them. There is then a harmony between the outward and the inward, which the soul is conscious of and rejoices in. But if the former is hindered from expansion, in time this harmony ceases, and then deceit and corruption ensue. There was a period when the worships of Baal and Osiris suited the spiritual wants of multitudes of men; and under their influence society took another step in advance out of animalism and savagery. That period passed away. A higher discipline was needed.

These old worships, no longer the expression of a living idea, mouldered into mere forms, and gradually died out of the earth. To do justice, therefore, to past ages, we must distinguish between forms which are necessarily transient, and the eternal ideas which with more or less of completeness have been embodied in them. It has been the injustice of Christians, to deny the existence of the latter in the religions of heathenism, and to try the former by a standard which is inapplicable to them. Our attention has been chiefly fixed on Heathenism in its decline, or in its sharpest conflicts with the nobler faiths, that were destined to supplant it. We forget what it had already done for an antiquity remoter and darker still. We overlook its assertion—faint as contrasted with the purer doctrines of Moses and Jesus, but bright indeed as compared with the gross fetichism of the savage—of those eternal principles—those Ideas, as Miss Martineau chooses to call them—which through all ages have been the guiding stars of human progress. We

have no right to oppose the best things in Christianity to the worst in Heathenism, as a measure of their relative value. We should reasonably complain, if a pure philosophical Theism, drawing its highest inspirations from the Gospel, were to point disparagingly—in proof of its own superiority to its parent—to the abominations and absurdities that have been sanctioned at times by some portions of the Christian Church—the Sale of Indulgences, the Exercises of St. Ignatius, or the Festival of the Ass.

If these views are correct, Judaism and Christianity take their place in the history of mankind, not absolutely as phenomena *sui generis*, cut off from all affinity with the general workings of human thought and affection—but as the fullest and purest manifestation of a spirit that is everywhere diffused—in Christianity, so unencumbered with outward form, so creative of new power in the will and new holiness in the heart, so free, so capable of indefinite expansion—that it meets and satisfies every condition of a Religion for universal humanity.

Miss Martineau with the zeal usual in the combatants of long-established prejudice—asserts so broadly and so constantly the claim of the old worships of the Nile valley and the plain of Damascus to a more candid hearing and the possession of some truth, that persons accustomed only to one strain on this subject, may fancy that she is depreciating, to that extent, the religion which from education and conviction should naturally share her deepest veneration. In justice to her, we must notice her very distinct denial, that this view of hers asserts a “parity of value for their objects of faith and our’s. It has nothing to do with the comparative elevation, purity and promise of any two faiths. It is merely a claim that the old Egyptians should be regarded as having a faith; a faith to which they might refer the loftiest ideas of a high order of intellect, and in which they might repose the affections of their common human heart.”*

Moses again she calls “the greatest of men, and the eternal benefactor of the world,” and “worth more to the human race than all the sages together who have been born of it.”† She expresses her feelings with regard to

* Vol. i. p. 244.

† Vol. ii. p. 202.

Christianity in the following passage. Speaking of those believers who are still bowed down to a superstitious observance of days and places, she says:—

“How different is the truer reverence of those who go enlightened by knowledge, and animated by a higher faith!—who believe that the history of man is truly the Word of God: and that the reason why the Gospel is especially called so is because those Glad Tidings are the most important event in the history of man! How infinitely venerable to them are the great religious Ideas which they know to have been the guiding lights of men from the remotest past, and which Christ presented anew, purified and expanded! What an exquisite pleasure it is to stand where Jesus stood, and look round on the old faiths and sectarian tenets of the world, and bring forth from them all a faith and hope which should, notwithstanding dreadful corruptions, elevate mankind through many future ages! to have insight into the sacred mysteries of Egypt, and the national theology and law of Sinai, and the ritual morality of the Pharisees, and the philosophical scepticism of the Sadducees, and the pure and peaceable and unworldly aspirations of the Essenes, and to see how from all these together come the ideas, and from the unseen world the spirit, of the religion which Jesus taught!”*

This is, undoubtedly, a very different view from the ordinary one; it may be a mistaken view: but it is certainly not an irreverent one, since it recognises the hand of God in everything. And no one who observes with what unfeigned delight Miss Martineau traces the haunts and realises the presence of Jesus on the Mount and by the well-side and along the pebbly beach of the lake, and how familiar she is with the minutest particulars of his doctrine and his life,—can doubt that from early years her spirit has deeply drunk of his, and must perceive, we should think, that in such spontaneous sympathy there is a truer reverence, than in kissing the stones which he is believed to have trod, or bearing torch-lights in a Church procession to his tomb.

We could not, to be honest, have said less than we have, in relation to the pervading idea of Miss Martineau's book, which appears to us to express in the main a great and neglected truth:—that *all* faiths are connected in principle, and fill their appointed time and place in the order of Providence—and that if Judaism and Christianity have taken the lead in the moral and spiritual progress of mankind, it is not that they differ in principle from other faiths,

* Vol. iii. pp. 72-3.

but so immeasurably transcend them in the purity and elevation of their objects. The source of all alike is to be found in the omnipotent Spirit of God.

Having thus freed our souls, we now add, that there are statements in the work before us from which we are compelled to dissent, and that Miss Martineau's style and manner are occasionally such as to aggravate gratuitously the unavoidable offensiveness of some of her views to many good and serious minds. We shall not dwell here on a certain dash of egotism over her whole narrative, and a display of contempt for danger and small female proprieties somewhat ostentatiously obtruded on all occasions; these blemishes strike every reader, and have been sufficiently animadverted upon. Our object is, to notice her book in its religious aspects.

Generally we may remark a want of measure and qualification in Miss Martineau's language, especially in her comparison of old faiths with the Jewish and Christian. The exaggeration of reaction against prejudice is too visible in her book. She is so anxious to do justice to Osiris, that she is sometimes a little too hard upon the Christians, and seems to forget that, upon her own broad principle, all symbols that are expressive of a sincere faith, though their day may have passed for us, are entitled to equal reverence. Reverence in *spirit*, we are sure, is never absent from Miss Martineau's mind: a momentary onesidedness sometimes occasions a semblance of it in her *words*. The following application of Scripture phrascology on the most solemn of themes, to the exploration of the tombs of the Pharaohs, will strike most readers as offensive:—

“Whose will be the honour of laying them open? Not in the Cambyzes spirit of rapine; but in all honour and reverence, in search of treasures which neither moth nor rust can corrupt, nor thieves carry away;—a treasure of light out of the darkened place, and of knowledge out of that place where usually no device or knowledge is found!”*

She speaks, moreover, with too great positiveness of its being a certain fact, that the Egyptians from the earliest times believed in one Supreme God, of whose attributes most of the other gods were deifications. We have always

* Vol. i. p. 188.

felt doubtful, whether the Sovereign Unity placed by the great religions of the East at the head of their mythological systems, was to be regarded as an element of the primitive belief, or a late result of successive generalisations of the priesthood. The science of comparative mythology is as yet in too crude a state, to admit of our adopting an absolute conclusion. Miss Martineau's reference to Jamblichus, quoting from the Hermetic books, is rather in favour of the late origin of the belief. We observe that the Chevalier Bunsen hesitates to determine absolutely the relation of the different orders of the Egyptian Pantheon to each other, and leaves it open to future question, whether the Osirid Cycle or the eight Gods of the first rank, should be considered the older.*

Miss Martineau's expectation of results to religion, philosophy and science from the progress of hieroglyphic discovery, appears to us extravagant; and her enthusiasm goes beyond our point of sympathy, when she speaks of the old gods of Egypt as reappearing from the restored walls "almost as venerable as ever to those who can discern their ideal through their forms: and it may be that their *worship* (!) is as lively as ever in the hearts of those who regard them (as their best worshippers always did regard them) as imperishable ideas presented in forms congenial to their times."†

Egypt in fact has so intoxicated her spirit and possessed her mind, that it becomes a fixed point of departure for all her thoughts, and the medium through which every object is beheld. The relations of the Hebrew race, and especially of the Mosaic institutions, with Egypt, are incontestible, and they have been of the deepest effect: but our authoress states the fact in too broad and absolute a way, when she terminates her first volume with this unqualified assertion: "Out of this valley of the Nile issued Judaism: and out of Judaism issued, in due time, Christianity."

On Judaism properly so called—that form of the religious life which arose between the Exile and the birth of Christ—another oriental philosophy, that of Bactria and Babylon, exerted a more direct and a more powerfully modifying influence than the doctrines of Egypt: and even

* *Ægypten's Stelle* etc., vol. i. p. 515.

† *Eastern Life*, vol. i. pp. 178-254.

with respect to the earlier Mosaism, this view too completely excludes the vast interposing influence of the mind of Moses. On Miss Martineau's own showing, the three great points which characterised the mission of Moses—his abandoning mystery and laying all truth open to the whole people—his declaring the Supreme a tutelary God—and his substitution of temporal retribution for future reward and punishment—were in direct contravention to the established system of Egypt.*

Miss Martineau states—and we think justly—that “while everybody believes the general fact of the leading of the Hebrews” into the desert, “no one can say how much of the details is strictly historical, and how much legendary.” It is hardly consistent with this view, to have gone so much as she has done, into particulars respecting the designs and beliefs of Moses in the establishment of the national economy, and to have assumed so intimate a familiarity with the inner workings of his mind. Conjectures and surmises are given by her almost as if they were facts. It would, in our judgment, have been more reverential, to acknowledge, without all this speculation, the plain evidence of a great formative mind in Moses,—and in the purity and elevation of the principles introduced by him among the Hebrews,—no less than in their deep and lasting influence on the moral condition of the human race,—a visible manifestation of the Sovereign Spirit of wisdom and truth.

It is a fair question for historical criticism, how far the youthful mind of Jesus may have been nurtured in the principles of any one of the Jewish sects of his day. Miss Martineau decides in favour of the Essenes : and there are doubtless some remarkable points of agreement between his teachings and their known doctrines. On the other hand, the remoteness of Galilee, where his youth was passed, from the settlements of the Essenes, the unascetic character of his life (so strongly in contrast with that of John the Baptist), the practicality of his discourses, and the coincidence of his theology (as displayed in the three first Gospels) with that of the Pharisees—present very considerable difficulties to the entertainment of this theory. Miss Martineau has a right to her own opinion ; but she

* Vol. ii. p. 274.

should not have quietly substituted it for fact, and without further notice or any qualification, spoken of Jesus as sitting "where others of the Therapeutæ had sat before him." *

We are told, that "those who are intimate with the minds of educated and conscientious Jews are aware that such cannot be converted to Christianity: that the very foundation of their faith cannot support that superstructure: that there can be to them, no reason why they should change, and every conceivable reason why they should not. They well know that it is only the ill-grounded Jew who can be converted; the weak, the ignorant, or the needy and immoral."† We fear, this is only too correct an account of many conversions; but surely the entire statement requires qualification. It may be true, that the sincere conversion of an intelligent and well-educated Jew to most of the existing forms of Christianity—encrusting as they do the pure spirit of the Gospel with so many theological accretions that have gathered round it in the course of ages—is next to impossible. There is however a view of Christianity—comprehending its pure essence of faith and love—in which it commends itself to the heart of every good and earnest man as a religion for collective humanity. Miss Martineau will not deny that such a faith is an advance on the elementary Monotheism of Moses, and that there is nothing inconceivable in the acceptance of it by an enlightened Jew, who can read the order of providence in a retrospect of human history.

We may observe, in passing, that Miss Martineau employs the word *Ideas* in a sense not familiar to all English readers. It expresses with her those perceptions, at first dim, but continually becoming clearer and brighter with the unfolding of the spiritual nature—of God, truth, duty, and a divine order in human affairs—which cannot be classed among the accidental results of outward experience, but grow by a sort of interior necessity out of the original constitution of the human mind. They make up together the spiritual organization of humanity, and history becomes intelligible and instructive to us, as we trace their uniform working. In this sense, Miss Martineau finely says, that

* Vol. iii. p. 226.

† Ibid. p. 112.

"the history of Ideas is the only true history of Man;" and carrying out the leading conception of her book, thinks it possible, could more light be cast on the earliest history of mankind, that all faiths might be shown to be derived through different channels from the same primitive Ideas.*

From the strong way in which Miss Martineau is accustomed to set forth one side of her opinions, to the apparent ignoring of any other—she is open to the suspicion of deficiencies in her faith which do not exist. In a passage of her first volume,† she so expresses herself concerning the exclusive importance of the present life in the view of wise and mature men, as almost to indicate that a futurity after death has no place in her creed as a positive reality, and as though the belief in it were a seasonable though temporary aspiration suited only to an infantine condition of the human mind:—and the impression thus left with the reader, is not removed by her summary in a subsequent part of the work,‡ of the leading principles of the religion of Jesus, the final object of which she represents as the establishment of a spiritual kingdom *on earth*. It may be said, that she is here giving only the Jewish form of the original announcement of the Gospel. Still it is remarkable, that under that form she does not recognise so unspeakably glorious a doctrine, as the continuance of man's spiritual progress hereafter. She dwells rather on the completeness of his retribution here, and the more than sufficiency of this earthly life to the capacities and affections of his soul. Yet we do not believe, that the deep inner faith in immortality has faded from her mind. We rather impute her silence—if such it be—to a sort of one-sided reaction against the shallow sentimentalism so prevalent on this solemn theme, and so exhaustive of all true and vital conviction. It is our persuasion, that all earnest and thoughtful natures, as they advance deeper into life's business and reflect more intently on its grave realities and the solemn mystery that invests it on every side—are conscious of increasing unwillingness to speculate on the vast and unknown future, or to indulge in those ideal pictures which a youthful fancy loves to dwell upon. Under that

* Vol. iii. p. 272; ii. p. 60.

† Pp. 300-303.

‡ Vol. iii. p. 226.

silence, however, there is perhaps a deeper faith—a faith too deep for words—too solemn to be sported with by the imagination. Faith sums itself up in absolute trust in the Father, and concentrated earnestness and energy to do his work. The more faith a man has, the less he *talks* of its objects. Stern realities have to be grappled with, and out of these the substance of a divine life must be wrought into the soul, to prepare it for the change. While the will and the affections are passing through this discipline, the consciousness can never be suppressed of life's inadequacy to the fulfilment of the spiritual ends which life's experience brings out with increasing distinctness into view. Duty is never without cheering expectancy; revolt from it is always followed by a mysterious dread: and so the awful faith subsists, deep, unuttered, but unchangeably cleaving to the soul, that good must flow from good, and evil generate evil, through all the vicissitudes of that inexplicable life—that wondrous thread of consciousness—which comes from the Eternal Source of Being and inseparable from it can never cease to be. From simple silence, therefore, we do not infer the absence of faith. The weakness of the age is rather, that faith evaporates in words, when it should embody itself in act and endeavour.

We have expressed our regret at some things in these volumes, which will needlessly, as we fear, give offence to pious and tender minds. Yet we have not hesitated to say—and we deliberately repeat the statement on closing our review—that as a whole they are pervaded by a deep and healthful spirit of reverence. In expostulating with Miss Martineau for some unnecessary freedom and harshness of phrase, we must not, on the other hand, overlook the far more frequent sin of a want of sincerity and plain-speaking in authors. Amidst the notorious hollowness and compromise of the day, there is much in the courage and simple honesty of Miss Martineau, to command our admiration. Her example of fearless integrity, in spite of some faults of manner accompanying it, will work for certain good, and bring at length, we trust, to the excellent writer a recompense of well-earned fame. How true a spirit of religion fills her mind, how strong and pure are her sympathies with the mind of Christ—we cannot better

close our article than by evidencing in the following extract from her last volume:—

"I cannot agree with those who regard the life of Jesus as the mournful scene which it is commonly conceived to be. It is natural enough for us to look upon it as mournful. The tenderness of our gratitude and love makes us dwell on the sad features of his lot;—on the lowness of mind of his followers,—on the absence of sympathy in his family,—on the malice of his enemies,—on the apparent failure of his mission,—and on his humiliating and early death. But did these things make up his life? Have we no truer and higher sympathy with him than to be always looking for the thorns which strewed his path, without remembering the glorious world that spread around him, and the clear heavens over his head? Had he not all the gifts of the soul,—a higher wealth than that of the whole world? Had he not the pleasures of moral sympathy? If he was tortured, even into expressions of vehement wrath, by the evil tempers of the Pharisees, had he not intense enjoyments from the same source of sensibility? Did not the widow at the treasury, and the centurion, and the Syro-Phœnician woman, and the beloved disciple, all administer intense satisfactions to him? Is it not true that the still under-current of human affairs and human character is the purest and sweetest; and that it is the turbulent and corrupt part of human life which comes to the surface, and engages the eyes and ears of men? And did not Jesus know what was in Man and in his life? Was not all that was pure and sweet and noble known and felt to its very depths by him, in proportion as he was himself transcendently pure and sweet and noble? Is there no joy in aspiration? Was his soul sad when he said, 'the world hath not known thee; but I have known thee'? Are there no special satisfactions to the sons of God,—to the apostle,—to the redeemer of men? Is there no substantial happiness in steadfast devotedness?—no blissful thrill in self-sacrifice?—no sense of filial repose in such a martyrdom as his? To me it rather appears that if we were wise enough to enter into his experience as we ought, we should see that never before were a few months of life so crowded with joys as were those of the Ministry of Jesus. Think of the crowds who came to him with their several griefs, none of whom he sent away sorrowing:—think of the multitude of the docile, and hopeful, and faithful with whom he had communion:—think of his refuge in his solitude of spirit, and of his heavenly seasons of contemplation and prayer:—think of what the pure face of nature must have been to one who looked upon it with a sense quickened and deepened like his:—think, in short, what a heaven he caused within and about him, and say whether we are not irreverent and undutiful and hard, if we refuse to rejoice with him, as far as in us lies."*

* Vol. iii. pp. 228-30.

ART. V.—MILNES'S LIFE OF KEATS.

Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of John Keats. Edited by Richard Monckton Milnes. In two volumes. London: Edward Moxon, 1848.

OUR permission to take up these volumes is supplied in the concluding words of Mr. Milnes's Preface—"a previous admiration of the works of Keats which have been already published is the test of their (his readers') authority to approve or condemn these supplementary memorials, and I admit no other." To this test at least, as it is only ethical and chronological, we can render an honest signature.* But whatever be our own authority "to approve or condemn," we acknowledge Mr. Milnes's title to edit and collect, and rejoice that the gleanings of this harvest have fallen to the lot of a man at once of a catholic and a poetic temperament. The work is undertaken with an appropriate affectionateness of admiration for what Keats was, and a corresponding imaginativeness of reverence for what he might have been. Alluding to the early abundance of Keats's genius, he says,—“This adolescent character had given me an especial interest in the moral history of this Marcellus of the empire of English song,† and when my imagination measured what he might have become by what he was, it stood astounded at the result.” On first reading this and one or two other passages in the Preface, we felt threatened with a disproportionate idolatry, as though the Editor had fallen into the usual weakness of allowing the subject on which his thoughts had been occupied to fill the world to his vision, and unduly magnifying his office and his theme. But this fear has proved entirely unfounded. He has made no exaggerated display of his materials, which are wonderfully rich: and he has scarcely

* Article on Keats. *Christian Teacher*, Vol. I. New Series. 1839.

† It is not surprising that the exquisite lines, “*manibus date lilia plenis*” should strike Mr. M. as truly applicable to Keats's early fame and fate, but it is not till the familiar words occur to one's memory, “*Tu Marcellus eris*,” that one gets rid of the first momentary and puzzled impression that some allusion is making to the “sword”-like opponent of Hannibal, instead of the early-fated boy of Virgil's Elysian fields.

advanced a claim for Keats that every admirer of his poetry must not feel to be just. Out of the frank and careless letters of a man writing to a few intimate friends, he has drawn out a picture of character as distinctive and speaking, as the picture of the face is on the frontispiece.

Awed by the protest of Wordsworth,—“silence is a privilege of the grave, a right of the departed; let him therefore who infringes that right by speaking publicly of, for, or against those who cannot speak for themselves, take heed that he open not his mouth without sufficient sanction,”—Mr. Milnes had some scruples about the use of these materials, but finally decided in the best way for himself, for Keats and for the public. Reverent affection and cultivated taste may make with safety any use, that does not offend themselves, even of letters written before the age of the world in which letters have become the staple of biographies, and when public men are beginning to feel that what they write to any but the most intimate of their friends may hereafter be about as private as the letter handed in to the actor on the stage, which he reads indeed to himself, only a whole Theatre overhears him. Mr. Milnes felt an unreserved use of his materials the more called-for, owing to the utter opposition between the impression which he found very extensively to exist of Keats's character, and the impression he wished to communicate.

“I saw how grievously he was misapprehended even by many who wished to see in him only what was best. I perceived that many, who heartily admired his poetry, looked on it as the production of a wayward, erratic genius, self-indulgent in conceits, disrespectful of the rules and limitations of art, not only unlearned but careless of knowledge, not only exaggerated, but despising proportion. I knew that his moral disposition was assumed to be weak, gluttonous of sensual excitement, querulous of severe judgment, fantastical in its tastes, and lackadaisical in its sentiments. He was all but universally believed to have been killed by a stupid, savage article in a review, and to the compassion generated by his untoward fate he was held to owe a certain personal interest, which his poetic reputation hardly justified. When, then, I found from the undeniable documentary evidences of his inmost life, that nothing could be further from the truth than this opinion, it seemed to me that a portrait, so dissimilar from the general assumption, would hardly obtain credit, and might rather look like the production of a paradoxical partiality than the result of conscientious inquiry. I had to

show that Keats, in his intellectual character, revered simplicity and truth above all things, and abhorred what was merely strange and strong—that he was ever learning and ever growing more conscious of his own ignorance—that his models were always the highest and the purest, and that his earnestness in aiming at their excellence, was only equal to the humble estimate of his own efforts—that his poetical course was one of distinct and positive progress, exhibiting a self-command and self-direction which enabled him to understand and avoid the faults even of the writers he was most naturally inclined to esteem, and to liberate himself at once, not only from the fetters of literary partizanship, but even from the subtler influences and associations of the accidental literary spirit of his own time.”—Preface, p. xviii.

Leigh Hunt's brief sketch of this gifted creature may have fallen out of sight of late years, and we therefore avail ourselves of Mr. Milnes's fuller-bodied narrative to recapitulate a few of the facts of his brief story. Born in 1795, John Keats died in 1821, in his 26th year. His father was “employed in the establishment of Mr. Jennings, the proprietor of large livery stables on the Pavement in Moorfields, nearly opposite the entrance into Finsbury Circus, and became his master's son-in-law.” He died early, but of his wife we learn that she lived to inspire her children with the profoundest affection, and that when “on an occasion of illness, the doctor ordered her not to be disturbed for some time, John (between four and five years old) kept sentinel at her door for above three hours *with an old sword he had picked up*, and allowed no one to enter.” He was sent to school to Mr. Clarke's, at Enfield—would be a sailor, like his uncle—was always fighting, and “chose his favourites among his schoolfellows from those that fought the most readily and pertinaciously.” Not that he wanted tenderness. Tears and laughter were equally frequent with the lad; the sense of humour, as Mr. Milnes truly says, almost universally accompanying a deep sensibility, and being perhaps but the reverse of the medal. Full of life, spirit and energy, he did not during the earlier part of his school career care to observe routine duties so as to earn the appellation of “a good boy:” but during the last two years of his stay, took to working at his lessons with a passionate devotion. At fifteen he was apprenticed to Mr. Hammond, a surgeon at Edmonton, but kept up and increased his love of literature. At seventeen he asked

the Clarkes for Spenser's Faery Queen, and henceforth he feasted on the riches of its imagery, and inflicted his enthusiasm on every one about him. "He ramped through the scenes of the romance," writes his old schoolfellow and companion Cowden Clarke, "like a young horse turned into a spring meadow." Some early pieces accompanied these early studies, and already the lancet was giving way to the pinion, and the young surgeon burying himself in all the joyous present and the proud future of the conscious Poet. Here Mr. Milnes in passing lays his hand, with one of his slight but thrilling touches, upon the heart of the reader:—

"Although this foretaste of fame is in most cases a delusion (as the fame itself may be a greater still), yet it is the best and purest drop in the cup of intellectual ambition. It is enjoyed, thank God, by thousands, who soon learn to estimate their own capacities aright, and tranquilly submit to the obscure and transitory condition of their existence: it is felt by many, who look back on it in after years with a smiling pity to think they were so deceived, but who nevertheless recognize in that aspiration the spring of their future energies and usefulness in other and far different fields of action; and the few, in whom the prophecy is accomplished—who become what they have believed—will often turn away with uneasy satiety from present satisfaction to the memory of those happy hopes, to the thought of the dear delight they then derived from one single leaf of those laurels that now crowd in at the window, and which the hand is half inclined to push away to let in the fresh air of heaven."

The age of twenty finds Keats finishing his apprenticeship, removing to London, walking the hospitals, lodging in the Poultry, and forming some pleasant literary acquaintances. Among these was pre-eminent Leigh Hunt, who says of their intercourse, "No imaginative pleasure was left unnoticed by us or unenjoyed, from the recollection of the bards and patriots of old, to the luxury of a summer rain at our windows, or the clicking of the coal in winter time." Then follows the first volume, that, as it would appear from the experience of so many authors, necessary sacrifice to the infernal gods—that first-born of men's brains, which, like so often the first-born of their loins, lives but to die—the early flower, which the overtaking frosts will not permit to blow. "Beyond the circle of ardent friends

and admirers—it had hardly a purchaser.” By the contrast between the excessive admiration of his acquaintances and the apathy of the public he was induced to attribute “his want of success to the favourite scape-goat of unhappy authors, an inactive publisher, and incurred the additional affliction of a breach of his friendship with Mr. Ollier.”

When arrived at the age of twenty-one, and freed from the control of his guardian Mr. Abbey (who we understand used to profess himself heartily sick of his office), Keats took possession of his little fortune and abandoned all idea of prosecuting his calling as a surgeon—not apparently that he had lacked in due attention to his studies, for he passed his examinations creditably, nor that he was deficient in dexterity, for he professed himself alarmed and unnerved at the success of his own operations, feeling as though it were a miracle; but because his heart and soul lay in an unencumbered life of the imagination. It is hard that just because a man has nobler qualities that make him an object of deep interest to thousands, he is to have brought into the light those inferior attributes of character, for which the ignoble are never called to account by the public. We are willing enough therefore to allow that for a creature of such a temperament as Keats, his life was free from those grosser excitements, on which so many men of genius in their early years are content to feed themselves, and that as far as it is true, it is to his credit that he “led a temperate and honest life in an ideal world that knows nothing of duty and repels all images that do not please.” Still we suppose that it is according to evidence to say that for two or three years at this time, Keats was careless, extravagant, and disposed to yield to the sway of the passions. His share of the fortune left by his father was £2,000. Some not inconsiderable portion of this was devoted to the expenses of his education. The remainder he must have run through very rapidly, and we cannot at all respond to the good-natured estimate Mr. Milnes forms of his manner of life at this time, when he says that “he did not, to any serious extent, allow wine to usurp on his intellect, or games of chance to impair his means, for in his letters to his brothers, he speaks of having drunk too much as a rare piece of joviality, and of having won £10 at cards as a great hit.” Now we readily admit

not only that "a strictly regulated and abstinent life would have appeared to him pedantic and sentimental," but that the human meteor, passing under the name of John Keats, could not have led such a life. To tell a young Poet to go to bed at half-past ten o'clock and get up at half-past five—if he hears of a friend in distress not to send him the whole of his last £20—never to wait for the moon if she should be late in rising—always to be at home at dinner-time—to enter a shilling in his account-book every time he had his hair cut—to hold no *symposia* though Plato should provide the talk—never to stay out in the damp air—not to exert himself too much in climbing a mountain—or run the risk of wetting or drowning, for the love of the lightning or the storm—all this is tantamount to an animated request that he would cease to be ; that he would cook his epigrams like eggs, and his sonnets like potatoes. But surely we must be judging by a different standard of means, and by a different circle of life, when we speak of £10 as a trifling sum to risk at a game of chance by a young man, who was exercising no profession—who was of infirm health—and whose whole fortune consisted of a few hundred pounds. However, the early embarrassments consequent upon his carelessness, ere yet the sadness of the sorrow that fills his melancholy chamber at Rome comes upon us, supply some touches of hearty mirth and good humour, and we are sure that at this period his borrowing notes were in themselves worth full £20 a-piece, and we hope and doubt not they realised as much on the Exchange of friendship and genius.

From the time that Keats was released from the ties of his education and profession, that is, from the time he came of age and was his own master, until the time of his death five years after, he was always moving about, induced thereto chiefly by the demands of his health and the hope that change would aid his recovery, and perhaps also by a natural restlessness of habit. In this way he spends much time in Devonshire (watching tenderly by the couch of his dying younger brother Tom), in the Isle of Wight, in a town in Scotland, visits to Oxford, &c. ; but his principal residence was in Hampstead or the neighbourhood. From Oxford he writes to some apparently hard-working friend out upon a holiday :—

"Believe me, my dear —, it is a great happiness to see that you are in this finest part of the year (September) winning a little enjoyment from the hard world. In truth the great Elements we know of are no mean comforters; the open sky sits upon our senses like a sapphire crown; the air is our robe of state; the earth is our throne; and the sea a mighty minstrel playing before it—able, like David's harp, to make such a one as you forget almost the tempest cares of life. I have found in the ocean's music,—varying (the self-same) more than the passion of Timotheus,—an enjoyment not to be put into words; and 'though inland far I be,' I now hear the voice most audibly, while pleasing myself in the idea of your sensations."

The cheeriest and yet perhaps not the most profitable part of Keats's life brought before us in these volumes, is the winter spent at Hampstead in 1817-18, when he was twenty-two. There was recognition enough of his genius to bring him into the society of those spirits, whose bond of union is their hatred of common-place, and their demand from their associates of an intellectual *quid pro quo*. He had the future all before him. A consciousness of power enabled him to fill it with the most alluring shapes of fame and fruitfulness. But it is the mournful privilege of genius to live through its experiences fast. The convictions at which common men arrive, in the patient progress of their lives at the end of years, the greater velocity at which the man of genius suffers, enjoys, thinks, feels, and loves, brings to him at the end of as many months. It scarcely required the lapse of a year to alter the tone of Keats's feelings, and to draw (in spite of those coruscations of wit and merriment which are so often the accompanying phenomena of natures of a pervadingly pensive experience) the pall of a mature sadness over his life. He had come to see as his inevitable lot that he would have to keep the fire of his poetry alive through the long damp rain of a perseveringly hostile criticism. He felt the tissues of life within of a frail and delicate mould, and doubted at times whether the touch of the grave was not already upon him. His circumstances were becoming irretrievably bad, so that later he actually contemplated applying for the post of a surgeon on board of an India-man. To crown all, his heart was torn by an absorbing, and, after what we have said above it is of little necessity to add, a hopeless passion. To its intensity, the sonnets of the Literary Remains bear

ample testimony—sonnets composed in that peculiar reel and madness of the senses, which attach to strong passions, only while they are undebased, and whose earnest freshness of rank nature gathering around it all things of beauty from the outward universe, the psychologist can always distinguish from the subtler poison and artificial inventiveness of satiated and degraded sense. To the hopelessness of this passion the letters written in his last absence bear perhaps one of the most anguishing testimonies on record. He writes a few months before his death from Naples to his friend Brown:—

“The persuasion that I shall see her no more will kill me.”—
 “I can bear to die—I cannot bear to leave her. Oh! God! God! God! Everything I have in my trunks that reminds me of her goes through me like a spear. The silk lining she put in my travelling cap scalds my head. There is nothing in the world of sufficient interest to divert me from her for a moment—I am afraid to write to her, to receive a letter from her—to see her handwriting would break my heart—even to hear of her anyhow, to see her name written, would be more than I can bear. When you write to me, which you will do immediately, write to Rome (*poste restante*): if she is well and happy put a mark thus +; if ———”

For this setting of the sun of his life in darkness, the twilight had been sometime preparing. A certain sombreness, a certain submissive and unexpected quietness, seems to have been stealing on him for some time. It had been a good deal before observed that his early sensibility would yield to long periods of apparent apathy. As early as 1817, when just twenty-two, he writes from Leatherhead to his friend Bailey:—

“I think ——— or ——— has a better opinion of me than I deserve; for really and truly, I do not think my brother’s illness connected with mine. You know more of the real cause than they do; nor have I any chance of being racked as you have been. You perhaps, at one time, thought there was such a thing as worldly happiness to be arrived at, at certain periods of time marked out. You have of necessity, from your disposition, been thus led away. I scarcely remember counting upon any happiness. I look not for it if it be not in the present hour. Nothing startles me beyond the moment. The setting sun will always set me to rights; or if a sparrow were before my window, I take part in its existence, and pick about the gravel. The first thing that strikes me on hearing a mis-

fortune having befallen another is this—' Well, it cannot be helped : he will have the pleasure of trying the resources of his spirit ;' and I beg now, my dear Bailey, that hereafter, should you observe anything cold in me, not to put it to the account of heartlessness, but abstraction ; for I assure you I sometimes feel not the influence of a passion or affection during a whole week ; and so long this sometimes continues, I begin to suspect myself and the genuineness of my feelings at other times, thinking them a few barren tragedy-tears."

And again in 1818 writing to Mr. Taylor he says :—

" Young men, for some time, have an idea that such a thing as happiness is to be had, and therefore are extremely impatient under any unpleasant restraining. In time, however,—of such stuff is the world about them,—they know better, and instead of striving from uneasiness, greet it as an habitual sensation, a barrier which is to weigh upon them through life."—" I mean to follow Solomon's directions, ' Get learning, get understanding.' I find earlier days are gone by—I find that I can have no enjoyment in the world but continual drinking of knowledge. I find there is no worthy pursuit but the idea of doing some good to the world. Some do it with their society ; some with their wit ; some with their benevolence ; some with a sort of power of conferring pleasure and good humour on all they meet—and in a thousand ways, all dutiful to the command of great Nature. There is but one way for me. The road lies through application, study and thought. I will pursue it."

There is one subject, and one subject only, on which Mr. Milnes's mode of interpreting Keats's spiritual life may appear to detract from its ideal and romance : but it is clear to us that in this he adds to its dignity and truth. The strong tears with which his immediate friends bathed in their loving sorrow the tomb of the young poet, were mingled with something of that indignation which men under such circumstances often unconsciously desire to indulge in, as affording in fact considerable actual relief to their distress. A *double* passion affords often a diversion to itself, and nothing *earthly* sustains a man in sorrow like a good counter-vail of wrath. The heart-cutting grief with which every one who knew and loved Keats contemplated his stricken form—his hectic cheek—his convulsed affections and wounded ambition—the sympathising melancholy with which they saw that fair young tree of promise drooping its head down to the earth of the grave—drove

them for relief to the reaction of a gaze on all who could have had anything to do in bringing about so sad and hateful a catastrophe. The fierce fever of their eyes soon fixed on the Reviewers, and in the revival of a former impression of the same kind, Shelley wrote the fearful anathema on the Quarterly Reviewer which appears in the "Adonais." Now all that can be said of the hostile reviews is, that they doubtless struck at the heart of hope, which they should have cherished and energised: that they flung a few more drops of bitterness into a cup already containing more than its share: that they placed an additional weight upon the mountain which the young poet was still in his faith taxing his whole power to lift. This is no pleasant thing to do; and a man who has honestly done it must feel distressed when he comes to see what he has done;—while he who has done it from careless ill-nature, or the love of exercising his despotic power, must feel that remorse with which an unresisting and perishing victim inspires even the most atrocious. After all the indignation which that little wretched article of four pages in the "Quarterly" has occasioned and justly occasioned—after all the notoriety with which it has been branded for now thirty years, and the immortality with which it is still threatened to be cursed—these things often owe their origin to little more than the vile practice which Reviewers of all times have indulged in, of looking out, as a variety upon their graver and more respectful labours, for some book to *devil*. The condiment supplied by the Review does not come up to the requirement of the public taste without an occasional dash of *cayenne*. The cayenne here was carelessly thrown upon an exposed and lacerated frame (of which the Reviewer had full notice), and doubtless made it smart, but it is a mistake to say it made it mortify. Keats, with all his sensitiveness, had more manliness about him than the public have supposed. He used these things as medicines. "Adonais" was not, like Adonis, killed by the bite of a wild boar. He drunk not "poison," but drugs from the chalice offered him by his foes. Shelley was misapprehended when he asked—

"What deaf and viperous murderer could crown
Life's early cup with such a draught of woe?"

It is proved from his most confidential letters, that the wounds which rankled in his heart, were not from the reviewers—they were far more from the conviction that the young glad cup of life and hope was not for him to drink ; and that he was soon to cease to have to do with earth, its greenness and its glory,—with human life, its happy affection, and its fevered love. He had not made up his mind indeed to obscurity and misfortune, but he early saw that his path would not be over roses. He desired to achieve a name and fame, but he knew that to do this he must labour and he took the attacks of his unfavouring critics as so many real though rough stimulants to him in his progress. He had not laid himself out for the public, at least not for the immediate public. He wrote out of their sight—though his heart would have rebounded with delight, could he have found that they soared with pleasure in his company. He was determined not to bow to them or theirs. As early as when preparing his Preface for the “Endymion,” and before he had, according to his own feelings, at all fairly challenged the verdict of the public, hearing that his friends thought the Preface presumptuous, he writes to Mr. Reynolds :—

“I have not the slightest feeling of humility towards the public, or to anything in existence but the Eternal Being, the principle of Beauty, and the memory of great men.”—“I would be subdued before my friends, and thank them for subduing me ; but among multitudes of men I have no feel of stooping : I hate the idea of humility to men. I never wrote one single line of poetry with the least shadow of public thought. Forgive me for vexing you, and making a Trojan horse of such a trifle, both with respect to the matter in question and myself ; but it eases me to tell you : I could not live without the love of my friends ; I would jump down Ætna for any great public good—but I hate a mawkish popularity. *I cannot be subdued before them.*”

And when the “porcupines with quills erect” had really begun their anticipated work, he writes more quietly :—

“9th October, 1818.

“My dear Hessey,

“You are very good in sending me the letters from the Chronicle, and I am very bad in not acknowledging such a kindness sooner—pray forgive me. It has so chanced that I have had that paper every day. I have seen to-day’s. I cannot but feel indebted

to those gentlemen who have taken my part. As for the rest, I begin to get a little acquainted with my own strength and weakness. Praise or blame has but a momentary effect on the man whose love of beauty in the abstract makes him a severe critic on his own works. My own domestic criticism has given me pain without comparison beyond what 'Blackwood' or the 'Quarterly' could inflict; and also, when I feel that I am right, no external praise can give me such a glow as my own solitary re-perception and ratification of what is fine. J. S. is perfectly right in regard to the 'slipshod Endymion.' That it is so is no fault of mine. No! though it may sound a little paradoxical, it is as good as I had power to make it by myself. Had I been nervous about it being a perfect piece, and with that view asked advice, and trembled over every page, it would not have been written: for it is not in my nature to fumble. I will write independently. I have written independently *without judgment*. I may write independently, and *with judgment*, hereafter."—"In 'Endymion' I leaped headlong into the sea, and thereby have become better acquainted with the soundings, the quicksands, and the rocks, than if I had stayed upon the green shore, and piped a silly pipe, and took tea and comfortable advice."

So again in one of his easy confidential letters to his brother George—in which it is his custom to let his heart out as into the keeping of one who loves him and feels with him—he says frankly, and we have no doubt with perfect truth, speaking of the criticisms favourable and unfavourable—

"This is a mere matter of the moment: I think I shall be among the English Poets after my death. Even as a matter of present interest, the attempt to crush me in the 'Quarterly' has only brought me into notice."—"It does me not the least harm in society to make me appear little and ridiculous: I know when a man is superior to me, and give him all due respect; he will be the last to laugh at me."

Independently of a consciousness of the necessity of thought and study, and patient laborious self-improvement, the signs of which are scattered through his letters, and to which the hostility of the reviews would only furnish fresh fuel, his published Preface to his "Endymion," shows a remarkably just estimate of himself, which would take away from any hostile criticism (however severe) the power of utterly crushing him:—

"Knowing within myself the manner in which this Poem has been

produced, it is not without a feeling of regret that I make it public. What manner I mean, will be quite clear to the reader, who must soon perceive great inexperience, immaturity, and every error denoting a feverish attempt rather than a deed accomplished. The two first books, and indeed the two last, I feel sensible are not of such completion as to warrant their passing the press: nor should they if I thought a year's castigation would do them any good; it will not, the foundations are too sandy. It is just that this youngster should die away, a sad thought for me, if I had not some hope that while it is dwindling I may be plotting and fitting myself for verse fit to live."

There is more in this Preface of an equally just and discriminating self-knowledge, and all going to confirm the Editor's argument, that Keats's soul was not snuffed out by an article. It was rather indeed burnt out in the midst of the volcano of hopes and passions in which it had its fiery life. Love and despair hastened and brought on what constitutional debility had begun, and rendered a few years sooner or later inevitable. The mother died of consumption, and the brothers. This alone was enough to account for the early death of poor Keats himself, in the midst of his uncompleted greatness, and his unslaked thirst of life.

The Quarterly Reviewer was right in many things, and Keats and his friends knew it. He was right in his criticism on the rhymes, which formed Keats's pre-eminently weak point. They are often forced, awkward and bungling. He was right in condemning sundry affectations of thought and expression, and vagueness and looseness of style. But how any man, in whose own bosom Poetry had ever lived (if it ever did), could have failed to discover Poetry in *Endymion*, is inconceivable, unless his eye were blinded by some horny scales of resolute prejudice or spite. Although Keats afterwards published things more perfectly wrought, and of what may be called a maturer promise, the *Endymion* is that after all by which he will live. It is his distinction among Poets. There is none other here equal to or like him. It was the wondrous, venturous song of his generation. Surely the young poet who could dare to take as his topic the vague myth of the Moon's visits to the young shepherd on Mount Latmos, weave out of this a variegated web of some four or five thousand lines, and sustain with so wild, melancholy and wayward a power the steps of his shepherd in such a region—was no com-

mon man ; and if he encountered a fate similar to Phaeton's, deserved at least an equal degree of compassionate tenderness. The confines of earth, and air and sea, of body and soul, of passion and imagination, are here blended as by alchemy, and the result is the presentation of abstract, passionate love-being. All Nature is woven into the passion, every thread of light and beauty is stolen from her, and goes to constitute the texture. That Keats beat his head continually against the material walls of earthly feeling, is evident: but it must be remembered that Endymion was human. Perhaps the true way of viewing this poem is to regard it as the first, as *youth's*, solution of the great problem of the admixture of the human and divine. As Dante produced his Purgatorio, Inferno, and Paradiso, might it not have been the completed fate of Keats to produce the triple alliance of the earthly and heavenly ; first, as seen through passion, then through intellect, and last through the perfection of moral harmony ? As it stands, however, the Endymion is simply a rainbow in the sky of Poetry, interweaving as many hues, as distinct from and yet as melting into one another, as those of the natural arch.

The Hyperion was intended by Keats himself probably to be his "*Opus Magnum*." Shelley says of it—"I consider the fragment of Hyperion as second to nothing that was ever produced by a writer of the same years:" and indeed, considered as presenting us with the image of the *possible*, this is not too strong language to apply to it. It is in fact an awful *torso*—as commanding amid poems, as that is among statues. That we are inevitably reminded by it of Milton's Second Book is indeed to be avowed, but—without the impiety of derogating from that Homeric creation of the English Bard, and without the ingratitude of insinuating defects in that great mirror of the passions—we may say that there are, among numerous signs of vastly inferior powers, some differences, not wholly to the disadvantage of the younger Poet. The physical is in Hyperion more subdued before the spiritual, and the moral takes place of the material. Milton borrows his thoughts from the battle-field of outward War—Keats from the conflict of the many-thoughted, many-passioned soul. In Milton you have a simple sense of the bad defeated and the good triumphant—angels in Heaven and devils in Hell.

Keats unfolds the doctrines of progress and succession. His defeated are not devils, but inferiors—his conquerors are not perfect, but superior. The doctrine of Milton is that Bad and Good have had a fight, that Good sits steady and triumphant on high, singing self-laudatory melodies—that Bad lies uneasily and subduedly below, muttering its spiteful curses. The doctrine of Keats is, that at a certain point the Old has become effete, insufficient, and passes away; and the New, become necessary, succeeds. Milton makes the devils acknowledge in hate and spite the superior power of God and the angels—Keats makes his Titans confess the same superiority in the new Dynasty, but with a recognition of its necessity. Milton rests in the ideas of the received theology as exhibited in the dogma of extremes—of Perfection and the Fall, God and the Devil, Chaos and Creation, Salvation and Perdition. Keats rests on the philosophy of actual things, of all-pervading series and order—of capability and growth—succession and progress—one generation going and another coming, but the earth of inevitable growth and accretion remaining for ever.

In all poetry there is nothing finer than the opening of Hyperion—that it is not sustained should excite no wonder. The image of old Saturn after his defeat by Jupiter and the new Dynasty is unrivalled for its still and awful portraiture:—

“Deep in the shady sadness
Sat grey-haired Saturn, *quiet as a stone*,
Still as the silence round about his lair.”

The air around was still and

“*Where the dead leaf fell, there did it rest.*”

“A stream went voiceless by, still deadened more
By reason of his fallen divinity,
Spreading a shade: the Naiad 'mid her reeds
Press'd her cold finger closer to her lips.
Along the margin-sand large footmarks went,
No further than to where his feet had stray'd,
And slept there since. Upon the sodden ground
His old right hand lay nerveless, listless, dead,
Unscathed; and his realmless eyes were closed;
While his bow'd head seem'd listening to the Earth,
His ancient mother, for some comfort yet.”

The effect of the approach and address of a young Titan-goddess, Thea, on the old God, is described with equal power, but with the appropriately modified tone of a gentler beauty :—

“As when, upon a tranced summer night,
Those green-rob'd senators of mighty woods,
Tall oaks, branch-charmed by the earnest stars,
Dream, and so dream all night without a stir,
Save from one gradual solitary gust
Which comes upon the silence, and dies off,
As if the ebbing air had but one wave ;
So came these words and went.”

Then the description of the recurring silence after this address:—

“One moon, with alteration slow, had shed
Her silver seasons four upon the night,
And still these two were postured motionless
Like natural sculpture in cathedral cavern ;
The frozen God still couchant on the earth,
And the sad Goddess weeping at his feet :
Until at length *old Saturn lifted up*
His faded eyes, and saw his kingdom gone,
And all the gloom and sorrow of the place.”

The Literary Remains will not add much to the fame of the writer of these verses, though something to the illustration of his character. Otho the Great, the Tragedy in Five Acts, which Keats and Mr. Brown composed together, is a stirring piece of action, with half-a-dozen passages in it of Kean-like energy and passion. But the interlocutory is confused and jagged, and (a more serious defect) it is destitute of those episodes of thought, which form so great an adornment in the plays of our greatest Dramatists. Everything bears too directly and barely on the plot. There is none of that allowable discursiveness, which introduces by the way, and as it were under cover of the characters and incidents, ethical matter. It may be safely said Keats has left behind him nothing with less poetry in it. It forms, notwithstanding all these drawbacks from high merit, pleasant reading.

The Cap and Bells is an amusing though unfinished

thing of about ninety stanzas in a species of Faery Beppo School. The Emperor Elfinan has no taste for the society of the ladies of Elf-land, and ventures to flutter round the more solid forms of the daughters of earth. This dissipation is strongly resented by the people and parliament, and the Emperor, to pacify the public clamour, consents to an aerial alliance with a fairy—who, sad to say, has the same unnatural penchant for mortal society, to which her intended lord has so lamentable a leaning.

Among the minor pieces there is nothing sweeter than the Faery song, which Mr. Milnes has with a melancholy significance chosen for the exhibition of Keats's autograph.

“Shed no tear! O shed no tear!
The flower will bloom another year.
Weep no more! O weep no more!
Young buds sleep in the root's white core.
Dry your eyes! Oh! dry your eyes!
For I was taught in Paradise
To ease my breast of melodies.
Shed no tear.”

The present volumes form a most attractive addition to English Biography—we cannot doubt but that they will be greedily read by all lovers of the study of character, certainly by all admirers of Keats. They will invite and recall many readers to his poems. Another collateral result we anticipate with an almost equal pleasure—they will lead many to realize for the first time by their own knowledge the rumour they had heard that we have among us a true poet also in his Biographer. The young spirit of America has seized hold of Mr. Milnes's lyre with a heartiness of admiration which we believe is only a precursor of what he deserves and what assuredly sooner or later awaits him at home.

ART. VI.—SCOTT'S DISCOURSES.

Two Discourses. The Kingdom of the Truth: The Range of Christianity. By A. J. Scott, M.A. London: J. Darling, Clerical Library. 1848.

"To be of no Church is dangerous"—said Johnson oracularly, in allusion to Milton's abstinence from outward communion with any Christian Society. And there is doubtless a sense in which this is true; when such isolation from the religious associations of mankind is an effect of apathy or scepticism. The same course, however, may be dictated by exactly the opposite state of mind, and indicate rather redundancy than defect of faith and love—a faith so earnest and conscientious, that it cannot find entire satisfaction in the doctrines and usages of any one among many sects,—and a love so tender and diffusive, that it discovers something to sympathise with in all. We believe, there are not a few minds, which, if they could shake off from themselves the trammels of existing relations, and were at liberty to form their religious connection anew, would have some difficulty in determining where to cast their lot; for in the combination of elements presented by each Church in turn, they would find some attractive and others repellent to their feelings. The parts which go to make up the organic whole of Christian unity, have been torn asunder, and lie dispersed in the scattered limbs. In each of these we can discern some true life, but life that is defective—the absence of the genuine principle being replaced by what is accidental or extraneous. Yet it requires great vigour and courage of mind, a rare union of qualities, to take an isolated position and pursue a truly independent and self-relying course. It is easy to be eccentric and exclusive; it is difficult to be at once original and wise—true to the impulses of a strongly-developed individuality, and at the same time considerate and reverential for other forms of thought. The mass of men work best in some kind of regulated companionship. They have not enough of inward force and self-discipline, to be safely left to their own unaided and uncontrolled

guidance. Where conscience is not warped or thwarted, and they are open to receive freely all fresh and higher influences—it is within the limits of some prescribed duty, and by the help of a few simple formulas, that they assist most surely and steadily the work of human progress, and diffuse most widely and deeply the silent efficacy of truth. Every one must judge for himself, in which of these two ways he is best able to fulfil the task which God has confided to him. With good men, it is but a diversity of means in compassing the same end. There is room, as there is a call, for labourers of both descriptions. One class rouses and stimulates; the other appropriates and applies. If all belonged to the former, society would be in a process of perpetual disintegration; if all to the latter, it would crystallise into fixedness. Men therefore are always wanted, who will step out from the multitude, and dare to stand alone, and by the attractive force of their own will and affection, draw the floating elements of society into new combinations:—and the demand for such men becomes more pressing, as old beliefs lose their hold of the popular mind, and old formulas become inapplicable to the social energies that once acted through them.

The powerful and richly-endowed mind to which we owe the two discourses on the Kingdom of Truth and the Range of Christianity, has ventured with modest self-reliance to take the bolder of the two courses referred to. Standing aloof from all Sects and Churches, throwing himself on the strength of his own convictions, and full of trust in the guiding influences of a religious spirit—he invites the world in no sectarian guise to come to hear the word of truth that he has to utter: and we understand the call has been responded to with no little interest by hearers of every denominational complexion, from the High Churchman on one hand, to the Unitarian and the simple Theist on the other. The peculiarity of Mr. Scott, as a reformer and a free searcher after truth—a peculiarity that marks significantly his relation to the times—is that there is nothing destructive in his operations—that he takes hold of one or two great positive principles, and setting them forth with singular energy and earnestness, trusts to their certain effect for the final expulsion of such

errors as have grown up around and encrusted the religious heart of humanity.

It will be asked by many, what are his views? In the usual dogmatic sense, it would not be very easy from these Discourses to give a definite reply. There is nothing said of Trinity, Atonement, Humanitarianism, or such like questions. We gather from the tenor of his words, that he regards Christianity, not so much as a dogma to be defined and apprehended by the intellect, as an influence to be imbibed into the affections and the will, and a moral effort to be sustained and carried out, engaging the powers of the entire man. The whole Truth, he argues in his First Discourse, is not to be found in the exclusively intellectual or the exclusively sentimental or the exclusively spiritual man—forms of character which successively arise and predominate in Society,—but in him who under the combined influence of intellect, sentiment, and lofty spiritual feeling, feels that he was born for action, and works out the highest truth in the submission of his active powers to the law of right which exists in him as a primal element of his being and a condition of its healthy development. Christianity, again, in his Second Discourse, he does not treat as an insulated element of humanity, but as an influence that is designed to take possession of the whole of it, and spiritualise all its operations and aims, as well those which relate to the present, as to the heavenly, world. We cannot do more than briefly call attention to these interesting Discourses. Mr. Scott is no ordinary man. There is an unmistakeable impress of originality and earnestness on his words which must command attention and will produce results. His actual position is some guarantee for his sincerity and truthfulness. We shall watch his career with deep interest.

We shall best serve our purpose of calling attention to the important workings of so thoughtful and original a mind, by a few extracts. His style strikes us at first as somewhat wanting in clearness and fluency. It is like the speech of one accustomed to deliver himself *extempore*, in which we miss the running commentary of the voice and look of the speaker. It is heavy-weighted with thought and requires attention ; but it is not obscure.

There is a truth which we have often felt, in the following passage :—

“No doubt there is an inward correspondency between humanity as God means it, and the entire reality of things. No doubt the sense of truth is the experience of this harmony. The answer is so prompt and unhesitating to a great discovery of truth, that it looks like unreasoning haste. The mind opened, as the infant's lungs to the air. Over the naphtha lake the mist seemed to sleep heavily; the torch came, and it was one blaze all over. Its nature was to be food for light. The perfection of this correspondency is the standard for us—is humanity as God means it. But we see how men are perverted from it by their false estimate of their own position towards the truth. They speak of their rights in regard to it, of the freedom of their opinion, but not of its absolute rights over them. They think to work best in a vacuum; not knowing that the weight and compression of obligation and necessity save us from explosion and destruction. They expect to conquer truth, rather than to submit to it. They are moved towards it at best by an attraction, not by duty. And then duty itself is rootless, or does not own its root, when its object is not God. Without Him, there is nothing over us to which we should thus be bound. If the feeling be there, it is the zodiacal light of an unseen sun. And, again, we may stand in need of truth not mainly that we may see, but that we may be and do. The grand obstruction is the dread of committing ourselves to practical results. He who is willing to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine. No doubt this principle has been grossly caricatured by those who hold that all infidelity is a cloak for vicious indulgence; but he would be strangely self-ignorant who thought himself prepared for all self-sacrifice to truth, because he was not drawn away by sensuality or avarice. Doubtless to be brought to this unconditional surrender is the result of that hearing and learning from the Father, of which the Founder of this Kingdom saith, that it brings men to Himself. The truth by which a man lives, becomes to him more and more a truth.”—Pp. 19-21.

The following sentiment flows from an original mind, and is finely expressed :—

“What is art? It is first nature. The Creator is the first artist. Some nations have called their poets Finders. The countenance of the true poet, while at work, is that of one listening or receiving. Analysis gives us laws, science. A childlike singleness takes in those single impressions from woods, seas, flowers, skies, which make us know what is beauty, sublimity; how gloom and tenderness, gaiety

and earnest depth, pass over the face of the world as over a human face. Men dwell much on the adaptations that express a purpose of the Creator, and too much overlook this adaptation ; though the analogy between the arrangement in nature and the contrivances of man, what we call design, is no better ascertained, does not prevail more widely, does not indicate a supreme living presence more mightily, than the correspondence between the poetic sense in man, and the language addressed to it by the universe around him. As the Supreme Spirit utters itself in the forms of reality, the human spirit would embody its activity in imitative forms. As Science turns matter to intelligent mind, Art turns spirit into form. It is life, in another way, at its constant work of assimilating, appropriating the outward in order to assert itself. Where there is the most, and of the highest and purest kind of life embodied, art is nearest nature : it is man's joyful answer, or echo, of the Supreme Artist. Every fragment of truth in art is a snatch caught up of man's part in the choral harmony, whose burden is, 'the Lord reigneth, let the earth be glad ;' or an oppressed longing after it : which part, when a man shall have fully learned, when he shall take the lead in this rejoicing, shall he not hear all round him, that 'the mountains and the hills break forth into singing, and that all the trees of the forest clap their hands ?' Perhaps, were those anticipations realized, of which we spoke in the words of him who saw the Apocalypse, were God indeed all in all, his name hallowed, his kingdom come, his will done on earth as it is done in heaven, that name might be too all-pervading an element of life and thought to be often mentioned. That the parents speak often to the children of the affection and respect due from them, or the children to the parents, is a proof rather of duty striving to gain its ground from without, than of the law of the spirit of life. Were God felt in all, then created forms in their variety would be cherished as his utterances and used as our utterances of Him and to Him ; and the mystery of music would be solved ; and the composition and poesy of all things would be both his voice to us, and ours to Him. Where nothing of this is felt, even now, there is no art : where it is subordinated to meaner ends, it is idolatrous, and will more and more become false. But all this lowers not at all the vocation of that quintessence of all knowledge, as the philosopher himself has called it."—Pp. 42-45.

With one other extract we must conclude, which will show, that the poetical element largely mingles in the composition of Mr. Scott's mind.

"And, indeed, is it not so, that to combine time and eternity, heaven and earth, is the highest task, of the most difficult, and accordingly of the most precious, accomplishment here appointed to

man? The worldly man satisfies himself with the materials and the ends of time: the enthusiast is stunned and absorbed by the contemplation of things eternal, forgetting that his lot and his work are cast in time, though with a light of eternity upon them: the vulgar man wavers between the one and the other: the complete man aims to bring down heaven and eternity into earthly objects and occupations, or rather finds them there, in their full dignity and importance, forbidding temporal things to be mean or trivial. So, in the scenery of man's actual habitation, all that is most exquisite in beauty and delicacy and sublimity, is a mingling of earth and heaven; the moon burning through the boughs of a wood: the dark tracery of the mountain-ash or the birch-tree seen against the amber sky of sunset: the pale Alpine summit that seems to bear more affinity to the pure element into which it aspires, than to the green turf or the rude rocks that lie beneath:—all these speak to us of this world transfigured and glorified—of the world above substantiated and made ours, by their mutual blending.”—Pp. 47-48.

END OF FOURTH VOLUME.



